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Preface
The publication of this book is in large part due to the role of Canada's Inter-
national Development Research Center (IDRC) in encouraging policy-relevant
research in the fields of poverty and equity. The book has in particular benefit-
ted much from IDRC's support of two significant ventures, the Micro Impacts
of Macro Economic and Adjustment Programs (MIMAP) and the Poverty and
Economic Policy (PEP) international research network. We are most grateful
to the IDRC for their continued and inspiring dedication, professionalism and
vision in the field of development research. The Secretariat d'appui institution-
nel a la recherche e'conomique en Afrique (SISERA), the World Bank Institute
and the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) have also partially
supported to the production of this book. The fundamental research was fur-
ther financed by grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada (SSHRC) and from the Fonds Quebecois de Recherche sur
la Socie'te' et la Culture (FQRSC) of the Province of Quebec.
This book is mostly targeted to senior undergraduate and graduate students
in economics as well as to researchers and analytical policy makers. More gen-
erally, it is intended for social scientists and statisticians. Some of its content
can also be instructive to less specialized readers, such as those in the general
public wishing to introduce themselves to the challenges posed and the insights
generated by distributive analysis.
The book covers a relatively wide range of material. Part I deals with some
of the conceptual, methodological and empirical issues and difficulties that
arise in the assessment of well-being and poverty. Part II presents a number
of measures on poverty, inequality, social welfare, and vertical and horizon-
tal equity. Part III considers some of the methods that can establish whether
a distribution of well-being or a policy "dominates" another in terms of some
generally-defined ethical criteria. Part IV develops tools that can be used to
understand and predict how targeting, price changes, growth and fiscal policy
can affect poverty and equity. Part V introduces some of the statistical tech-
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niques that can help depict the distribution of living standards and help protect
against the presence of sampling errors in making poverty and equity com-
parisons. Part V also introduces DAD and shows how that software can be
used to apply the book's measurement and statistical techniques to micro data.
Part VI contains a number of exercises (with illustrative datasets) that can be
used to learn to implement some of the measurement and statistical techniques
described in the book.
We certainly cannot pretend the book to be a comprehensive survey of the
methods used to analyze poverty and equity. There is an obvious tendency for
an author's exposition of a subject to be biased in favor of the work he knows
best—and thus in favor of the work most closely related to his own work. This
book is a clear example of this bias. One advantage of such a bias, however,
is that it tends to unify the exposition. Such a unification, we have tried to
enforce as much as we could throughout the various parts of the book. This
helped present in a single text a unified treatment of distributive analysis from
a conceptual, methodological, policy, statistical and practical point of view.
Most of the book's footnotes refer to applications programmed in DAD.
These footnotes can thus guide the reader to where to go in DAD to test and
implement many of the measurement and statistical tools exposed in the book.
In the margins appear the exercise numbers which can be used to learn more
about the book's tools. Most of these exercises involve the use of DAD. The
solutions to the exercises can be found on DAD's official web page,
www.mimap.ecn.ulaval.ca.
The illustrative datasets used are briefly described at the end of the exercises.
An index of the symbols used can be found starting on page 376. An author
and a subject index are also provided at the end of the book.
To ease exposition within the main text, we endeavored to limit as much
possible references to the literature, except when such references were clearly
improving readability. Instead, each chapter is followed by a reference section
in which the chapter's appropriate bibliographic references are mentioned and
linked to each other.
This book and the accompanying software are certainly perfectible. I sup-
pose it is the plight of all book writers to feel that their product is never satis-
factorily finished. We hope to correct some of this version's shortcomings in
future editions. For this, any comments on this first edition will be gratefully
received.
I wish to thank my co-authors and former students, Sami Bibi, Philippe
Gregoire, Vincent Jalbert, Paul Makdissi and Martin Tabi for their insights and
dedication. I am also very grateful to my co-authors on distributive analy-
sis papers — Russell Davidson, Damien Echevin, Carl Fortin, Peter Lambert,
Magda Mercader, David Sahn, Steve Younger and Quentin Wodon — for their
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friendship and fruitful collaboration. Work at Universitd Laval was made pro-
ductive and particularly enjoyable by the encouragement of my colleagues —
among whom Bernard Decaluwd and Bernard Fortin feature prominently as
former heads of CREFA — and more generally by the support of the Depart-
ment of Economics and CIRPEE (formerly CREFA). My thanks also extend to
MIMAP and PEP co-workers, inter alia Touhami Abdelkhalek, Louis-Marie
Asselin, Dorothee Boccanfuso, John Cockburn, Anyck Dauphin, Yazid Dis-
sou, Samuel Kabore', Jean Bosco Ki, Marie-Claude Martin, Damien Mededji,
Abena Oduro, Luc Savard, Randy Spence, and to the teams of IDRC and
AERC administrators and researchers with whom we have had the pleasure
and privilege to work in the last decade. They provided much of the motiva-
tion and inspiration for writing this book. I am also grateful to my co-author,
Abdelkrim Araar, for the trust and dedication he put into building DAD and
this book's material over the last years, despite the uncertainty that initially
clouded the project. I finally wish to thank Bill Carman of IDRC and Marilea
Polk Fried of Springer-Kluwer for their efforts in bringing the publication of
this book to full completion.
JEAN-YVES DUCLOS
Developing the DAD software, conducting fundamental research in distribu-
tive analysis and assisting researchers in developed countries have been my
main activities for the last several years. The expertise that I have acquired in
distributive analysis is the result of the continued support that I have received
from Jean-Yves Duclos, who was also the director of my Ph.D. thesis. I am
also grateful to all the researchers with whom I have worked for their collabo-
ration and assistance.
ARAAR ABDELKRIM
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PART I
CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGI-
CAL ISSUES
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Chapter 1
WELL-BEING AND POVERTY
The assessment of well-being for poverty analysis is traditionally character-
ized according to two main approaches, which, following Ravallion (1994), we
will term the welfarist and the non-welfarist approaches. The first approach
tends to concentrate in practice mainly on comparisons of "economic well-
being", which we will also call "standard of living" or "income" (for short). As
we will see, this approach has strong links with traditional economic theory,
and it is also widely used by economists in the operations and research work of
organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and
Ministries of Finance and Planning of both developed and developing coun-
tries. The second approach has historically been advocated mainly by social
scientists other than economists and partly in reaction to the first approach.
This second approach has nevertheless also been recently and increasingly ad-
vocated by economists and non-economists alike as a multidimensional com-
plement to the unidimensional standard of living approach.
1.1 The welfarist approach
The welfarist approach is strongly anchored in classical micro-economics,
where, in the language of economics, "welfare" or "utility" are generally key in
accounting for the behavior and the well-being of individuals. Classical micro-
economics usually postulates that individuals are rational and that they can be
presumed to be the best judges of the sort of life and activities which max-
imize their utility and happiness. Given their initial endowments (including
time, land, and physical, financial and human capital), individuals make pro-
duction and consumption choices using their set of preferences over bundles
of consumption and production activities, and taking into account the avail-
able production technology and the consumer and producer prices that prevail
in the economy.
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Under these assumptions and constraints, a process of individual and ra-
tional free choice will maximize the individuals' utility; under additional as-
sumptions (including that markets are competitive, that agents have perfect
information, and that there are no externalities — assumptions that are thus
restrictive), a society of individuals all acting independently under this free-
dom of choice process will also lead to an outcome known as Pareto -efficient,
in that no one's utility could be further improved by government intervention
without decreasing someone else's utility.
Underlying the welfarist approach to poverty, there is a premise that good
note should be taken of the information revealed by individual behavior when
it comes to assessing poverty. More precisely, the assessment of someone's
well-being should be consistent with the ordering of preferences revealed by
that person's free choices. For instance, a person could be observed to be poor
by the total consumption or income standard of a poverty analyst. That same
person could nevertheless be able (i.e., have the working capacity) to be non-
poor. This could be revealed by the observation of a deliberate and free choice
on the part of the individual to work and consume little, when the capability
to work and consume more nevertheless exists. By choosing to spend little
(possibly for the benefit of greater leisure), the person reveals that he is happier
than if he worked and spent more. Although he could be considered poor
by the standard of a (non-welfarist) poverty analyst, a comprehensive utility
judgement would conclude that this person is not poor. As we will discuss
later, this can have important implications for the design and the assessment of
public policy.
A pure welfarist approach faces important practical problems. To be op-
erational, pure welfarism requires the observation of sufficiently informative
revealed preferences. For instance, for someone to be declared poor or not
poor, it is not enough to know that person's current characteristics and income
status: it must also be inferred from that person's actions whether he judges
his utility status to be above a certain poverty utility level.
A related problem with the pure welfarist approach is the need to assess lev-
els of utility or "psychic happiness". How are we to measure the actual pleasure
derived from experiencing economic well-being? Moreover, it is highly prob-
lematic to attempt to compare that level of utility across individuals — it is well
known that such a procedure poses serious ethical difficulties, preferences are
heterogeneous, personal characteristics, needs and enjoyment abilities are di-
verse, households differ in size and composition, and prices vary across time
and space. More generally, because economic well-being (in particular, utility)
is typically seen as a subjective concept, most economists believe that interper-
sonal comparisons of economic well-being do not make much sense.
Supposing that these criticisms are resolved, the welfarist approach would
classify as poor an individual who is materially well-off but not content, and
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as not poor an individual materially deprived but nevertheless content. It is
not clear that we should accept as ethically significant such individual feelings
of utilities. Said differently, why should a difficult-to-satisfy rich person be
judged less well-off than an easily-contented poor person? Or, in the words of
Sen (1983), p. 160, why should a "grumbling rich" be judged "poorer" than a
"contented peasant"?
Hence, welfarist comparisons of poverty almost invariably use imperfect
but objectively observable proxies for utilities, such as income or consump-
tion. The "working" definition of poverty for the welfarist approach is there-
fore a lack of command over commodities, measured by low income or con-
sumption. These money-metric indicators are often adjusted for differences in
needs, prices, and household sizes and compositions, but they clearly represent
far-from-perfect indicators of utility and well-being. Indeed, economic theory
tells us little about how to use consumption or income to make consistent in-
terpersonal comparisons of well-being. Besides, the consumption and income
proxies are rarely able to take full account of the role for well-being of public
goods and non-market commodities, such as safety, liberty, peace, health. In
principle, such commodities can be valued using reference or "shadow" prices.
In practice, this is difficult to do accurately and consistently.
1.2 Non-welfarist approaches
1.2.1 Basic needs and functionings
There are two major non-welfarist approaches, the basic-needs approach
and the capability approach. The first focuses on the need to attain some ba-
sic multidimensional outcomes that can be observed and monitored relatively
easily. These outcomes are usually (explicitly or implicitly) linked with the
concept of functionings, a concept largely developed in Amartya Sen's influ-
ential work:
Living may be seen as consisting of a set of interrelated 'functionings', consisting of
beings and doings. A person's achievement in this respect can be seen as the vector of
his or her functionings. The relevant functionings can vary from such elementary things
as being adequately nourished, being in good health, avoiding escapable morbidity and
premature mortality, etc., to more complex achievements such as being happy, having
self-respect, taking part in the life of the community, and so on (Sen 1992, p.39).
In this view, functionings can be understood to be constitutive elements of
well-being. One lives well if he enjoys a sufficiently large level of function-
ings. The functioning approach would generally not attempt to compress these
multidimensional elements into a single dimension such as utility or happiness.
Utility or happiness is viewed as a reductive aggregate of functionings, which
are multidimensional in nature. The functioning approach usually focuses
instead on the attainment of multiple specific and separate outcomes, such as
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the enjoyment of a particular type of commodity consumption, being healthy,
literate, well-clothed, well-housed, socially empowered, etc..
The functioning approach is closely linked to the well-known basic needs
approach, and the two are often difficult to distinguish in practice. Function-
ings, however, are not synonymous with basic needs. Basic needs can be under-
stood as the physical inputs that are usually required for individuals to achieve
functionings. Hence, basic needs are usually defined in terms of means rather
than outcomes, for instance, as living in the proximity of providers of health
care services (but not necessarily being in good health), as the number of years
of achieved schooling (but not necessarily being literate), as living in a democ-
racy (but not necessarily participating in the life of the community), and so on.
In other words,
Basic needs may be interpreted in terms of minimum specified quantities of such things
as food, shelter, water and sanitation that are necessary to prevent ill health, undernour-
ishment and the like (Streeten, Burki, Ul Haq, Hicks, and Stewart 1981).
Unlike functionings, which can be commonly defined for all individuals, the
specification of basic needs depends on the characteristics of individuals and
of the societies in which they live. For instance, the basic commodities required
for someone to be in good health and not to be undernourished will depend on
the climate and on the physiological characteristics of individuals. Similarly,
the clothes necessary for one not to feel ashamed will depend on the norms of
the society in which he lives, and the means necessary to travel, on whether he
is handicapped or not. Hence, although the fulfillment of basic needs is an im-
portant element in assessing whether someone has achieved some functionings,
this assessment must also use information on one's characteristics and socio-
economic environment. Human diversity is such that equality in the space of
basic needs generally translates into inequality in the space in functionings.
Whether unidimensional or multidimensional in nature, most applications
of both the welfarist and the non-welfarist approaches to poverty measurement
do recognize the role of heterogeneity in characteristics and in socio-economic
environments in achieving well-being. Streeten, Burki, Ul Haq, Hicks, and
Stewart (1981) and others have nevertheless argued that the basic needs ap-
proach is less abstract than the welfarist approach in recognizing that role.
Indeed, as mentioned above, assessing the fulfillment of basic needs can be
seen as a useful practical and operational step towards appraising the achieve-
ment of the more abstract "functionings".
Clearly, however, there are important degrees in the multidimensional
achievements of basic needs and functionings. For instance, what does it
mean precisely to be "adequately nourished"? Which degree of nutritional
adequacy is relevant for poverty assessment? Should the means needed for
adequate nutritional functioning only allow for the simplest possible diet and
for highest nutritional efficiency? These problems also crop up in the estima-
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tion of poverty lines in the welfarist approach. A multidimensional approach
extends them to several dimensions.
In addition, how ought we to understand such functionings as the function-
ing of self-respect? The appropriate width and depth of the concept of basic
needs and functionings is admittedly ambiguous, as there are degrees of func-
tionings which make life enjoyable in addition to making it purely sustainable
or satisfactory. Furthermore, could some of the dimensions be substitutes in
the attainment of a given degree of well-being? That is, could it be that one
could do with lower needs and functionings in some dimensions if he has high
achievements in the other dimensions? Such possibilities of substitutability
are generally ignored (and are indeed hard to specify precisely) in the multi-
dimensional non-welfarist approaches.
1.2.2 Capabilities
A second alternative to the welfarist approach is called the capability ap-
proach, also pioneered and advocated in the last three decades by the work of
Sen. The capability approach is defined by the capacity to achieve function-
ings, as defined above. In Sen (1992)'s words,
the capability to function represents the various combinations of functionings (beings
and doings) that the person can achieve. Capability is, thus, a set of vectors of func-
tionings, reflecting the person's freedom to lead one type of life or another, (p.40)
What matters for the capability approach is the ability of an individual to func-
tion well in society; it is not the functionings actually achieved by the person
per se. Having the capability to achieve "basic" functionings is the source of
freedom to live well, and is thereby sufficient in the capability approach for
one not to be poor or deprived.
The capability approach thus distances itself from achievements of specific
outcomes or functionings. In this, it imparts considerable value to freedom of
choice: a person will not be judged poor even if he chooses not to achieve some
functionings, so long as he would be able to achieve them if he so chose. This
distinction between outcomes and the capability to achieve these outcomes
also recognizes the importance of preference diversity and individuality in de-
termining functioning choices. It is, for instance, not everyone's wish to be
well-clothed or to participate in society, even if the capability is present.
An interesting example of the distinction between fulfilment of basic needs,
functioning achievement and capability is given in Townsend (1979)'s (Ta-
ble 6.3) deprivation index. This deprivation index is built from answers to
questions such as whether someone "has not had an afternoon or evening out
for entertainment in the last two weeks", or "has not had a cooked breakfast
most days of the week". It may be, however, that one chooses deliberately not
to have time out for entertainment (he prefers to watch television), or that he
chooses not to have a cooked breakfast (he does not want to spend the time to
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prepare it), although he does have the capacity to have both. That person there-
fore achieves the functioning of being entertained without meeting the basic
need of going out once a fortnight, and he does have the capacity to achieve
the functioning of having a cooked breakfast, although he chooses not to have
one.
The difference between the capability and the functioning/basic needs ap-
proaches is in fact somewhat analogous to the difference between the use of
income and consumption as indicators of living standards. Income shows the
capability to consume, and " consumption functioning" can be understood as
the outcome of the exercise of that capability. There is consumption only if
a person chooses to enact his capacity to consume a given income. In the ba-
sic needs and functioning approach, deprivation conies from a lack of direct
consumption or functioning experience; in the capability approach, poverty
arises from the lack of incomes and capabilities, which are imperfectly related
to the functionings actually achieved.
Although the capability set is multidimensional, it thus exhibits a parallel
with the unidimensional income indicator, whose size determines the size of
the "budget set":
Just as the so-called 'budget set' in the commodity space represents a person's freedom
to buy commodity bundles, the 'capability set' in the functioning space reflects the
person's freedom to choose from possible livings (Sen 1992, p. 40).
This shows further the fundamental distinction between the extents of free-
doms and capabilities, the space of achievements, and the resources required
to generate these freedoms and to attain these achievements.
1.3 A graphical illustration
To illustrate the relationships between the main approaches to assessing
poverty, consider Figure 1.1. Figure 1.1 shows in four quadrants the links
between income, consumption of two goods — transportation T and clothing
C goods — and the functionings associated to the consumption of each of
these two goods. The northeast quadrant shows a typical budget set for the
two goods and for a budget constraint Yl. The curve Ul shows the utility in-
difference curve along which the consumer chooses his preferred commodity
bundle, which is here located at point A.
The northwestern and the southeastern quadrants then transform the con-
sumption of goods T and C into associated functionings FT and FC- This
is done through the functioning Transformation Curves TCr and TCc, for
transformation of consumption of T and C into transportation and clothing
functionings, respectively. The curves TGr and TCc appear respectively in
the northwest and the southeast quadrants respectively. These curves thus bring
us from the northeastern space of commodities, {C, T}, into the southwestern
space of functionings, {Fc, FT}- Using these transformation functions, we
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can draw a budget constraint SI in the space of functionings using the tradi-
tional commodity budget constraint, Yl. Since the consumer chooses point A
in the space of commodities, he enjoys B's combination of functionings. But
all of the functionings within the constraint SI can also be attained by the con-
sumer. The triangular area between the origin and the line SI thus represents
the individual's capability set. It is the set of functionings which he is able to
achieve.
Now assume that functioning thresholds of zc and ZT must be exceeded (or
must be potentially exceeded) for one not to be considered poor by non- wel-
farist analysts. Given the transformation functions TCr and TCp, a budget
constraint Yl makes the individual capable of not being poor in the func-
tioning space. But this does not guarantee that the individual will choose a
combination of functionings that will exceed zc and ZT'. this also depends on
the individual's preferences. At point A, the functionings achieved are above
the minimum functioning thresholds fixed in each dimension. Other points
within the capability set would also surpass the functioning thresholds: these
points are shown in the shaded triangle to the northeast of point B. Since part
of the capability set allows the individual to be non-poor in the space of func-
tionings, the capability approach would also declare the individual not to be
poor.
So would conclude, too, the functioning approach since the individual
chooses functionings above zc and ZT. Such a concordance between the two
approaches does not always prevail, however. To see this, consider Figure 1.2.
The commodity budget set and the functioning Transformation Curves have
not changed, so that the capability set has not changed either. But there has a
been a shift of preferences from Ul to U2, so that the individual now prefers
point D to point A, and also prefers to consume less clothing than before. This
makes his preferences for functionings to be located at point E, thus failing
to exceed the minimum clothing functioning zc required. Hence, the person
would be considered non-poor by the capability approach, but poor by the
functioning approach. Whether an individual with preferences U2 is really
poorer than one with preferences Ul is debatable, of course, since the two
have exactly the same "opportunity sets", that is, have access to exactly the
same commodity and capability sets.
An important allowance in the capability approach is that two persons with
the same commodity budget set can face different capability sets. This is il-
lustrated in Figure 1.3, where the functioning Transformation Curve for trans-
portation has shifted from TCr to TCT. This may due to the presence of a
handicap, which makes it more costly in transportation expenses to generate
a given level of transportation functioning (disabled persons would need to
expend more to go from one place to another). This shift of the TCr curve
moves the capability constraint to SI' and thus contracts the capability set.
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Figure 1.1: Capabilities, achievements and consumption
Figure 1.2: Capabilities and achievements under varying preferences
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With the handicap, there is no point within the new capability set that would
surpass both functioning thresholds zc and ZT- Hence, the person is deemed
poor by the capability approach and (necessarily so) by the functioning ap-
proach. Whether the welfarist approach would also declare the person to be
poor would depend on whether it takes into account the differences in needs
implied by the difference between the TCr and the TC'T curves.
For the welfarist approach to be reasonably consistent with the functioning
and capability approaches, it is thus essential to consider the role of transfor-
mation functions such as the TC curves. If this is done, we may (in our simple
illustration at least) assess a person's capability status either in the commodity
or in the functioning space.
To see this, consider Figure 1.4. Figure 1.4 is the same as Figure 1.1 ex-
cept for the addition of the commodity budget constraint Y2 which shows the
minimum consumption level needed for one not to be poor according to the
capability approach. According to the capability approach, the capability set
must contain at least one combination of functionings above zc and ZT, and
this condition is just met by the capability constraint S2 that is associated with
the commodity budget Y2. Hence, to know whether someone is poor accord-
ing to the capability approach, we may simply check whether his commodity
budget constraint lies below Y2.
Even if the actual commodity budget constraint lies above Y2, the indi-
vidual may well choose a point outside the non-poor functioning set, as we
discussed above in the context of Figure 1.2. Clearly then, the minimum to-
tal consumption needed for one to be non-poor according to the functioning
or basic needs approach generally exceeds the minimum total consumption
needed for one to be non poor according to the capability approach. More
problematically, this minimum total consumption depends in principle on the
preferences of the individuals. On Figure 1.2, for instance, we saw that the
individual with preference U2 was considered poor by the functioning ap-
proach, although another individual with the same budget and capability sets
but with preferences Ul was considered non-poor by the same approach.
1.3.1 Exercises
1 Show on a figure such as Figure 1.1 the impact of an increase in the price
of the transportation commodity on the commodity budget constraint and
on the capability constraint.
2 On a figure such as Figure 1.4, show the minimal commodity budget set
that ensures that the person
(a) is just able to attain one of the two minimum levels of functionings zc
or ZT;
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(b) chooses a combination of functionings such that one of them exceeds
the corresponding minimum level of functionings zc or ZT',
(c) is just able to attain both minimum levels of functionings zc and ZT',
(d) chooses a combination of functionings such that both exceed the corre-
sponding minimum level of functionings zc and ZT-
(e) How do these four minimal commodity budget constraints compare to
each other? Which one corresponds to the different approaches to as-
sessing poverty seen above?
1.4 Practical measurement difficulties for the
non-welfarist approaches
The measurement of capabilities raises various problems. Unless a person
chooses to enact them in the form of functioning achievements, capabilities
are not easily inferred. Achievement of all basic functionings implies non-
deprivation in the space of all capabilities; but a failure to achieve all basic
functionings does not imply capability deprivation. This makes the monitor-
ing of functioning and basic needs an imperfect tool for the assessment of
capability deprivation.
Besides, and as for basic needs, there are clearly degrees of capabilities,
some basic and some deeper. It would seem improbable that true well-being
be a discontinuous function of achievements and capabilities. For most of the
functionings assessed empirically, there are indeed degrees of achievements,
such as for being healthy, literate, living without shame, etc... It would seem
important to think of varying degrees of well-being in assessing and comparing
achievements and capabilities, and not only to record dichotomic 0/1 answers
to multidimensional qualitative criteria.
The multidimensional nature of the non-welfarist approaches also raises
problems of comparability across dimensions. How should we assess ade-
quately the well-being of someone who has the capability to achieve two
functionings out of three, but not the third? Is that person necessarily "better
off than someone who can achieve only one, or even none of them? Are all
capabilities of equal importance when we assess well-being?
The multidimensionality of the non-welfarist criteria also translates into
greater implementation difficulties than for the usual proxy indicators of the
welfarist approach. In the welfarist approach, the size of the multidimensional
budget set is ordinarily summarized by income or total consumption, which
can be thought of as a unidimensional indicator of freedom. Although there
are many different combinations of consumption and functionings that are
compatible with a unidimensional money-metric poverty threshold, the wel-
farist approach will generally not impose multidimensional thresholds. For
instance, the welfarist approach will usually not require for one not to be poor
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that both food and non-food expenditures be larger than their respective food
and non-food poverty lines. A similar transformation into a unidimensional
indicator is more difficult with the capability and basic needs approaches.
One possible solution to this comparability problem is to use "efficiency-
income units reflecting command over capabilities rather than command over
goods and services" (Sen 1985, p.343), as we illustrated above when discussing
Figure 1.4. This, however, is practically difficult to do, since command over
many capabilities is hard to translate in terms of a single indicator, and since
the "budget units" are hardly comparable across functionings such as well-
nourishment, literacy, feeling self-respect, and taking part in the life of the
community. On Figure 1.4, anyone with an income below Y2 would be judged
capability-poor. But by how much does poverty vary among these capability-
poor? A natural measure would be a function of the budget constraint. It is
more difficult to make such measurements and comparisons within the non-
money-metric capability set.
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Figure 1.3: Capability sets and achievement failures
Figure 1.4: Minimum consumption needed to escape capability poverty
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1.5 Poverty measurement and public policy
1.5.1 Poverty measurement matters
The measurement of well-being and poverty plays a central role in the dis-
cussion of public policy. It is used, among other things, to identify the poor
and the non-poor, to design optimal poverty targeting schemes, to estimate the
errors of exclusion and inclusion in the targeting set (also known as Type I
and Type II errors), and to assess the equity of poverty alleviation policies. Is
growth " pro-poor"? How do indirect taxes and relative price changes affect
the poor? What should the target groups be for socially-improving government
interventions? What impact do transfers have on poverty? Is it the poorest of
the poor who benefit most from public policy?
An important example of the central role of poverty measurement in the set-
ting of public policy is the optimal selection of safety net targeting indicators.
The theory of optimal targeting suggests that it will commonly be best to target
individuals on the basis of indicators that are as easily observable and as ex-
ogenous as possible, while being as correlated as possible with the true poverty
status of the individuals. Indicators that are not readily observable by program
administrators are of little practical value. Indicators that can be changed ef-
fortlessly by individuals will be distorted by the presence of the program, and
will lose their poverty-informative value. Whether easily observable and suffi-
ciently exogenous indicators are sufficiently correlated with the deprivation of
individuals in a population is given by a poverty profile. The value of this pro-
file will naturally be highly dependent on the approach used and the particular
assumptions made to measure well-being and poverty.
Estimation of inclusion and exclusion errors is also a product of poverty
profiling and measurement. These errors are central in the trade-off involved
in choosing between a wide coverage of the population — at relatively low
administrative and efficiency costs — and a narrower coverage — with more
generous support for the fewer beneficiaries. Indeed, as van de Walle (1998a)
puts it, a narrower coverage of the population, with presumably smaller er-
rors of inclusion of the non-poor, does not inevitably lead to a more equitable
treatment of the poor:
Concentrating solely on errors of leakage to the non-poor can lead to policies which
have weak coverage of the poor (p.366).
The terms of this trade-off are again given by a poverty assessment exercise.
Another lesson of optimal redistribution theory is that it is usually better
to transfer resources from groups with a high level of average well-being to
those with a lower one. What matters more, however, is the distribution of
well-being within each of the groups. For instance, equalizing mean well-
being across groups does not ordinarily eliminate poverty since there generally
exist within-group inequalities. Even within the richer group, for instance,
16 POVERTY AND EQUITY
there normally will be found some deprived individuals, whom a rich-to-poor
cross-group redistributive process would clearly not take out of poverty. The
within- and between-group distribution of well-being that is required for devis-
ing an optimal redistributive scheme can again be revealed by a comprehensive
poverty profile.
1.5.2 Welfarist and non-welfarist policy
implications
The distinction between the welfarist and non-welfarist approaches to pover-
ty measurement often matters (implicitly or explicitly) for the assessment and
the design of public policy. As described above, a welfarist approach holds
that individuals are the best judges of their own well-being. It would thus in
principle avoid making appraisals of well-being that conflict with the poor's
views of their own situation. A typical example of a welfarist public policy
would be the provision of adequate income-generating opportunities, letting
individuals decide and reveal whether these opportunities are utility maximiz-
ing, keeping in mind the other non-income-generating opportunities that are
available to them.
A non-welfarist policy analyst would argue, however, that providing income
opportunities is not necessarily the best policy option. This is partly because
individuals are not necessarily best left to their own resolutions, at least in
an intertemporal setting, regarding educational and environmental choices for
example. The poor's short-run preoccupations may, for instance, harm their
long-term self-interest. Individuals may choose not to attend skill-enhancing
programs because they deceivingly appear overly time costly in the short-run,
and because they are not sufficiently aware or convinced of their long-term
benefits. Besides, if left to themselves, the poor will not necessarily spend their
income increase on functionings that basic-needs analysts would normally con-
sider a priority, such as good nutrition and health.
Thus, fulfilling "basic needs" cannot be satisfied only by the generation of
private income, but may require significant amounts of targeted and in-kind
public expenditures on areas such as education, public health and the environ-
ment. This would be so even (and especially) if the poor did not presently
believe that these areas were deserving of public expenditures. Furthermore,
social cohesion concerns are arguably not well addressed by the maximiza-
tion of private utility, and raising income opportunities will not fundamentally
solve problems caused by adverse intra-household distributions of well-being,
for instance.
An objection to the basic needs approach is that it is clearly paternalistic
since it supposes that it must be in the absolute interests of all to meet a set of
often arbitrarily specified needs. Indeed, as emphasized above, non-welfarist
approaches generally use criteria for identifying and helping the poor that may
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conflict both with the poor's preferences and with their utility maximizing
choices. The welfarist school conversely emphasizes that individuals are gen-
erally better placed to judge what is good for them. For instance,
To conclude that a person was not capable of living a long life we must know more
than just how long she lived: perhaps she preferred a short but merry life. (Lipton and
Ravallion 1995)
To force that person to live a long but boring life might thus go against her
preferences.
For poverty alleviation purposes, the prescriptions of non-welfarist approa-
ches could in principle go as far as, for instance, enforced enrolment in commu-
nity development programs, forced migration, or forced family planning. This
may not only conflict with the preferences of the poor, but would also clearly
undermine their freedom to choose. Freedom to choose is, however, arguably
one of the most important basic capabilities that contribute fundamentally to
well-being.
A further example of the possible tension between the welfarist and non-
welfarist influences on public policy comes from optimal taxation theory, which
is linked to the theory of optimal poverty alleviation. In the tradition of classi-
cal microeconomics, which values leisure in the production and labor market
decisions of individuals, pure welfarists would incorporate the utility of leisure
in the overall utility function of workers, poor and non-poor alike. In its sup-
port to the poor, the government would then take care of minimizing the distor-
tion of their labor/leisure choices so as not to create overly high "deadweight
losses". Classical optimal taxation theory then shows that being concerned
with such things as labor/leisure distortions implies a generally lower benefit
reduction rates on the income of the poor than otherwise. Taking into account
such abstract things as "deadweight losses" is, however, less typical of the
basic needs and functioning approaches. Such approaches would, therefore,
usually target program benefits more sharply on the poor, and would exact
steeper benefit reduction rates as income or well-being increases.
Relative to the pure welfarist approach, non-welfarist approaches are also
typically less reluctant to impose utility-decreasing (or "workfare") costs as
side effects of participation in poverty alleviation schemes. These side effects
are in fact often observed in practice. For instance, it is well-known that income
support programs frequently impose participation costs on benefit claimants.
These are typically non-monetary costs. Such costs can be both physical and
psychological: providing manual labor, spending time away from home, sacri-
ficing leisure and home production, finding information about application and
eligibility conditions, corresponding and dealing with the benefit agency, queu-
ing, keeping appointments, complying with application conditions, revealing
personal information, feeling "stigma" or a sense of guilt, etc...
18 PO VERTY A ND EQ UITY
Although non-monetary, these costs impact on participants' net utility from
participating in the programs. When they are negatively correlated with un-
observed (or difficult to observe) entitlement indicators, they can provide self-
selection mechanisms that enhance the efficiency of poverty alleviation pro-
grams, for welfarists and non-welfarists alike. One unfortunate effect of these
costs is, however, that many truly-entitled and truly deserving individuals may
shy away from the programs because of the costs they impose. Although pro-
gram participation could raise their income and consumption above a money-
metric poverty line, some individuals will prefer not to participate, revealing
that they find apparent poverty utility greater than that of program participa-
tion. Welfarists would in principle take these costs into account when assess-
ing the merits of the programs. Non-welfarists would usually not do so, and
would therefore judge such programs more favorably.
Finally, the width of the definition of functionings is also important for the
design and the assessment of public policy. For instance, public spending on
education is often promoted on the basis of its impact on future productivity
and growth. But education can also be seen as a means to attain the func-
tioning of literacy and participation in the community. This then provides an
additional support for public expenditures on education. Analogous arguments
also apply, for instance, to public expenditures on health, transportation, and
the environment.
Chapter 2
THE EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT OF
WELL-BEING
The empirical assessment of poverty and equity is customarily carried out
using data on households and individuals. These data can be administrative
(i.e., stored in government files and records), they can come from censuses of
the entire population, or (most commonly) they can be generated by proba-
bilistic surveys on the socio-demographic characteristics and living conditions
of a population of households or individuals. We focus on this latter case in
this chapter.
2.1 Survey issues
There are several aspects of the surveying process that are important for
assessment of poverty and equity. First, there is the coverage of the survey:
does it contain representative information on the entire population of interest,
or just on some socio-economic subgroups? Whether the representativeness
of the data is appropriate depends on the focus of the assessment. A survey
containing observations drawn exclusively from the cities of a particular coun-
try may be perfectly fine if the aim is to design poverty alleviation schemes
within these cities; its representativeness will, however, be clearly insufficient
if the objective is to investigate the optimal allocation of resources between the
country's urban and rural areas.
Then, there is the sample frame of the survey. Surveys are usually stratified
and multi-staged, and are therefore made of stratified and clustered observa-
tions. Stratification ensures that a certain minimum amount of information is
obtained from each of a given number of "areas" within a population of inter-
est. Population strata are often geographically defined and typically represent
different regions or provinces of a country. Clustering facilitates the interview-
ing process by concentrating sample observations within particular population
subgroups or geographic locations. They thus make it more cost effective to
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collect more observations. Strata are thus often divided into a number of dif-
ferent levels of clusters, representing, say, cities, districts, neighborhoods, and
households. A complete listing of first-level clusters in each stratum is used
to select randomly within each stratum a given number of clusters. The initial
clusters can then be subjected to further stratification or clustering, and the pro-
cess continues until the last sampling units (usually households or individuals)
have been selected and interviewed. This therefore leads to both stratification
and multi-stage sampling.
Fundamental in the use of survey data is the role of the randomness of the
information that is generated by the sampling process. Because households
and individuals are not all systematically interviewed (unlike in the case of
censuses), the information generated from survey data will depend on the par-
ticular selection of households and individuals that is made from a population.
In other words, a poverty/equity assessment of a population will vary accord-
ing to the sample drawn from that population. For that reason, distributive as-
sessments carried out using survey data will be subject to so-called "sampling
errors", that is, to sampling variability. When carrying out distributive using
sample data, it is therefore important to recognise and assess the importance of
sampling variability.
By ensuring that a minimum amount of information (typically, a minimum
number of observations) is obtained from each of a number of strata, stratifi-
cation decreases the extent of sampling errors. A similar effect is obtained by
increasing the total size of the sample: the greater the number of households
surveyed, the greater on average is the sampling precision of the estimates ob-
tained. Conversely, by bundling observations around common geographic or
socio-economic indicators, clustering tends to reduce the informative content
of the observations drawn and thus also tends to increase the size of the sam-
pling errors (for a given number of observations). The sampling structure of
a survey also impacts on its ability to provide accurate information on certain
population subgroups. For instance, if the clusters within a stratum represent
geographical districts, and between-district variability is large, it would be un-
wise to use the information generated by the selected regions to depict poverty
in the other, non-selected, regions.
Survey data are also fraught with measurement and other "non-sampling"
errors. For instance, even though they may have been selected to belong to a
sample, some households may end up not being interviewed, either because
they cannot be reached or because they refuse to be interviewed. Such "non-
response" will raise difficulties for distributive assessments if it is correlated
with observable and non-observable household characteristics. Even if inter-
viewed, households will sometimes misreport their characteristics and living
conditions, either because of ignorance, misunderstanding or mischief. This
tends to make distributive assessments built from survey data diverge system-
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atically from the true (and unobserved) population distributive assessment that
would be carried out if there were no non-sampling errors. Clearly, such a
shortcoming can bias the understanding of poverty and equity and the subse-
quent design of public policy.
The empirical analysis of vulnerability and poverty dynamics is particularly
"data demanding". In general, it requires longitudinal (or panel) surveys, sur-
veys that follow each other in time and that interview the same final observa-
tional units. Because they link the same units across time, longitudinal data
contain more information than transversal (or cross-sectional) surveys, and
they are particularly useful for measuring vulnerability and for understanding
poverty dynamics - in addition to facilitating the assessment of the temporal
effects of public policy on well-being. Note, however, that measurement errors
are particularly problematic for the analysis of vulnerability and mobility.
2.2 Income versus consumption
It is frequently argued that consumption is better suited than income as an
indicator of living standards, at least in many developing countries. One rea-
son is that consumption is believed to vary more smoothly than income, both
within a given year and across the life cycle. Income is notoriously subject to
seasonal variability, particularly in developing countries, whereas consumption
tends to be less variable. Life-cycle theories also predict that individuals will
try to smooth their consumption across their low- and high-income years (in
order to equalize their "marginal utility of consumption" across time), through
appropriate borrowing and saving behavior. In practice, however, consumption
smoothing is far from perfect, in part due to imperfect access to commodity and
credit markets and to difficulties in estimating precisely one's "permanent" or
life-cycle income. Using short-term vs longer-term consumption or income
indicators can therefore change the assessment of well-being.
For the non-welfarist interested in outcomes and functionings, consumption
is also preferred over income because it is deemed to be a more "direct" indi-
cator of achievements and fulfllment of basic needs. A caveat is, however, that
consumption is an outcome of individual free choice, an outcome which may
differ across individuals of the same income and ability to consume, just like
actual functionings vary across people of the same capability sets. At a given
capability to spend, some individuals may choose to consume less (or little),
preferring instead to give to charity, to vow poverty, or to save in order to leave
important bequests to their children.
Consumption is also held to be more readily observed, recalled and mea-
sured than income (at least in developing countries, although even then this is
not always the case), to suffer less from underreporting problems, This is not
to say that consumption is easy to measure accurately. Sources of income are
typically far more limited than types of expenditures, which can make it easier
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to collect income information. The periodicity of expenses on various goods
varies, and different recall periods are therefore needed to ensure adequate ex-
penditure coverage.
Moreover, consumption does not equal expenditures. The value of con-
sumption equals the sum of the expenditures on the goods and services pur-
chased and consumed in a given period, plus the value of goods and services
consumed but not purchased (such as those received as gifts and produced
by the household itself), plus the consumption or service value of assets and
durable goods owned. Unlike expenditures, therefore, consumption includes
the value of own-produced goods. The value of these goods is not easily as-
sessed, since it has not been transacted in a market. Distinguishing consump-
tion from investment is also very difficult, but failure to do so properly can lead
to double-counting in the consumption measure. For instance, a $1 expendi-
ture on education or machinery should not be counted as current consumption
if the returns and the utility of such expenditure will only accrue later in the
form of higher future utility and earnings.
Similarly, and as just mentioned, the value of the services provided by those
durable goods owned by individuals ought also to enter into a complete con-
sumption indicator, but the cost of these durable goods should feature in the
consumption aggregate of the time at which the good was purchased. An im-
portant example of this is owner-occupied housing. Further measurement dif-
ficulties arise in the assessment of the value of various non-market goods and
services - such as those provided freely by the government - and the value of
intangible benefits such as the quality of the environment, the benefit of peace
and security, and so on.
2.3 Price variability
Whether it is income or consumption expenditures that are measured and
compared, an important issue is how to account for the variability of prices
across space and time. Conceptually, this also encompasses variability in qual-
ity and in quantity constraints. Failure to account for such variability can dis-
tort comparisons of well-being across time and space. In Ecuador, for instance
(Hentschel and Lanjouw 1996), and in many other countries, some households
have free access to water, and tend to consume relatively large quantities of it
with zero water expenditure. Others (often peri-urban dwellers) need to pur-
chase water from private vendors and consequently consume a lower quantity
of it at necessarily higher total expenditures. Ranking households according to
water expenditures could wrongly suggest that those who need to buy water are
better off and derive greater utility from water consumption (since they spend
more on it).
Microeconomic theory suggests that we may wish to account for price vari-
ability by comparing real as opposed to nominal consumption expenditures (or
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income). Several procedures can be followed to enable such comparisons. A
first procedure estimates the parameters of consumers' indirect utility func-
tions. Let these parameters be denoted by D and the indirect utility function be
defined by V(y, q, •$), where q is the price vector and y is total nominal expen-
diture (we abstract from savings). Suppose that reference prices are given by
qR. Equivalent consumption expenditure is then given implicitly by yR:
Inversion of the indirect utility function yields an equivalent expenditure func-
tion e, which indicates how much expenditure at reference prices is needed to
be equivalent to (or to generate the same utility as) the expenditure observed at
current prices q:
Distributive analysis would then proceed by comparing the real incomes de-
fined in terms of the reference prices qR.
An alternative procedure deflates by a cost-of-living index the level of total
nominal consumption expenditures. One way of defining such a cost-oi-living
index is to ask what expenditure is needed just to reach a poverty level of utility
vz at prices q. This is given by e (q, tf, vz). A similar computation is carried
out for the expenditure needed to attain vz at prices q
R: this is e (qR, •&, vz).
The ratio
is then a cost-of-living index. Dividing y by (2.3) yields real consumption
expenditure.
In practice, cost-of-living indices are often taken to be those aggregate con-
sumer price indices routinely computed by national statistical agencies. These
consumer price indices usually vary across regions and time, but not across
levels of income (e.g., across the poor and the non-poor). In some circum-
stances (i.e., for homothetic utility functions and when consumer preferences
are identical), all of the above procedures are equivalent. In general, however,
they are not the same.
The fact that utility functions are not generally homothetic, and that pref-
erences are highly heterogeneous, has important implications for distributive
analysis and public policy. First, the true cost-of-living index would normally
be different across the poor and the rich. Using the same price index for the
two groups may distort comparisons of well-being. An example is the effect
of an increase in the price of food on economic welfare. Since the share of
food in total consumption is usually higher for the poor than for the rich, this
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increase should hurt disproportionately more the poor. Deflating nominal con-
sumption by the same index for the entire population will, however, suggest
that the burden of the food price increase is shared proportionately by all.
Spatial disaggregation is also important if consumption preferences and
price changes vary systematically across regions. In few developing coun-
tries, however, are consumer price indices available or sufficiently disaggre-
gated spatially. The alternative for the analyst is then to produce different
poverty lines for different regions (based on the same or different consumption
baskets, but using different prices) or construct separate price indices. In both
cases, the analyst would usually be using regional price information derived
from consumption survey data. The resulting indices would then be interpreted
as cost-of-living indices, and could help correct for spatial price variation and
regional heterogeneity in preferences.
To see why these adjustments are necessarily in part arbitrary, and to see
why they can matter in practice, consider the case of Figure 2.1. It shows 3
indifference curves Ul, U2 and US, for three consumers, 1, 2 and 3. Two
of these consumers have relatively strong preferences for meat as opposed to
fish, and the third (represented by US) has strong preferences for fish. Also
shown are two budget constraints, one using relative prices qc (c for coastal
area), where the price of fish is relatively low, and the other with qm (m for
mountainous area), where the price of fish is high compared to the price of
meat.
How is the standard of living for individuals 1,2 or 3 to be compared? One
way to answer this question is to "cost" the consumption of the three individ-
uals. For this, we may use either q° or qm. If we use the mountains' relative
price, then the consumption bundles chosen by individuals 1 and 3 are equiv-
alent in terms of value: they lie on the same budget constraint of value B in
terms of meat (the numeraire). Individual 2 is clearly then the worst off of all
three. If instead we use the coastal area's relative price, then the consumption
bundles chosen by individuals 2 and 3 are equivalent, with a common value of
A in terms of meat - and individual 1 is the best off.
Hence, choosing reference prices to assess and compare living standards can
matter significantly. If we knew a priori that individuals 1 and 3 had equivalent
living standards, then reference prices qm would be the right ones (conversely:
qc would be the correct reference prices if 2 and 3 could be assumed to be
equally well off). But such information is generally not available. In some
circumstances, such as in comparing 1 and 2, we can be fairly certain that one
individual is better off than another, whatever the choice of reference prices,
but even then, the extent of the quantitative difference in well-being can can
vary to a large extent with the choice of reference prices.
The choice of reference prices and reference preferences will also matter
for estimating the impact of price changes on well-being and equity. Consider
Figure 2.1: Price adjustments and well-being with two commodities
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again Figure 2.1. Suppose that we wish to measure the impact on consumers'
well-being of an increase in the price of fish. Assume for simplicity that this
change in relative prices is captured by a move from qm to qc. If we were to
choose as a reference bundle the bundle of meat and fish chosen by individuals
1 and 2 to capture the impact of this change, then the price impact would be
estimated to be fairly low. The reason is that both individuals consume little
of fish. For instance, take meat as the numeraire and assess the real income
value of being at Ul . Under qm, this is given by B and under qc by D. Using
instead the preferences of individual 3 as reference tastes (and thus U3 as
reference well-being), real consumption would move from A to B, a much
greater change.
Furthermore, even if 3 were deemed better off than 1 before the increase
in the price of fish, it could well be that 3's strong preferences for fish would
make him less well off than 1 after the price change. Hence, when consumer
preferences are heterogeneous, price changes can reverse rankings of well-
being. Indeed, in Figure 2.1, the increase in the price of fish is visibly much
more costly for fish eaters than for meat ones. This warns again against the use
of a common price index across all regions as well as across all socio-economic
groups — rich and poor.
2.3.1 Exercises
Suppose the following direct utility function over the two goods x\ and X2,
with v = 1/3, and let prices q\ and q^ be set to 1.
1 What is the expenditure needed to attain a poverty level of utility of 158.74
at the reference prices q? = 1 and q% = 1? (Call this ZR.)
answer: see table 2.1, ̂  = 300 for U = 159.78$
2 What are the quantities of goods 1 and 2 that are consumed at the poverty
level of utility?
answer: see table 2.1, x\ = 100 and x2 = 200 for U = 159.78$
3 Suppose that the price of good 2 is increased from 1 to 3. What is the new
cost of the level of poverty utility? (Call this z.)
answer: see table 2.2, z = 624 for U = 159.78$
4 Using definitions (2.1) and (2.2), prove the following :
What does it imply?
answer: When preferences are homothetic, poverty measures are the same
for two following methods that one can use to adjust the nominal income:
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• Equivalent expenditure method: y* — e(qR, XR, v(q, x, y ) )
• Welfare ratio method: y* = y/z
5 Suppose now that a poverty analyst does not believe that consumption of
goods 1 and 2 will adjust following good 2's price increase. What is the
poverty line z that he would then obtain? (Hint: compute the cost of the
initial commodity basket using the new prices.)
answer: z = 700$
6 Using indifference curves and budget constraints, show the difference that
taking account of changes in behavior can make for the computation of
price indices and the assessment of poverty.
Table 2.1: Equivalent income and price changes
i
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
i
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
y
150.00
210.00
300.00
380.00
500.00
510.00
550.00
600.00
800.00
1000.00
Table 2.2:
y xi
160.00 53.33
200.00 66.67
500.00 166.67
624.00 208.00
1100.00 366.67
1240.00 413.33
1300.00 433.33
1500.00 500.00
1600.00 533.33
2770.00 923.33
Xi
50.00
70.00
100.00
126.67
166.67
170.00
183.33
200.00
266.67
333.33
Xl
100.00
140.00
200.00
253.33
333.33
340.00
366.67
400.00
533.33
666.67
U
79.37
111.12
158.74
201.07
264.57
269.86
291.02
317.48
423.31
529.13
y/z
0.50
0.70
1.00
1.27
1.67
1.70
1.83
2.00
2.67
3.33
Equivalent income and price changes
a:2
35.56
44.44
111.11
138.67
244.44
275.56
288.89
333.33
355.56
615.56
U yR
40.70 76.92
50.88 96.15
127/19 240.37
158.74 300.00
279.82 528.82
315.43 596.13
330.70 624.97
381.57 721.12
407.01 769.20
704.64 1331.68
y/z yR/zR y/700
0.26
0.32
0.80
1.00
1.76
1.99
2.08
2.40
2.56
4.44
0.26 0.23
0.32 0.29
0.80 0.71
1.00 0.89
1.76 1.57
1.99 1.77
2.08 1.86
2.40 2.14
2.56 2.29
4.44 3.96
2.4 Household heterogeneity
A fundamental problem arises when comparing the well-being of individ-
uals who live in households of differing sizes and composition. Differences
T-
28 POVERTY AND EQUITY
in household size and composition can indeed be expected to create differ-
ences in household "needs". It is essential to take these differences in needs
into account when comparing the well-being of individuals living in differing
households. This is usually done using equivalence scales. With these scales,
the needs of a household of a particular size and composition are compared to
those of a reference household, usually one made of one reference adult.
2.4.1 Estimating equivalence scales
Strategies for the estimation of equivalence scales are all contingent on the
choice of comparable indicators of well-being. The choice of any such indica-
tor is, however, intrinsically arbitrary. A popular example is food share in total
consumption: at equal household food shares, individuals of various house-
hold types are assumed to be equally well-off. But, at equal well-being, one
household type could certainly choose a food share that differs from that of
other household types. This would be the case, for instance, for households
of smaller sizes for which it could make perfect sense to spend more on food
than on those goods for which economies of scale are arguably larger, such as
housing. Failing to take this differential price effect into account would lead to
an overestimation of the needs of small households.
Another difficulty arises when household size and composition are the re-
sult of a deliberate free choice. It may be argued, for instance, that a couple
which elects freely to have a child cannot perceive this increase in household
size to be utility decreasing. This would be so even if the household's total
consumption remained unchanged after the birth of the child (or even if it fell),
despite the fact that most poverty analysts would judge this birth to increase
household "needs". Another difficulty lies in the fact that the intra-household
decision-making process can distort the allocation of resources across house-
hold members, and thereby lead to wrong inferences of comparative needs.
This is the case, for instance, when more is spent on boys than on girls, not
because of greater boy needs, but because of differential gender preferences
on the part of the household decision-maker. Such observations can lead ana-
lysts to overestimate the real needs of boys relative to those of girls. In turn,
this would underestimate on average the level of deprivation experienced by
girls and their households, since it would be wrongly assumed that girls are
less "needy". An analogous analytical difficulty arises when the household
decision-maker is a man, and the consumption of his spouse is observed to be
smaller than his own. Is this due to gender-biased household decision-making,
or to gender-differentiated needs?
To illustrate these issues, consider Figure 2.2, which graphs consumption
of a reference good xr(y, q) against household income y. The predicted con-
sumption of the reference good is plotted for two households, the first com-
posed of only one man, and the other made of a couple (i.e., a man and a
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woman). A common procedure in the equivalence scales literature is the es-
timation of the total household income at which a reference consumption of
a reference good is equal for all household types. The basic argument is that
when the consumption of that reference good is the same across households,
the well-being of household members should also be the same across house-
holds. Reference goods are often goods consumed exclusively by some mem-
bers of the household, such as adult clothing.
For Figure 2.2, take for instance the case of men's clothing for xr (y, q). Sup-
pose that the reference level of that good is given by xO. Leaving aside issues
of consumption heterogeneity within households of the same type at a given
income level, one would estimate that the one-member household would need
an income yc in order to consume xO (at point c), and that the two-member
household would require total household income yd to reach that same refer-
ence consumption level. Hence, following this line of argument, the second
household would need yd/yc as much income as the first one to be "as well
off in terms of consumption of men's clothing. Said differently, the second
household's needs would be yd/yc that of the single man household. The
number of "equivalent adults" in the second household would then be said to
be yd/yc. When applied to different household types, this procedure provides
a full equivalence scale, expressing the needs of various household types as a
function of those of a reference household.
Such a procedure faces many problems, however, most of which are very
difficult to resolve. First, there is the choice of the reference level of xr(y, q).
If a reference level of xl instead of xO were chosen in Figure 2.2, the number
of adult equivalents in the second household would fall from yd/yc to yf /ye.
There is little that can be done in general to determine which of these two
scales is the right one. In such cases, one cannot use a welfare-independent
equivalence scale - the equivalence scale ratios must depend on the levels of
the households' reference well-being.
Equivalence scale estimates also generally depend on the choice of the ref-
erence good. For instance, the choice of adult clothing versus that of tobacco,
alcohol or other adult commodities will generally matter in trying to compare
the needs, say, of households with and without children. This is in part because
preferences for these goods are not independent of - and do not depend in the
same manner on - household composition. One additional problem is the issue
of the price dependence of equivalence scale estimates. Choosing a different
q in Figure 2.2, for instance, would usually lead to the estimation of different
equivalence scale ratios.
2.4.2 Sensitivity analysis
In view of these difficulties, the literature has often emphasized that the
choice of a particular scale inevitably introduces value judgements and some
Figure 2.2: Equivalence scales and reference well-being
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arbitrariness. It would therefore seem important to recognize explicitly such
difficulties when measuring and comparing poverty and inequality levels.
Allowing the assessment of needs to vary turns out to be especially relevant
in cross-country comparative analyses, particularly when those countries com-
pared differ significantly in their socio-economic composition. There is in this
case the added issue that not only can the appropriate scale rates be uncertain
in a given country, but they may also be different between countries. Testing
the sensitivity of inequality and poverty results to changes in the incorporation
of needs would seem particularly important for those comparisons whose re-
sults can influence redistributive policies, e.g., through the transfer of resources
from some regions or household types to others.
To see how to carry out such sensitivity analysis, define an equivalence scale
E as a function of household needs. This function will typically depend on the
characteristics of the M different household members, such as their sex and
age, and on household characteristics, such as location and size. Because E
is normalized by the needs of a single adult, it can be interpreted as a number
of "equivalent adults", viz, household needs as a proportion of the needs of a
single adult. A "parametric" class of equivalence scales is often defined as a
function of one or of a few relevant household characteristics, with parameters
indicating how needs are modified as these characteristics change.
A survey of Buhmann, Rainwater, Schmaus, and Smeeding (1988) reported
34 different scales from 10 countries, which they summarized as
with s being a single parameter summarizing the sensitivity of E to household
size M. This needs elasticity, s, can be expected to vary between 0 and 1. For
s = 0, no account is taken of household size. For s = 1, adult-equivalent
income is equal to per capita household income. The larger the value of s,
the smaller are the economies of scale in the production of well-being that are
implicitly assumed by the equivalence scale, and the greater is the impact of
household size upon household needs.
An obvious limitation of a simple function such as (2.4) is its dependence
solely on household size and not on household composition or other relevant
socio-demographic characteristics. Most equivalence scales do indeed distin-
guish strongly between the presence of adults and that of children, and some
like that of McClements (1977) even discriminate finely between children of
different ages. An example of a class of equivalence scales that is more flexi-
ble than the above was suggested by Cutler and Katz (1992) - this class takes
separately into account the importance of the MA adults and the M — MA
children:
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where c is a constant reflecting the resource cost of a child relative to that of
an adult, and s is now an indicator of the degree of overall economies of scale
within the household. When c = I, children count as adults (which is the
assumption made in (2.4)); otherwise, adults and children are assumed to have
different needs.
2.4.3 Household decision-making and
within-household inequality
Finally, and as elsewhere in distributive analysis, there is the practically in-
soluble difficulty of having to make interpersonal comparisons of well-being
across individuals - compounded by the fact that individuals here are hetero-
geneous in their household composition. On the basis of which observable
variable can we really make interpersonal comparisons of well-being? Again,
note that the assumption that well-being for the man is the same as well-being
for the couple when xr(y,q) is equalized in Figure 2.2 is a very strong one.
Furthermore, apart from influencing preferences and commodity consump-
tion, household formation is as indicated above itself a matter of choice and
is presumably the source of utility in its own right. Preferences for house-
hold composition are themselves heterogeneous, and so is the utility derived
from a certain household status. All of this makes comparisons of well-being
across heterogeneous individuals and the use of equivalence scales the source
of arbitrariness and significant measurement errors.
An additional problem in measuring individual living standards using sur-
vey data comes from the presence of intrahousehold inequality. The final unit
of observation in surveys is customarily the household. Little information is
typically generated on the intrahousehold allocation of well-being (e.g., on the
individual benefits stemming from total household consumption). Because of
this, the usual procedure is to assume that adult-equivalent consumption (once
computed) is enjoyed identically by all household members.
This, however, is at best an approximation of the true distribution of eco-
nomic well-being in a household. If the nature of intrahousehold decision-
making leads to important disparities in well-being across individuals, assum-
ing equal sharing will underestimate inequality and aggregate poverty. Not
being able to account for intra-household inequities will also have important
implications for profiling the poor, and also for the design of public policy. For
instance, a poverty assessment that correctly showed the deprivation effects of
unequal sharing within households could indicate that it would be relatively
inefficient to target support at the level of the entire household - without tak-
ing into account how the targeted resources would subsequently be allocated
within the household. Instead, it might be better to design public policy such
as to self-select the least privileged individuals within the households, in the
form of specific in-kind transfers or specially designed incentive schemes.
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2.4.4 Counting units
A final and related difficulty concerns who we are counting in aggregating
poverty: is it individuals or households? Although this distinction is funda-
mental, it is often surprisingly hidden in applied poverty profiles and poverty
measurement papers. The distinction matters since there is usually a strong
positive correlation between household size and a household's poverty status.
Said differently, poverty is usually found disproportionately among the larger
households. Because of this, counting households instead of individuals will
typically underestimate the true proportion of individuals in poverty.
2.5 References for Chapters 1 and 2
The literature investigating the foundations and the impact of alternative
approaches to measuring well-being is large and (yet) rapidly increasing.
Influential discussions of the conceptual foundations can be found in Das-
gupta (1993), Sen (1981), Sen (1983), Sen (1985), Streeten, Burki, Ul Haq,
Hicks, and Stewart (1981) and Townsend (1979).
Papers considering the impact of the accounting period (e.g., short-term vs
long-term incomes) on the distribution of well-being include Aaberge, Bjork-
lund, Jantti, Palme, Pedersen, Smith, and Wennemo (2002), Arkes (1998),
Bjorklund (1993), Burkhauser, Frick, and Schwarze (1997), Burkhauser and
Poupore (1997), Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass (2000), Greedy (1997), Greedy
(1999a), Gibson, Huang, and Rozelle (2001), Harding (1993) and Parker and
Siddiq(1997).
The comprehensiveness of income concepts can also make a difference. A
good introduction to the general methodological issues is Hentschel and Lan-
jouw (1996). The impact of the difference between cash and more compre-
hensive measures of income is studied inter alia in Formby, Kirn, and Zheng
(2001), Gustafsson and Makonnen (1993), Gustafsson and Shi (1997), Hard-
ing (1995), Jenkins and O'Leary (1996), Smeeding, Saunders, Coder, Jenk-
ins, Fritzell, Hagenaars, Hauser, and Wolfson (1993), Smeeding and Weinberg
(2001), Van den Bosch (1998), and Yates (1994). The role of public services
is also discussed in Anand and Ravallion (1993); see also Propper (1990) and
?) for adjusting the value of public services for the costs of accessing them.
The sensitivity of the measurement of well-being to the choice between con-
sumption and income measures is analyzed in Barrett, Crossley, and Worswick
(2000b), Barrett, Crossley, and Worswick (2000a), Blacklow and Ray (2000),
Blundell and Preston (1998), Cutler and Katz (1992), Jorgenson (1998) Mi-
trakos and Tsakloglou (1998), O'Neill and Sweetman (2001), Slesnick (1993)
and Zaidi and de Vos (2001).
Choosing the units of analysis, be they individuals, households or equiva-
lent adults, also influences distributive analysis, as studied by Bhorat (1999),
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Carlson and Danziger (1999), Ebert (1999), and Sutherland (1996). This is
closely related to the growing concerns expressed about the role of income
pooling/sharing within families and households; see for instance Cantillon and
Nolan (2001), Haddad and Kanbur (1990), Jenkins (1991), Kanbur and Had-
dad (1994), Lazear and Michael (1988), Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997),
Phipps and Burton (1995), Quisumbing, Haddad, and Pena (2001), and Wool-
ley and Marshall (1994). Ebert and Moyes (2003) explore the normative impli-
cations of a concern for equality in living standards for the use of equivalence
scales in applied studies.
Price adjustments can also be important to making consistent comparisons
of well-being across time, space and socio-economic groups, and for measur-
ing equity and poverty properly. A good introduction to the methodological
literature is given by Donaldson (1992). Empirical evidence can be found in
Araar (2002), Bodier and Cogneau (1998), Deaton (1988), Erbas and Sayers
(1998), Finke, Chern, and Fox (1997), Idson and Miller (1999), Muller (2002),
Pendakur (2002), Rao (2000), Ruiz Castillo (1998) and Slesnick (2002).
Justification and examples of the use by economists of non-money-metric
measures of well-being can be found inter alia in De Gregorio and Lee (2002)
(for a link between education and income inequality), Haveman and Bershad-
ker (2001) (self-reliance), Jensen and Richter (2001) (children's health), Klasen
(2000) and Layte, Maitre, Nolan, and Whelan (2001) (deprivation), Sahn and
Stifel (2000) (a composite welfare index), Sefton (2002) (fuel poverty) and Sk-
oufias (2001) (calorie intake). The wealth distribution is also often of interest:
see for instance Wolff (1998) for a review of the American evidence. Alterna-
tive measures of well-being are also explored in Davies, Joshi, and Clarke
(1997) (for a construction of a deprivation index), Desai and Shah (1988)
(for estimates of relative deprivation), Hagenaars (1986) (for perceptions of
poverty), and Narayan and Walton (2000) (for participatory evidence on the
living conditions and views of more than 20,000 poor people).
Survey measurement problems are numerous. See for instance Fields (1994)
for a general discussion, Juster and Kuester (1991) for wealth measurement,
and Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2001) for the estimation of food and non-food
consumption expenditures.
The sensitivity of distributive analysis to the "equivalization" of incomes
has been the focus of much work in the last 15 years. This includes Banks
and Johnson (1994), Bradbury (1997), Buhmann, Rainwater, Schmaus, and
Smeeding (1988), Burkhauser, Smeeding, and Merz (1996), Coulter, Cow-
ell, and Jenkins (1992b), Coulter, Cowell, and Jenkins (1992a), de Vos and
Zaidi (1997), Duclos and Mercader Prats (1999), Jenkins and Cowell (1994),
Lancaster and Ray (2002), Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995), Lyssiotou (1997),
Meenakshi and Ray (2002), Phipps (1993), and Ruiz Castillo (1998).
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The econometric and theoretical difficulties involved in the estimation of
equivalence scales are formidable, and these are discussed inter alia in Blun-
dell and Lewbel (1991), Blundell (1998), and Pollak (1991). Estimation of
equivalence scales is performed in Bosch (1991), Nicol (1994), Pendakur (1999)
(where they are found to be "base-independent"), Pendakur (2002) (where they
are found to be price-dependent), Phipps and Garner (1994) (where they are
found to be different across Canada and the United States), Phipps (1998), and
Radner (1997) (where they depend on the types of income considered).
An attempt to identify and estimate unconditional preferences for goods and
demographic characteristics is Ferreira, Buse, and Chavas (1998). Whether
equivalence scales should be income-dependent, and what happens if they are,
is studied among others in Aaberge and Melby (1998), Blackorby and Donald-
son (1993), and Conniffe (1992).
The normative issues raised by the presence of heterogeneity in the popula-
tion - heterogeneity other than in the dimension of income - are numerous, and
some of them are examined in Ebert and Moyes (2003), Fleurbaey, Hagnere,
and Trannoy (2003), Glewwe (1991), and Lewbel (1989).
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Chapter 3
INTRODUCTION AND NOTATION
In what follows in this book, we will denote living standards by the variable
y. The indices we will use will sometimes require these living standards to be
strictly positive, and, for expositional simplicity, we may assume that this is
always the case. Strictly positive values of y are required, for instance, for the
Watts poverty index and for many of the decomposable inequality indices. It
is of course reasonable to expect indicators of living standards such as con-
sumption or expenditures to be strictly positive. This assumption is less natural
for other indicators, such as income, for which capital losses or retrospective
tax payments can generate negative values. Also recall that, for expositional
simplicity, we will also usually refer to living standards as incomes.
Let p = F(y) be the proportion of individuals in the population who enjoy a
level of income that is less than or equal to y. F(y) is called the cumulative dis-
tribution function (cdf) of the distribution of income; it is non-decreasing in y,
and varies between 0 and 1, with F(0) = 0 and F(oo) = I1. For expositional
simplicity, we will sometimes implicitly assume that F(y) is continuously dif-
ferentiable and strictly increasing in y. These are reasonable approximations
for large-population distributions of income. They are also reasonable assump-
tions from the point of view of describing the data generating processes that
generate the distributions of income observed in practice. The density func-
tion, which is the first-order derivative of the cdf, is denoted as f(y) = F'(y)
and is strictly positive when F(y) is assumed to be strictly increasing in y.
'DAD: Distribution|Distribution Function.
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3.1 Continuous distributions
A useful tool throughout the book will be "quantile functions". The use
of quantiles will help simplify greatly the exposition and the computation of
several distributive measures. Quantiles will also sometimes serve as di-
rect tools to analyze and compare distributions of living standards (to check
first-order dominance for instance). The quantile function Q(p) is defined
implicitly as F(Q(p)) = p, or using the inverse distribution function, as
Q(p) = F(~l\p)2. Q(p) is thus the living standard level below which we
find a proportion p of the population. Alternatively, it is the income of that
individual whose rank — orpercentile — in the distribution is p. A proportion
p of the population is poorer than he is; a proportion 1 — p is richer than him.
These tools are illustrated in Figure 3.1. The horizontal axis shows per-
centiles p of the population. The quantiles Q(p) that correspond to different
p values are shown on the vertical axis. The larger the rank p, the higher the
corresponding income Q(p). Alternatively, incomes y appear on the vertical
axis of Figure 3.1, and the proportions of individuals whose income is below
or equal to those y are shown on the horizontal axis. At the maximum income
level, ymax, that proportion F(ymax) equals 1. The median is given by Q(0.5),
which is the income value which splits the distribution exactly in two halves.
Note that an important expositional advantage of working with quantiles is
to normalize the population size to 1. This also means that everyone's income
and contribution to this book's poverty and equity analysis can then appear on
an interval of percentiles ranging from 0 to 1. In a sense, the population size
is thus scaled to that of a socially representative individual. Normalizing all
population sizes to 1 also makes comparisons of poverty and equity accord
with the population invariance principle. This principle says that adding an
exact replicate of a population to that same population should not change the
value of its distributive indices. Putting everyone's income within a common
total population scale of 1 is a handy descriptive way of comparing popula-
tions of different sizes. It also ensures that adding exact replications to these
populations will not change the distributive picture.
We will define most of the distributive measures (indices and curves) in
terms of integrals over a range of percentiles. This is a familiar procedure in the
context of continuous distributions. We will see below why this procedure is
also generally valid in the context of discrete distributions, even though the use
of summation signs is often more familiar in that context. Using integrals will
make the definitions and the exposition simpler, and will help focus on what
matters more, namely, the interpretation and the use of the various measures.
2DAD: Curves|Quantile.
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The most common summary index of a distribution is its mean. Using inte-
grals and quantiles, it is defined simply as:
H is therefore the area underneath the quantile curve. This corresponds to the
grey area shown on Figure 3.1. Since the horizontal axis varies uniformly from
0 to 1, fj, is also the average height of the quantile curve Q(p), and this is given
by // on the vertical axis, n is thus the income of the population's "average
individual".
The computation of the average income n gives equal weight to all incomes
in the population. We will see later in the book alternative weighting schemes
for computing socially representative incomes. As for most distributions of
income, the one shown on Figure 3.1 is skewed to the right, which gives rise
to a mean p, that exceeds the median Q(p). Said differently, the proportion of
individuals whose income falls underneath the mean, F(fj,), exceeds one half.
3.2 Discrete distributions
To see how to rewrite the above definitions using familiar summation signs
for discrete distributions, we need a little more notation. Say that we are inter-
ested in a distribution of n incomes. We first order the n observations of y, in
increasing values of y, such that y\ < y^ < yz < ... < yn-\ < Vn- We then
associate to these n discrete quantiles over the interval of p between 0 and 1.
For p such that (i — l)/n < p < i/n, we then have Q(p) = y,. Technically,
this is equivalent to defining quantiles as Q(p) = min{j/ |F(y) > p}. This is
illustrated in Table 3.1 for n = 3 and where the three income values are 10, 20
and 30. Figure 3.2 graphs those quantiles as a function of p. p values between
0 and 1/3 give a quantile of 10, the second income, 20, covers percentile 1/3 to
2/3, and the highest incomes, 30, covers percentile 2/3 to 1.
The formulae for discrete distributions are then computed in practice by
replacing the integral sign in the continuous case by a summation sign, by
summing across all quantiles, and by dividing that sum by the number of
observations n. Thus, the mean /j, of a discrete distribution can be expressed
as:
Thus, whenever an expression like (3.1) arises, we can think of the integral
sign as standing for a summation sign and of dp as standing for 1/n.
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Using (3.2), the mean of the discrete distribution of Table 3.1, which is 20,
is then simply the integral of the quantile curve shown on Figure 3.2. In other
words, it is the sum of the area of the three boxes each of length 1/3 that can
be found underneath the filled curve. For completeness, we will mention from
time to time how indices and curves can be estimated using the more familiar
summation signs. For more information, the reader can also consult DAD's
User Guide, where the estimation formulae shown use summation signs and
thus apply to discrete distributions.
Table 3.1: Incomes and quantiles in a discrete distribution
I
1
2
3
i/n
0.33
0.66
1
Q(i/n) = yi
10
20
30
3.3 Poverty gaps
For poverty comparisons, we will also need the concept of quantiles cen-
sored at a poverty line z. These are denoted by Q*(p; z) and defined as:
Censored quantiles are therefore just the incomes Q(p) for those in poverty
(below z) and z for those whose income exceeds the poverty line. This is
illustrated on Figure 3.3, which is similar to Figure 3.1. Quantiles Q(p) and
censored quantiles Q*(p; z) are identical up to p = F(z), or up to Q(p) = z.
After this point, censored quantiles equal a constant z and therefore diverge
from the quantiles Q(p).
The mean of the censored quantiles is denoted as n*(z):
This is the area underneath the curve of censored incomes Q* (p; z). Censoring
income at z helps focus attention on poverty, since the precise value of those
living standards that exceed z is irrelevant for poverty analysis and poverty
comparisons (at least so long as we consider absolute poverty).
The poverty gap at percentile p, g(p;z), is the difference between the
poverty line and the censored quantile atp, or, equivalently, the shortfall (when
applicable) of living standard Q(p) from the poverty line. Let /+ = max(/, 0).
Poverty gaps can then be defined as3:
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When income at p exceeds the poverty line, the poverty gap equals zero. A
shortfall g(q; z) at rank q is shown on Figure 3.3 by the distance between z
and Q(q). The larger one's rank p in the distribution — the higher up in the
distribution of income — the lower the poverty gap g(p; z). The proportion of
individuals with a positive poverty gap is given by F(z). The average poverty
gap then equals jJ.a(z}\
pp(z) is then the size of the area in grey shown on Figure 3.3.
3.4 Cardinal versus ordinal comparisons
There are two types of poverty and equity comparisons: cardinal and or-
dinal ones. Cardinal comparisons involve comparing numerical estimates of
poverty and equity indices. Ordinal comparisons rank broadly poverty and eq-
uity across distributions, without attempting to quantify the precise differences
in poverty and equity that exist between these distributions. They can often say
where poverty and equity is larger or smaller, but not by how much.
Consider for instance the case of cardinal poverty comparisons. Numerical
poverty estimates attach a single number to the extent of aggregate poverty in
a population, e.g., 40% or $200 per capita. But calculating cardinal poverty
estimates requires making a number of very specific assumptions. These in-
clude, inter alia, assumptions on the form of the poverty index, the definition
of the indicator of well-being, the choice of equivalence scales, the value of the
poverty line, and how that poverty line varies precisely across space and time.
Once these assumptions are made, cardinal poverty estimates can tell, for
instance, that the consumption expenditures of 30% of the individuals in a
population lie underneath a poverty line, but that a proposed government pro-
gram could decrease that proportion to 25%. Cardinal poverty estimates can
also be used to carry out a money-metric cost-benefit analysis of the effects
of social programs. Thus, if the above government program involved yearly
expenditures of $500 million, then we would know immediately that a 1% fall
in the proportion of the poor would cost on average $100 million to the gov-
ernment. That amount could then be compared to the poverty alleviation cost
of other forms of government policy.
The main advantage of cardinal estimates of poverty and equity is their ease
of communication, their ease of manipulation, and their (apparent) lack of
3DAD: Curves|Poverty gap.
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ambiguity. Government officials and the media often want the results of dis-
tributive comparisons to be produced in straightforward and seemingly precise
terms, and will often feel annoyed when this is not possible. As hinted above,
cardinal estimates of poverty and equity are, however, necessarily (and often
highly) sensitive to the choice of a number of arbitrary measurement assump-
tions.
It is clear, for example, that choosing a different poverty line will almost
always change the estimated numerical value of any index of poverty. The
elasticity of the poverty headcount index with respect to the poverty line is,
for example, often significantly larger than 1 (see Section 12.2). This implies
that a variation of 10% in the poverty line will then change by more than 10%
the estimated proportion of the poor in the population; this sensitivity is sub-
stantial, especially since poverty lines are rarely convincingly bounded within
a narrow interval.
Another source of cardinal variability comes from the choice of the form
of a distributive index. Many procedures have been proposed for instance to
aggregate individual poverty. Depending on the chosen procedure, numerical
estimates of aggregate poverty will end up larger or lower. As we will see later,
for instance, identifying a "socially representative poverty gap" will hinge par-
ticularly on the relative weight given to the more deprived among the poor.
There is little objective guidance in choosing that weight; the greater its value,
however, the greater the socially representative poverty gap, and the greater the
estimate of aggregate poverty.
Ordinal comparisons, on the other hand, do not attach a precise numerical
value to the extent of poverty or equity, but only try to rank poverty and equity
across all indices that obey some generally-defined normative (or ethical) prin-
ciples. This can be useful when it suffices to know which of two policies will
better alleviate poverty, or which of two distributions has more inequality, but
not precisely by how much. Because of this lower information requirement,
ordinal rankings can prove robust to the choice of a number of measurement
assumptions. For instance, ordinal poverty orderings can often rank poverty
over general classes of possible poverty indices and wide ranges of possible
poverty lines.
It is thus useful to consider in turn cardinal and ordinal comparisons of
poverty and equity. We first see how to construct aggregate cardinal distribu-
tive indices. Ordinal comparisons are considered in Part III.
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Figure 3.1: Quantile curve for a continuous distribution
Figure 3.2: Quantile curve for a discrete distribution
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Fisure 3.3: Incomes and oovertv at different oercentiles
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Chapter 4
MEASURING INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL
WELFARE
4.1 Lorenz curves
The Lorenz curve has been for several decades the most popular graphi-
cal tool for visualizing and comparing income inequality. As we will see, it
provides complete information on the whole distribution of incomes relative
to the mean. It therefore gives a more comprehensive description of relative
incomes than any one of the traditional summary statistics of dispersion can
give, and it is also a better starting point when looking at income inequality
than the computation of the many inequality indices that have been proposed.
As we will see, its popularity also comes from its usefulness in establishing
orderings of distributions in terms of inequality, orderings that can then be said
to be "ethically robust".
The Lorenz curve is defined as follows ' :
The numerator f£ Q(q)dq sums the incomes of the bottom p proportion (the
poorest 100p%) of the population. The denominator fj, = J0 Q(q)dq sums
the incomes of all. L(p) thus indicates the cumulative percentage of total in-
come held by a cumulative proportion p of the population, when individuals
are ordered in increasing income values. For instance, if L(0.5) = 0.3, then
we know that the 50% poorest individuals hold 30% of the total income in the
population.
'DAD: Curves]Lorenz.
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A discrete formulation of the Lorenz curve is easily provided. Recall that
the discrete income values y, are ordered such that y\ < y% < ... < yn, with
percentiles pi = i/n such that Q(pt) = yi- For i = 1, ...n, the discrete Lorenz
curve is then defined as:
If needed, other values of L(p) in (4.2) can be obtained by interpolation.
The Lorenz curve has several interesting properties. As shown in Figure
4.1, it ranges from L(0) = 0 to L(l) = I , since a proportion p = 0 of the
population necessarily holds a proportion of 0% of total income, and since a
proportion p = 1 of the population must hold 100% of aggregate income. L(p)
is increasing as p increases, since more and more incomes are then added up.
This is also seen by the fact that the derivative of L(p) equals Q(p)//j,:
This is positive if incomes are positive, as we are assuming throughout. Hence
by observing the slope of the Lorenz curve at a particular value of p, we also
know the p-quantile relative to the mean, or, in other words, the income of an
individual at rank pas a proportion of mean income. An example of this can be
seen on Figure 4.1 for p = 0.5. The slope of L(p) at that point is Q(0.5)//J,,
the ratio of the median to the mean. The slope of L(p) thus portrays the whole
distribution of mean-normalized incomes.
The Lorenz curve is also convex in p, since as p increases, the new incomes
that are being added up are greater than those that have already been counted.
This is clear from equation (4.3) since Q(p) is increasing in p. Mathematically,
a curve is convex when its second derivative is positive, and the more positive
that second derivative, the more convex is the curve. Formally, the second-
order derivative of the Lorenz curve equals
Note that by definition that p = F(Q(p)). Differentiating this identity with
respect to p, we have that 1 = f(Q(p)) d(Q(p}}/dp. Thus,
and we therefore have that
Figure 4.1: Lorenz curve
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The larger the density of income f(Q(p)) at a quantile Q(p), the less convex
the Lorenz curve at L(p). The convexity of the Lorenz curve is thus revealing
of the density of incomes at various percentiles. On Figure 4.1, this density
is thus visibly larger for lower values of p since this is where the slope of the
L(p) changes less rapidly as p increases.
Some measures of central tendency can also be identified by a look at the
Lorenz curve. In particular, the median (as a proportion of the mean) is given
by Q(0.5)//i, and thus, as mentioned above, by the slope of the Lorenz curve
at p = 0.5. Since many distributions of incomes are skewed to the right, the
mean often exceeds the median and Q(p = Q.5)//j, will typically be less than
one. The mean income in the population is found at that percentile at which the
slope of L(p) equals 1, that is, where Q(p) = /J, and thus at percentile F(/i) (as
shown on Figure 4.1). Again, this percentile will often be larger than 0.5, the
median income's percentile. The percentile of the mode (or modes) is where
L(p) is least convex, since by equation (4.4) this is where the density f(Q(p))
is highest.
Simple summary measures of inequality can readily be obtained from the
graph of a Lorenz curve. The share in total income of the bottom p proportion
of the population is given by L(p); the greater that share, the more equal is the
distribution of income. Analogously, the share in total income of the richest
p proportion of the population is given by 1 - L(p); the greater that share,
the more unequal is the distribution of income. These two simple indices of
inequality are often used in the literature.
An interesting but less well-known index of inequality is given by the pro-
portion of total income that would need to be reallocated across the population
to achieve perfect equality in income. This proportion is given by the maxi-
mum value of p — L(p), which is attained where the slope of L(p) is 1 (i.e., at
L(p = F(fj,))). It is therefore equal to F(fj) - L(F(fj,)). This index is usually
called the Schutz coefficient.
Mean-preserving equalizing transfers of income are often called Pigou-
Dalton transfers. In money-metric terms, they involve a marginal transfer of
$1, say, from a richer person (of percentile r, say) to a poorer person (of per-
centile q < r) that keeps total income constant. All indices of inequality which
do not increase (and sometimes fall) following any such equalizing transfers
are said to obey the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. These equalizing
transfers also have the consequence of moving the Lorenz curve unambigu-
ously closer to the line of perfect equality. This is because such transfers do
not affect the value of L(p) for all p up to q and for all p greater than r, but
they increase L(p) for all p between q and r.
Hence, let the Lorenz curve LB(P) of a distribution B be everywhere above
the Lorenz curve LA(P) of a distribution A. We can think of B as having been
obtained A through a series of equalizing Pigou-Dalton transfers applied to
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an initial distribution A. Hence, inequality indices which obey the principle of
transfers will unambiguously indicate more inequality in A than in B. We will
come back to this important result in Chapter 11 when we discuss how to make
ethically robust comparisons of inequality.
4.2 Gini indices
If all had the same income, the cumulative percentage of total income held
by any bottom proportion p of the population would also be p. The Lorenz
curve would then be L(p) = p: population shares and shares of total income
would be identical. A useful informational content of a Lorenz curve is thus
its distance, p — L(p), from the line of perfect equality in income. Compared
to perfect equality, inequality removes a proportion p — L(p) of total income
from the bottom 100 -p% of the population. The larger that "deficit", the larger
the inequality of income.
If we were then to aggregate that deficit between population shares and in-
come shares in income across all values of p between 0 and 1, we would get
half the well-known Gini index2:
The Gini index implicitly assumes that all "share deficits" across p are equally
important. It thus computes the average distance between cumulated popula-
tion shares and cumulated income shares.
4.2.1 Linear inequality indices and S-Gini indices
One can, however, also think of other weights to aggregate the distance
p—L(p). The class of linear inequality indices is given by applying percentile-
dependent weights to those distances. Let those weights be defined by K(P). A
popular one-parameter functional specification for such weights is given by
and depends on the value of a single "ethical" parameter p. That parameter
must be greater than 1 for the weights K(P; p)) to be positive everywhere. The
shape of K(P; p) is shown on Figure 4.2 for values of p equal to 1.5, 2 and 3.
The larger the value of p, the larger the value of K(P; p) for small p.
2DAD: lnequality|Gini/S-Gini Index.
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Figure 4.2: The weighting function K,(p; p)
Figure 4.3: The weighting function w(p;)
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Using (4.8) then gives what is called the class of S-Gini (or "Single-Parameter"
Gini) inequality indices, /(p)3:
Note4 that 1(2) is the standard Gini index. This is because K(P; p = 2) = 2, E:18.8.2
which then gives equal weight to all distances p — L(p). When 1 < p < 2,
relatively more weight is given to the distances occurring at larger values of p,
as shown by Figure 4.2. Conversely, when p > 2, relatively more weight is
given to the distances found at lower values of p. Changing p thus changes the
"ethical" concern which is felt for the "share deficits" at various cumulative
proportions of the population.
Let oj(p; p) be defined as
The shape of uj(p; p) is shown on Figure 4.3 for p equal to 1.5, 2 and 3. Note
that w(p; p) > 0 and that dw(p\ p)/dp < 0 when p > 1. Since /0 uj(p\ p)dp =
1 for any value of p, the area under each of the three curves on Figure 4.3
equals 1 too. Using (4.10) and integrating by parts equation (4.9), we can then
show that5: E:18.8.31
This says that I(p) weights deviations of incomes from the mean by weights
which fall with the ranks of individuals in the population. Since, in equation
(4.11), I(p) is a (piece-wise) linear function of the incomes Q(p), it is a mem-
ber of the class of linear inequality measures, a feature which will prove useful
later in measuring progressivity and vertical equity. The usual Gini index is
then given simply by:
Yaari (1988) defines "an indicator for the policy maker's degree of equality
mindedness at p" as —u^\p;p)/ui(p\p}, where uj^(p;p) is the first-order
3DAD: lnequality|Gini/S-Gini Index.
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derivative of OJ(P; p) with respect to p. This indicator thus captures the speed
at which the weights u(p; p) decrease with the ranks p. It gives:
Thus, the local degree of "equality mindedness" for ui(p; p) is a proportional
function of the single parameter p. As definition (4.13) makes clear, this degree
of inequality aversion is defined at a particular rank p in the distribution of
income, independently of the precise value that income takes at that rank. The
larger the value of p, the larger the local degree of equality mindedness, and the
faster the fall of the weights u>(p; p) with an increase in the rank p. Therefore,
the greater the value of p, the more sensitive is the social decision-maker to
differences in ranks when it comes to granting ethical weights to individuals.
The functions n(p',p) and o>(p;p) can also be given an interpretation in
terms of densities of the poor. Assume that r individuals are randomly selected
from the population. The probability that the income of all of these r individu-
als will exceed Q(p) is given by [1 — F(Q(p)}]r'. The probability of finding an
income below Q(p) in such samples is then 1 — [1 — F(Q(p))]r = 1 — [1 — p ] r .
1 — [1 — p]r is thus the distribution function of the lowest income in samples of
r individuals. The density of the lowest income rank in a sample of r randomly
selected incomes is the derivative of that distribution with respect to p, which
is
This helps interpret the weights K(p;p) and u}(p;p). By equation (4.8),
K(P; p) is p times the density of the lowest income in a sample of p— 1 randomly
selected individuals; analogously, by equation (4.10), o>(p; p) is the density of
the lowest income in a sample of p randomly selected individuals.
We might be interested in determining the impact of some inequality-changing
process on the inequality indices of type (4.11). One such process that can be
handled nicely spreads income away from the mean by a proportional factor A,
and thus corresponds to some form of bi-polarization of incomes away from the
mean (loosely speaking). This bi-polarization process is equivalent to adding
(A - 1) (Q(p) - n) to Q(p), since
does indeed spread income away from the mean by a proportional factor A. As
can be checked from equation (4.11), this changes I(p) proportionally by A:
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Equation (4.16) also says that the elasticity of I(p) with respect to A, when A
equals 1 initially, is equal to 1 whatever the value of the parameter p: —gj-f- / I ( p )
= A.
Such bi-polarization away from the mean is also equivalent to a process that
increases the distance p — L(p) by a factor A. That this gives the same change
in I(p) can be checked from equation (4.9). This bi-polarization process thus
increases the deficit p — L(p) between population shares p and income shares
L (p) by a constant factor A across all p. We will see later in Chapter 12 how this
distance-increasing process leads to a nice illustration of the possible impact
of changes in inequality on poverty.
As shown on Figure 4.3 and in equation 4.11, the larger the value of p, the
greater the weight given to the deviation of low incomes from the mean. When
p becomes very large, the index I(p) equals the proportional deviation from
the mean of the lowest income. When p = 1, the same weight w(p; p = 1) =
I is given to all deviations from the mean, which then makes the inequality
index I(p = 1) always equal to 0, regardless of the income distribution under
consideration. Thus, S-Gini indices range between 0 (when all incomes are
equal to the mean or when the ethical parameter p is set to 1) and 1 (when total
income is concentrated in the hands of only one individual, or when p is large
and the lowest income is close to 0). Since the Lorenz curve moves towards
p when a Pigou-Dalton equalizing transfer is implemented, the value of the
S-Gini indices also naturally decreases with such transfers.
Hence, p is a parameter of "inequality aversion" that captures our concern
for the deviation of quantiles from the mean at various ranks in the popu-
lation. In this sense, it is analogous to the parameter f. of relative inequality
aversion which we will discuss below in the context of the Atkinson indices.
For the standard Gini index of inequality, we have that p = 2 and thus that
u(p;p — 2) = 2(1—p); hence in assessing the standard Gini, the weight on the
deviation of one's income from the mean decreases linearly with one's rank in
the distribution of income. In a discrete formulation, the weights u(p; p) take
the form of:
4.2.2 Interpreting Gini indices
The S-Gini indices can also be shown to be equal to the covariance formula
58 POVERTY AND EQUITY
a formula which can simplify their computation with common spreadsheet or
statistical softwares. The traditional Gini is then simply:
and is just a proportion of the covariance between incomes and their ranks.
Note here the interesting analogy of (4.19) with the variance, given by
A further useful interpretive property of the standard Gini index is that it
equals half the mean-normalized average distance between all incomes:
Thus, if we find that the Gini index of an income distribution equals 0.4, then
we know that the average distance between the incomes of that distribution is
of the order of 80% of the mean. Again, note the interesting link of (4.21) with
another definition of the variance, which is var(Q(p)) = 0.5JJ, 0 \Q(p) —f
Q(q)\2dpdq.
The Gini index can also be computed as the integral of a simple transfor-
mation of the familiar cumulative distribution function. Recall that F(y) and
1 — F(y) are simply the proportions of individuals with incomes below and
above y. If we integrate the product of these proportions across all possible
values of y, we again obtain the Gini coefficient:
Note also that F(y) (1 — F(y}) is largest at F(y) = 0.5, which also explains
why the Gini index is often said to be most sensitive to changes in incomes
occurring around the median income.
Now suppose that society can be split into two classes, and that income is
equally distributed within each class.
1 Assume that those in the first class hold no income. The Gini index of the
total population is then given by the population share of that zero-income
class.
2 Assume that the population share of each group is 0.5. The Gini index
of the total population is then given by 0.5 — Z/(0.5). In other words, the
income share of the bottom class is 0.5 minus the Gini coefficient.
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3 Assume that the population share of each group is again 0.5. Denote the
incomes of those in the richer class by yn and of those in the poorer class
by yp. We then have:
or alternatively
which gives a simple relationship between incomes and the Gini coefficient.
For instance, if ypi = Xyp, then the Gini index is simply (A — 1)/(2A + 2);
for A = 2, we thus have I(p = 2) = 1/6.
4.2.3 Gini indices and relative deprivation
A final interesting interpretation of the Gini index is in terms of relative
deprivation, which has been linked in the sociological and psychological lit-
erature to subjective well-being, social protest and political unrest. Runciman
(1966) defines it as follows:
The magnitude of a relative deprivation is the extent of the difference between the
desired situation and that of the person desiring it (as he sees it), (p. 10)
Sen (1973), Yitzhaki (1979) and Hey and Lambert (1980) follow Runci-
man's lead to propose for each individual an indicator of relative deprivation
that measures the distance between his income and the income of all those rel-
ative to whom he feels deprived. For instance, let the relative deprivation of an
individual with income Q(p), when comparing himself to another individual
with income Q(q), be given by:
The expected relative deprivation of an individual at rank p is then S(p)6:
As we did for the "shares deficits" above, we can aggregate the relative depri-
vation at every percentile p by applying the weights K(P', p). We can show that
this gives the S-Gini indices of inequality:
6DAD: CurvesjRelative Deprivation.
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Hence, the S-Gini indices are also a weighted average of the average relative
deprivation felt in a population. By equations (4.8), (4.14) and (4.27), they
equal the expected relative deprivation of the poorest individual in a sample
of p — 1 randomly selected individuals. The greater the value of p, the more
important is the relative deprivation of the poorer in computing /(/>).
4.3 Social welfare and inequality
We now introduce the concept of a social welfare function. Unlike rela-
tive inequality, which considers incomes relative to the mean, social welfare
aggregates absolute incomes. We will see that under some popular conditions
on the shape of social welfare functions, the measurement of inequality and
social welfare can often be nicely linked and integrated, and that the tools used
for the two concepts are then similar. This will explain why some inequality
indices are sometimes called "normative".
The social welfare functions we consider take the form of:
where for expositional simplicity we restrict w(p) to be of the special form
u>(p;p) defined by equation (4.10). U(Q(p)} is a "utility function" of income
Q(p). Social welfare is then the expected utility of the poorest individual in a
sample of (p — 1) individuals.
Another requirement that we wish to impose on the form of W is that it
be homothetic. Homotheticity of W is analogous to the requirement for con-
sumer utility functions that the expenditure shares of the different consump-
tion goods be constant as income increases, or the requirement for production
functions that the ratios of the marginal products of inputs stay constant as
output is increased. For social welfare measurement, homotheticity implies
that the ratio of the marginal social utilities (the marginal utility being given
by U'(Q(p})uj(p)) of any two individuals in a population stays the same when
all incomes are changed by the same proportion. For (4.28) to be homothetic,
we need U(Q(p)) to take the popular form of U(Q(p); e), which is defined as
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Hence, W in equation (4.28) will depend on the parameters p and on e, and we
will denote this as W(p, e)7:
Homotheticity of a social welfare function has an important advantage: the
social welfare function can then easily be used to measure relative inequality.
To see how this can be done, define £(p, e) as the equally distributed income
that is equivalent, in terms of social welfare, to the actual distribution of in-
come. We will refer to £ as the EDE income, the equally distributed equivalent
income. £(p, e) is implicitly defined as:
The index of inequality / corresponding to the social welfare function W
is then defined as the distance between the EDE and the mean incomes, ex-
pressed as a proportion of mean income:
Using ((p, e) in (4.35) gives I ( p , e): I(p, e) = 1 - £(p, e)//i8.
Clearly, then, the EDE income is a simple function of average income and
inequality, with
7DAD: Welfare|S-Gini Index.
8DAD: lnequality|Atkinson-Gini Index.
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Compared to W, £ has the advantage of being money metric and thus of be-
ing easily interpreted. It can, for instance, be compared to other economic
indicators that are also expressed in money-metric terms.
To increase social welfare, we can either increase n or we can increase
equality of income 1 — I by decreasing inequality I. Two distributions of in-
come can display the same social welfare even with different average incomes
if these differences are offset by differences in inequality. This is shown in
Figure 4.4, starting initially with two different levels of mean income IJLQ and
Hi and common zero inequality. We then have that £ = HQ and f = p,i. To
preserve the same level of social welfare in the presence of inequality, mean
income must be higher: this is shown by the positive slope of the constant £
functions. Furthermore, as inequality becomes larger, further increases in /
must be matched by higher and higher increases in mean income for social
welfare not to fall.
Defined as in (4.35), inequality has an interesting interpretation: it measures
the difference between
• the mean level of actual income
« and the (lower) level that would instead be needed to achieve the same level
of social welfare were income distributed equally across the population.
This difference being expressed as a proportion of mean income, / thus shows
the per capita proportion of income that is "wasted" in social welfare terms
because of its unequal distribution. Society as a whole would bejust as well-off
with an equal distribution of a proportion of just 1 — / of total actual income. /
can thus be interpreted as a unit-free indicator of the social cost of inequality.
Let a distribution B of income be a proportional re-scaling of a distribution
A. In other words, for a constant A > 0, let QB(P) — ^QA(P) for all p. If
the social welfare function used for the computation of 7 is homothetic, it
must be that I A = IB- This is illustrated in Figure 4.5 for the case of two
incomes j/j4 and y% for an initial distribution A, and two incomes j/f and y%
for a "scaled-up" distribution B (since A > 1). Social welfare in A is given
by WA- The social indifference curve WA shown in Figure 4.5 also depicts the
many other combinations of incomes that would yield the same level of social
welfare. The combinations at point F correspond to a situation of equality of
income where both individuals enjoy £4- £4 is therefore the equally distributed
income that is socially equivalent to the distribution (y^, y%).
The average income in A is given by HA, which leads to point G = (fj,A, P-A)
in Figure 4.5. Hence two distributions of income, one made of the vector
(y^y^} and me omer °ftne vector (£4, £4), generate the same level WA of
social welfare, the first with an unequally distributed average income JJ.A and
the other with an equally distributed average income £4. Hence, the vertical
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(or horizontal) distance between point F and point G in Figure 4.5 can be
understood as the "cost of inequality" in A's distribution of income. Taking
that distance as a proportion of /M (see equation (4.35)) gives the index of
inequality I A-
That yf = Ayj4 and yf = \y$ for the same A can be seen from the fact
that the two vectors of income lie along the same ray from the origin. If the
function W is homothetic, then inequality in A must be the same as inequality
in B. In other words, the distance between points D and E as a proportion of
the distance OE must be the same as the distance between points F and G as
a proportion of the distance OG.
4.4 Social welfare
4.4.1 Atkinson indices
Two special cases of W(p, e) are of particular interest in assessing social
welfare and relative inequality. The first is when income ranks are not impor-
tant per se in computing social welfare: this is obtained with p = 1, and it
yields the well-known Atkinson additive social welfare function, W(e)9:
This Atkinson social welfareatk function has had two major interpretations: 1)
first, as a utilitarian social welfare function, where U(Q(p); e) is an individual
utility function displaying decreasing marginal utilities of income, and 2) sec-
ond, as a concave social evaluation of a concave individual utility of income.
It can be argued, however, that "it is fairly restrictive to think of social wel-
fare as a sum of individual welfare components", and that one might feel that
"the social value of the welfare of individuals should depend crucially on the
levels of welfare (or incomes) of others" (Sen 1973, pp.30 and 41). The un-
restricted form W(p, e) allows for such interdependence and may therefore be
thought more flexible than the Atkinson additive formulation. In the light of
the above, we can indeed interpret W(p, e) as the expected utility of the poor-
est individual in a group of p randomly selected individuals, or the expected
social valuation of the utility of such individuals. This interpretation of the
social evaluation function W(p, e) confirms why it is not additive or separable
in individual welfare: the social welfare weight on U(Q(p)', e) depends on the
rank p of the individual in the whole distribution of income. It is only when
e = 1 that W(p, e) gives the average utility U(Q(p); e) weighted by a function
of ranks.
9DAD: WelfarejAtkinson Index.
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Figure 4.6 shows the shape of the utility functions U (y; e) for different val-
ues of e.10 Incomes are shown on the horizontal axis as a proportion of their
mean, and utility U (y, e) can be read on the vertical axis. The normalization
U (n; e) = 1 has been applied for graphical convenience. Although for all val-
ues of e, the slope of U (y ; e) is positive, that slope is not constant. This is made
more explicit on Figure 4.7 which shows the marginal social utility of income
U^ (y; e) for different values of e. Again, a normalization of U^ (/j; e) = 1
is applied. For e = 0, the marginal social utility is constant: increasing by
a given amount a poor person's income has the same social welfare impact
as increasing by the same amount a richer person's income. For e > 0, how-
ever, increasing the poor's income is socially more desirable than increasing
the rich's. The larger the value of e, the faster marginal social utility falls with
y-
By (4.33) and (4.35), the Atkinson inequality index is then given by11 :
The Atkinson indices are said to exhibit constant relative inequality aversion
since the elasticity of U^(Q(p); e) with respect to Q(p) is constant and equal
toe:
The parameter e is thus usually called the Atkinson parameter of relative in-
equality aversion.
Figure 4.8 illustrates graphically the link between the Atkinson social evalu-
ation functions W(t) and their associated inequality indices. For this, suppose
a population of only two individuals, with incomes y\ and 2/2 as shown on the
horizontal axis. Mean income is given by fj, = (y\ + 2/2) /2 (the middle point
between y\ and y?). The utility function U(y; e) has a positive but decreas-
ing slope. W(e) is then given by (U (y\) + U (2/2)) /2, the average height of
If equally distributed, a mean income of f would be sufficient to generate
that same level of social welfare, since on Figure 4.8 we have that W(e) =
[/(£; e) . The cost of inequality is thus given by the distance between /j, and f ,
shown as C on Figure 4.8. Inequality is the ratio C/ ' p,.
Graphically, the more "concave" the function U(y; (.} , the greater the cost
of inequality and the greater the inequality indices J(e). This can be seen on
'"This paragraph draws from Cowell (1995), pp.40-41.
"DAD: lnequality|Atkinson Index.
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Figure 4.9 where two functions U(y; e) have been drawn, with different relative
inequality aversion parameters e° < e1. We have that W(£) = U (£°; e°) and
W(0 = ^ (£*> e1)- The difference in relative inequality aversion parameters
nevertheless leads to f° > £*, and therefore to /(e°) < /(e1). A specification
with greater inequality aversion leads to a greater inequality index, and to
the judgement that inequality costs socially a greater proportion of average
4.4.2 S-Gini social welfare indices
The second special case of W(p, e) is obtained when the utility functions
U(Q(p)\e) are linear in the levels of income, and thus when 6 = 0. This yields
the class of S-Gini social welfaresgini functions, W(p)12:
Social welfare is then the expected income of the poorest individual in a group
of p randomly selected individuals. By (4.33), this is also the EDE income.
Hence, the associated inequality indices are given by:
which is seen by (4.11) to be the same as the S-Gini inequality indices I ( p ) .
Hence, social welfare and the EDE income equal per capita income corrected
by the extent of relative deprivation in those incomes:
4.4.3 Generalized Lorenz curves
A useful curve for the analysis of the distribution of absolute incomes is the
Generalized Lorenz curve. It is defined as GL(p)13:(:
and is illustrated on Figure 4.10. The Generalized Lorenz curve has all of the
attributes of the Lorenz curve, except for the fact that it does not normalize
l2DAD:Welfare|S-Gini Index.
"DAD: Curves!Generalized Lorenz.
income
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incomes by their mean. GL(p) gives the absolute contribution to per capita
income of the bottom p proportion (the 100p% poorest) of the population.
GL(p) is thus also the per capita income that would be available if society
could rely only on the income of the bottom p proportion of the population.
Assume for instance that p, = $20000 and that GL(0.5) = $5000. Then, per
capita income would be only $5000 if we assumed that the richest 50% of
the population were suddenly to retire and earn no income... Note also that
GL(p)/p gives the average income of the bottom p proportion of the popu-
lation. In the example just provided, the average income of the 50% poorest
would be $10,000, half the level of overall average income.
Combining (4.9), (4.35) and (4.40) further shows that the Generalized Lorenz
curve has a nice graphical link to the S-Gini indices of social welfare:
4.5 Statistical and descriptive indices of
inequality
A popular descriptive index of inequality is the quantile ratio. This is simply
the ratio of two quantiles, Q(pi)/Q(pi) using percentiles p\ andp214- Popular
values of pi and p-2 include p\ = 0.25 and pi = 0.75 (the quartile ratio), as
well as pi = 0.10 and pi = 0.90 (the decile ratio). Note that these values
of p\ and p2 are often reversed. Median income is also a popular choice for
Q(p\). Observe also that these ratios are by definition insensitive to changes
that affect quantiles other than Q(pi) and Q(pi}. Moreover, none of them is
consistent with Lorenz inequality orderings: it can be that the Lorenz curve
for a distribution A is always above that of distribution B, but that quantile
ratios suggest that B has less inequality than A. For inequality analysis, an
arguably better choice for normalizing Q(p^) is mean income — an index such
as Q(pz}/^ can indeed be shown to be consistent with first-order (restricted)
inequality dominance (we discuss this in Chapter 11).
The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean
of income. It is given by15:
and is therefore a function of the squared distance between incomes and the
mean.
'•'DAD: lnequality|Quantiles Ratio.
I5DAD: lnequality|Coefficient of Variation.
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Two other popular measures of inequality use distances in logarithms of
income. The first one, which we can call the logarithmic variance, is defined
as16
and the second, the variance of logarithms, as17
These two last measures do not, however, always obey the Pigou-Dalton prin-
ciple of transfers — that is, they will sometimes increase following a spread-
reducing transfer of income between two individuals.
Finally, the relative mean deviation is the average absolute deviation from
mean income, normalized by mean income18:
Note that this measure is insensitive to transfers made between individuals
whose income lies on the same side of the mean.
4.6 Decomposing inequality by population
subgroups
A frequent goal is to explain the total amount of inequality in a distribu-
tion by the extent of inequality found among socio-economic groups ("intra"
or "within" group inequality) and across them ("inter" or "between" group in-
equality). There are several ways to do this. One method uses the class of
inequality indices that are exactly decomposable into terms that account for
within- and between-groups inequality. Although that class can be given a
justification in terms of social welfare functions, this exercise is less transpar-
ent and intuitive than for the classes of relative inequality indices considered
hitherto. Another method applies the Shapley decomposition to any type of
inequality indices. We discuss these two methods in turn.
4.6.1 Generalized entropy indices of inequality
For most practical purposes, we can express these decomposable inequality
indices as Generalized entropy indices. We denote them as I(6)19:
16DAD: lnequality|Logarithmic Variance.
"DAD: InequalityjVariance of Logarithms.
I8DAD: InequalitylRelative Mean Deviation.
'•'DAD: InequalityJEntropy Index.
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Some special cases of (4.50) are worth noting. First, if we constrain 9 to be
no greater than 1 and let 9 = 1 — e, 1(6} becomes ordinally equivalent to the
family of Atkinson indices. This simply means that if an Atkinson index /(e)
indicates that there is more inequality in a distribution A than in a distribution
B, then the index 1(9) with 9 = 1 - e will also necessarily indicate more
inequality in A than in B. Second, the special case 1(9 = 0) gives the Mean
Logarithmic Deviation, since 1(9 = 0) can also be expressed as
that is, as the average deviation between the logarithm of the mean and the log-
arithms of incomes. 1(8 = 1) gives the well-known Theil index of inequality.
1(6 = 2) is half the square of the coefficient of variation (see (4.46)) since
1(6 = 2) can be rewritten as
ulation subgroups, k = 1, ..., K. The indices in (4.50) can then be decomposed
as follows20:
where 0(fc) is the proportion of the total population that belongs to subgroup
k and p,(k) is the mean income of subgroup k.
• I(k\ d) is inequality within subgroup k, defined in exactly the same way as
in (4.50) for the total population. The first term in (4.53) can thus be inter-
preted as a weighted sum of the within-group inequalities in the distribution
of income.
20DAD: Decomposition|Entropy: Decomposition by Groups.
Now assume that ewe can split the population into K mutually exclusive pop_
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• 1(9) is total population inequality when each individual in subgroup k is
given the mean income n(k) of his subgroup (namely, when within sub-
group inequality has been eliminated). 1(9} can thus be interpreted as the
contribution of between-group inequality to total inequality.
Note, however, that only when 9 = 0 is it the case that the within-group
inequality contributions do not depend on mean income in the groups; the
terms J(fc; 9 = 0) are then strictly population-weighted. Otherwise, the within-
group inequalities are weighted by weights which depend on the mean income
in the subgroups k. Depending on the context, this can make 1(6 = 0) a more
attractive decomposable index than for other values of d.
4.6.2 A subgroup Shapley decomposition of
inequality indices
This decomposition involves two steps. The first one is to decompose to-
tal inequality into global between-group and within-group contributions. The
second step is to the express global within-group contribution as a sum of the
within-group contribution of each of the groups.
For each of these two steps, we want to assess by how much inequality
would be reduced if we removed one of the "factors" that contribute to in-
equality. Take for instance the first step. It has two factors, within-group and
between-group inequality. By how much would inequality fall if between-
group inequality were eliminated? One estimate would be given by the dif-
ference between initial inequality and inequality after the mean income of all
groups has been equalized. Another estimate would be given by the inequal-
ity that remains once within-group inequality is removed and all that there is
left is between-group inequality. These two estimates, however, will generally
differ. Which one is better? Since there is no right answer to this question,
an alternative is to use the average of the two estimates. Note that the first
estimate gives the effect of the first factor when the second factor has not been
removed, while the second estimate gives the effect of the first factor after the
second factor has been eliminated.
Using the average marginal effect of removing a factor across all factor
elimination sequences is what is implied by the choice of the Shapley value
as a decomposition procedure. The procedure is detailed in an appendix found
below in Section 4.7.
As mentioned above, applying the Shapley decomposition procedure to our
sub-group inequality decomposition problem involves two steps. In the first
step, we suppose that the two Shapley factors are between-group and within-
group inequality. The basic rules followed to compute the marginal contribu-
tion of each of these factors are:
70 POVERTY AND EQUITY
1 first, to eliminate within-group inequality and to calculate between-group
inequality, we use a vector of incomes in which each observation is as-
signed the average income n(k) of the observation's group k;
2 to eliminate between-group inequality and to calculate within-group in-
equality, we use a vector of incomes where each observation has its income
multiplied by the ratio /j,(k}/n of its group k.
To be more precise, let an inequality index / depend on the incomes of
individuals in k = 1, ...,K groups, each group with n(k) individuals. Let y(fc)
be the n(fc)-vector of incomes of group k. We want to express total inequality
/ as a sum of between- and within- group inequality21:
To compute the contribution of between-group inequality, we compute the
fall of inequality observed when the mean incomes of the groups are equalized.
This can be done either before or after within-group inequality has been re-
moved. Hence, the Shapley contribution of between-group inequality is given
by:
where l(fc) is a unit vector of size n^. The within-group contribution is then
given as
The second step consists in decomposing total within-group inequality as a
sum of within-group inequality across groups. To do this, we proceed by re-
placing the incomes of those in a group k by n(k) in order to eliminate group
k's contribution to total within-group inequality. The fall in inequality induced
by this equalization of incomes is the contribution of group k to total within-
group inequality. We compute this for each group. Given that this computation
depends on the sequence ordering of the groups, we compute the average con-
tribution of a group k over all possible orderings of groups. This gives the
Shapley value of group k's contribution to total within-group inequality.
21 DAD: Decomposition|S-Gini: Decomposition by Groups.
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To formalize this, suppose that there are only two groups, k = 1,2. The first
group's contribution to total within-group inequality is given as
and symmetrically for the second group.
4.7 Appendix: the Shapley valueue
The Shapley value is a solution concept often employed in the theory of co-
operative games. Consider a set 5 of s players who must divide some surplus
among themselves. The question to resolve is: how can we divide the sur-
plus between the s players? To see how, suppose that the s players can form
coalitions (s) (these coalitions are subsets of 5) to extract a part of the surplus
and redistribute it between their a members. Suppose that the function V de-
termines the extracting force of the coalition, viz, that amount of the surplus
that it can extract without resorting to an agreement with those players that are
outside of the coalition. The value of an additional player J in a coalition (s) is
given by
The term MV(®,i) equals the marginal value added by player i after his
adhesion to the coalition (s). What will then be the expected marginal con-
tribution of player i over the different possible coalitions that can be formed
and which he can join? Note that the number of possible permutations of
the s players equals s!. Note also that the size of coalitions (S) is limited to
a 6 {0, 1, ...s — 1}. Out of s! possible permutations of players, the number of
times that the same first a players are located in a same coalition (s) is given
by the number of possible permutations of the a players in coalition ®, that
is, by cr\. For every permutation in the coalition (s), we find (s — a — 1)! per-
mutations for the players that complement the coalition (s) (excluding player
i). The Shapley value gives the expected marginal value that player i generates
after his adhesion to a coalition (s) of any possible size a. It is thus given by:
This decomposition procedure has two useful properties. The first is symmetry,
ensuring that the contribution of each factor is independent of the order in
which it appears in the initial list or sequence of factors. The second property
is exactness and additivity, from which the total surplus is given by X};=i @i-
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For decompositions of inequality or poverty indices, say, applying a Shapley
procedure consists in computing the marginal effect on such indices of remov-
ing each contributing factor (between or within group inequality, inequality in
income component, differences in mean income, etc.) in a given sequence of
elimination. Repeating the computation for all possible elimination sequences,
we estimate the mean of the marginal effects for each factor. This mean pro-
vides the contribution of each such factor. The contribution of all factors yield
an exact, additive decomposition of distributive indices and variations in them
into s contributions.
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Figure 4.4: Mean income and inequality for constant social welfare £
Figure 4.5: Homothetic social evaluation functions
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Figure 4.6: Social utility and incomes
Figure 4.7: Marginal social utility and incomes
Figure 4.8: Atkinson social evaluation functions and the cost of inequality 
Figure 4.9: Inequality aversion and the cost of inequality
Figure 4.10: Generalized Lorenz curve
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Chapter 5
MEASURING POVERTY
5.1 Poverty indices
Two approaches have been used to devise cardinal indices of poverty. The
first uses the concept of equally distributed equivalent ( EDE) incomes, and
applies it to distributions whose incomes have been censored at the poverty
line. It then compares those EDE incomes to the poverty line. The second
approach transforms incomes and the poverty line into poverty gaps, and ag-
gregates these gaps using social-welfare like functions. We look at these two
approaches in turn.
5.1.1 The EDE approach
For the EDE approach to building poverty indices, we start with the dis-
tribution of income Q(p). Since, for poverty comparisons, we want to focus
on those incomes that fall below the poverty line (the "focus axiom"), the in-
comes Q(p) are censored at the poverty line z to give Q*(p', z). The censored
incomes are then aggregated using one of the many social welfare functions
that have been proposed in the literature, such as the Atkinson or S-Gini ones.
A poverty index is obtained by taking the difference between the poverty line
and the EDE income. For instance, for the social welfare functions proposed
in section 4.3, this procedure leads to the following class of poverty indices:
where £"(2; p, e) is the EDE income of the distribution of censored income
Q*(p; z) and where we need p > 1 and e > 0 for the Pigou-Dalton transfer
principle not to be violated. P(z; p, e) can then be interpreted as the "socially
representative" or EDE poverty gap.
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Examples of such poverty indices include a transformation of the Clark,
Hemming and Ulph's (CHU) second class of poverty indices, given by P(z; e) =
The CHU indices are then obviously closely related to the Atkinson social
welfareatk functions and inequality indices. When e = 1, the CHU poverty
index is also the EDE poverty gap corresponding to the Watts poverty index,
an index which is defined as2:
For 0 < e < 1, the CHU indices also correspond to the EDE poverty gap of
the class of poverty indices proposed by Chakravarty, PC(z; e):
Moreover, if we choose e = 0 for the class of indices defined in (5.1), we
obtain the class of S-Gini indices of poverty, P(z; p f :
P(z; p = 2) is then a "Gini-like" index of poverty.
5.1.2 The poverty gap approach
The second approach to constructing poverty indices uses the distribution
of poverty gaps, g(p; z) = z — Q*(p; z). Once this distribution is known, no
other use of the poverty line is needed for the aggregation of poverty. Because
of this, the poverty gap approach to constructing poverty indices is slightly
more restrictive and also puts more structure on the shape of the allowable
poverty indices than the previous EDE approach. After the distribution of
poverty gaps has been computed, we may use aggregating functions analogous
to those used in Section 4.3 for the analysis of social welfare. Like social
'DAD: Poverty|CHU Index.
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welfare functions,where we normally want an increase in someone's income
to increase social welfare, we would normally wish the poverty indices to be
increasing in poverty gaps. Unlike social welfare functions, however, where
an equalizing Pigou-Dalton transfer would often increase the value of a social
welfare function, we would typically wish a poverty index to decrease when
such an equalizing transfer of income takes place.
A popular class of poverty gap indices that can obey these axioms is known
as the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT ) class. It differentiates its members using
an ethical parameter a > 0 and is generally defined as4 E: 18.7.4
for the normalized FGT poverty indices and as
for the un-normalized version (which can sometimes be more useful than the
more usual normalized form). Note that poverty gap indices other than the FGT
ones can also be easily proposed, simply by using other aggregating functions
of poverty gaps that obey some of the desirable axioms (such as that of being
increasing and convex in poverty gaps) discussed in the literature.
5.1.3 Interpreting FGT indices
When a = 0, the FGT index gives the simplest and most commonly used
poverty index. It is called the poverty headcount ratio, and is simply the pro-
portion of a population that is in poverty (those with a positive poverty gap),
F (z) 5. The shorter expression "poverty headcount" is sometimes meant to E:18.1.1
indicate the absolute (as opposed to the relative) number of the poor in the pop-
ulation. Since our population size is normalized ton 1 in the this book, we will
use the two expressions " headcount" and " headcount ratio" interchangeably.
The next simplest and most commonly used index, na(z), is given by the
average poverty gap, P(z; a = 1), and is the average shortfall of income from
the poverty line:
To see how to interpret the form of the FGT indices for general values of
a, consider Figure 5.1. It shows the (absolute) contributions to total poverty
"DAD: Poverty|FGT Index.
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P(z; a) of individuals at different ranks p. These contributions are given by
(g(p; z)/z)a. For a = 0, the contribution is a constant 1 for the poor and 0 for
the rich (those whose rank exceeds F(z) on the Figure, or equivalently those
whose income Q(p) exceeds z). The headcount is then the area covered by
the dotted rectangle on Figure 5.1. For a = 1, the contribution of someone at
p equals his normalized poverty gap, g(p; z)/z. Poverty is then the area under-
neath the g(p; z}/z curve drawn on Figure 5.1. The same reasoning is valid for
higher values of a. For instance, the absolute contribution to P(z; a = 3) of
individuals at rank p is given by (g(p\ z ) / z ) on Figure 5.1, and P(z; a = 3)
equals the area underneath the (g(p; z)/z)3 curve.
Notwithstanding the above, interpreting the numerical value of FGT indices
for a different from 0 and 1 can be problematic. We can easily understand what
is meant by a proportion of the population in poverty or by an average poverty
gap, but what, for instance, can a squared-poverty-gap index actually signify?
And how to explain it to a government Minister?... A further difficulty with
such indices emerges from a closer look at Figure 5.1, which indicates that
the absolute contribution of poverty gaps to poverty decreases with a — the
contribution curves (g(p)/z)a move down as a rises. This also implies that
the normalized FGT indices necessarily fall as a increases. This is paradoxical
since it is usually argued that the higher the value of a, the greater the focus on
those who suffer most "severely" from poverty. It would thus be more natural
if an increase in a also increased P(z; a).
5.1.4 Relative contributions to FGT indices
One partial solution to these interpretive problems is to switch one's focus
from the absolute to the relative contribution to an FGT index of individuals
with different poverty gaps. Such a relative contribution is depicted on Figure
5.2 for a = 0, 1 and 2. It shows the ratio of the absolute contributions g(p)a
to total poverty P(z\ a) — these ratios are the same for normalized and un-
normalized FGT indices. Since this graph shows relative contributions to total
poverty, the area underneath each of the three curves must in all cases equal 1.
For a = 0, each poor contributes relatively the same constant l/F(z) to the
poverty headcount. The poor's relative contribution to the average poverty gap
increases with their own poverty gap, as shown by the curve g(p)/P(z; a = 1).
That relative contribution equals 1 for those individuals whose own poverty gap
is precisely equal to the average poverty gap. The rank of such individuals is
given by F(p,a(z)}, as is also shown on Figure 5.2. Thus, those located at
p = F(p,B(z}} have a poverty gap that is representative of the average poverty
gap in the population. Increasing a from 1 to 2 decreases the relative con-
tribution of the not-so-poor, but inversely increases the contribution of those
with the highest poverty gaps as shown by the curve g(p;z}/P(z;a = 2).
This then becomes consistent with the general view that, in the aggregation of
00
0
0
0
Figure 5.1: Contribution of poverty gaps to FGT indices
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individual poverty, higher values of a put more emphasis on those who suffer
most severely from poverty — those with lower values of p and higher values
ofg(p;z).
5.1.5 EDE poverty gaps for FGT indices
Figure 5.2 does not, however, solve the main interpretation problems associ-
ated with the FGT indices. As mentioned above, explaining to non-technicians
or policymakers the practical meaning of FGT indices for general values of a
is difficult since these indices are averages of powers of poverty gaps. They are
also neither unit-free nor money-metric (except for a = 0 and 1). An another
already-mentioned difficulty is that the usual FGT indices will generally fall
with an increase in the value of their poverty aversion parameter, a.
A simple solution to these two problems is to transform the FGT indices
into EDE poverty gaps. An EDE poverty gap is that poverty gap which —
if it were assigned equally to all individuals — would yield the same aggre-
gate poverty index as that which is currently observed. An EDE poverty gap
can then usefully be interpreted as a socially-representative poverty gap. This
transformation provides a money-metric measure of poverty which can be use-
fully compared across different poverty indices and/or across different values
of a. As we will see later, it also allows the analyst to determine the impact of
poverty-gap inequality upon the level of poverty. For the un-normalized FGT
indices, the EDE poverty gap is given simply by (for a > O)6
For the normalized FGT indices, it is just £9(z; a) = f,9(z', a)/z. An EDE
poverty gap cannot be defined for a = 0.
Figure 5.3 shows such socially-representative poverty gaps £,a(z; a) for dif-
ferent values of a. In each case, we obtain a socially-weighted money-metric
indicator of the distribution of deprivation in the population. This summary ag-
gregate indicator can also be compared to the individual distribution of poverty,
given by the g(p; z) curve. Those whose g(p\z) exceeds £9(z;a) experi-
ence more poverty than the socially representative average. Those exactly at
£9(z; a) are located exactly at the socially representative poverty gap. Those
representative individuals are thus found at the ranks given by F(£g(z;a)),
which are also shown on Figure 5.3 for different values of a.
An important point to note is that an increase in a moves the socially-
representative poverty gap closer to that experienced by the poorest individ-
uals. This is since £ff(z; a + 1) > £g(z; a) for any a > 0. (This is unlike the
usual definition of the FGT indices, for which we have P(z; a + 1) < P(z; a)
6DAD: Poverty|FGT Index.
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for any a > 0.) Hence, we can readily interpret increases in a as leading
to increases in the socially-representative poverty gap, and thus in the relative
weight given to the poorer of the poor. The larger the value of a, the more
important are the most severe cases of deprivation in computing a socially-
representative aggregate level of poverty.
Note finally that, besides being already in an EDE poverty gap form, the
S-Gini index of poverty also has the property of being a poverty gap index.
Indeed, by (5.5), we have that
5.2 Group-decomposable poverty indices
Much of the early literature on the construction of poverty indices focussed
on whether indices were decomposable across population subgroups. This has
led to the identification of a subgroup of poverty indices known as the "class
of decomposable poverty indices". These indices have the property of being
expressible as a weighted sum (more generally, as a separable function) of
the same poverty indices assessed across population subgroups. They most
commonly include the FGT and the Chakravarty classes of indices as well as
the Watts index.
Let the population be divided into K mutually exclusive population sub-
groups, where tf>(k) is the share of the population found in subgroup k. For the
FGT indices, we then have that:
where P(k; z; a) is the FGT poverty index of subgroup k1'. The Watts and E: 18.6
Chakravarty indices are expressible as a sum of the poverty indices of each
subgroup in exactly the same way as for the FGT indices in (5.11).
To illustrate the practical implications of the group-decomposition property,
consider the following two-group (K = 2) example. Let the first group contain
40% of the total population, and let poverty in group 1 be 0.8 and that of group
2 be 0.4. Poverty in the total population is then a simple weighted mean of
group poverty, and is immediately computable as 0.4 • 0.8 -I- 0.6 • 0.4 = 0.56.
Estimates of total poverty in a population can then be constructed in a de-
centralized manner, first by estimating poverty within communities or regions,
and then by averaging over these decentralized estimates, without there being
a need for all of the micro data to be regrouped in one single register.
7DAD:Decomposition|FGT: Decomposition by Groups.
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Subgroup decomposability also implies that an income improvement in one
of the subgroups will necessarily improve aggregate poverty if the incomes in
the other groups have not changed. It will also mean that the optimal design of
social safety nets and benefit targeting within any given group can be assessed
independently of the income distribution in the other groups: only the distribu-
tive characteristics of the relevant group matter for the exercise. If targeting
succeeds in decreasing poverty at a local level, then it must also succeed at the
aggregate level.
Subgroup decomposability is therefore useful, although it is certainly not
imperative for poverty analysis. In particular, it is not because an index fa-
cilitates poverty profiling and targeting analysis that this index is necessarily
ethically fine. Ease of computation and ethical soundness are also two dif-
ferent an potentially conflicting criteria. Among other things, imposing the
decomposability and additivity property can mean sacrificing some important
ethical features in the aggregation of poverty. In that context, Ravallion (1994)
notes that when measuring poverty "one possible objection to additivity is that
it attaches no weight to one aspect of a poverty profile: the inequality between
subgroups in the extent of poverty". This can be an important flaw if for in-
stance between-group relative deprivation is considered ethically significant.
5.3 Poverty and inequality
Expressing poverty indices in the form of EDE poverty gaps enables the de-
composition of poverty as a sum of average poverty and inequality in poverty.
Let £9(z) be the EDE poverty gap and S9(z) be the cost of inequality in
poverty gaps. We then have:
or, alternatively,
For instance, for the popular FGT indices, we have that the cost of inequality
in poverty gaps is given by:
When a = 1, we have that the socially representative poverty gap £9(z) is just
the average poverty gap /I9(z); inequality in poverty gaps is thus not taken
into account in assessing poverty. The poverty cost of inequality is then nil.
Since [jfl(z) is insensitive to a, and since £9(z; a) is increasing in a, it follows
that Sa(z; a) is also increasing in a; the larger the value of a, the larger the
impact of inequality on the level of aggregate poverty. This can be checked
on Figure 5.3. We can thus interpret a as a parameter of inequality aversion
in measuring poverty. For 0 < a < 1, we have that £9(z;a) < /J,a(z), and
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inequality in poverty is then deemed to reduce poverty: S9(z, a) < 0. Ceteris
paribus, we then have that the greater the level of inequality, the lower the
socially representative level of poverty. For a > 1, we have that Sa(z; a) > 0
and inequality has therefore a positive poverty cost.
A similar decomposition can be done using (5.1) and the EDE level of
censored income. The EDE poverty gap corresponding to that approach is
defined as
where H* (z; p, e) = p.*(z) • I*(z; p, e) is the cost of inequality in censored
income and where I*(z; p.e) is the index of inequality in censored income.
5.4 Poverty curves
It is often informative to portray the whole distribution of poverty gaps on
a simple graph, in a way which shows both the incidence and the inequality
of income deprivation. Particularly useful is the poverty gap curve, which
plots g(p; z) as a function of p — see again Figure 5.3. The curve naturally
decreases with the rank p in the population, and reaches zero at the value of p
equal to the headcount. The integral under the curve gives the average poverty
gap, and its steepness indicates the degree of inequality in the distribution of
poverty gaps.
Another percentile-based curve that is graphically informative and that is
useful for the measurement and comparison of poverty is called the Cumula-
tive Poverty Gap (CPG ) curve (also sometimes referred to as the inverse Gen-
eralized Lorenz curve, the "TIP" curve, or the poverty profile curve). The CPG
curve cumulates the poverty gaps of the bottom p proportion of the population.
It is defined as:8 E:18.7.i
A CPG curve is drawn on Figure 5.4. The slope of G(p; z) at a given value
of p shows the poverty gap g(p; z). Since g(p; z) is non-negative, G(p\ z} is
non-decreasing. G(p = l;z) equals the average poverty gap p,9(z). The
percentile at which G(p; z) becomes horizontal (where g(p; z) becomes zero)
yields the poverty headcount. Furthermore, since the higher his rank p in the
population, the richer is an individual, and therefore the lower is his poverty
gap, G(p; z} is therefore concave in p. Because of this, the CPG curve exhibits
8DAD:Curves|CPG.
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for poverty analysis the same descriptive interest as the Lorenz and Gener-
alized Lorenz curves for the analysis of inequality and social welfare. The
distance of G(p; z) from the line of perfect equality of poverty gaps (namely,
the line OB in Figure 5.4) shows the inequality of poverty gaps among the total
population. The distance of G(p\ z) from the line of perfect equality of poverty
gaps among the poor (namely, the line OA in Figure 5.4) displays the inequality
of poverty gaps among the poor. Finally, the concavity of G(p; z) is inversely
related to the density of poverty gaps at p.
5.5 S-Gini poverty indices
When weighted by K(P; p), the area underneath the CPG curve generates the
class of S-Gini poverty indices9:
Recall that K(P; p) = p(p— 1) (1 — p)p • P(«; p = 1) thus equals the average
poverty gap, /J,9(z), P(z; p = 2) is the poverty index that is analogous to the
standard Gini index of inequality, and the well-known Sen index of poverty is
given by:
An interesting feature of the P(z; p) indices is their link with absolute and
relative deprivation. Let absolute deprivation, AD(z), be given by the average
shortfall from the poverty line, that is, by n?(z). Recalling (4.25) and (4.26),
we can define relative deprivation in censored income at percentile p as:
Average relative deprivation across the whole population is then:
It is then possible to show that:
The larger the value of p, the larger is relative deprivation, RD(z; p), and the
larger are P(z;p) and the contribution of relative deprivation and inequality
to poverty. This provides an alternative link between inequality and poverty.
9DAD: PovertyiS-Gini Index.
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5.6 Normalizing poverty indices
Most of the poverty indices discussed above have initially been introduced
in the literature in a normalized form, that is, by dividing censored income and
poverty gaps by the poverty line. The FGT indices, for instance, are generally
expressed as10:
(see (5.6)). Normalizing poverty indices will make no substantial difference
and little expositional difference for poverty analysis when the distributions of
income being compared have identical poverty lines. This will typically be
the case, for instance, when incomes are expressed in real (or constant) values,
and when the focus is on absolute poverty with constant real poverty lines.
Normalizing poverty indices by the poverty line will
« make the EDE poverty gap lie between 0 and 1,
» make poverty indices insensitive to and independent of the monetary units
(e.g., dollars or cents) used in assessing income, and
• make the indices invariant to an equi-proportionate change in all incomes
and in the poverty line.
Normalizing poverty indices is particularly useful if the poverty lines serve as
price indices, and thus used to enable comparisons of nominal income across
time and space (recall that price indices are used to convert nominal incomes
into base-year real incomes ).
Normalized poverty indices are usually referred to as "relative poverty in-
dices"; changing all incomes and the poverty line by the same proportion will
not affect the value of relative poverty indices. FGT and other poverty gap
indices that are not normalized are often called "absolute" poverty indices; it
can be checked that equal absolute additions to all incomes and to the poverty
line will not affect their value. Increasing all incomes and the poverty line by
the same proportion will, however, increase the value of such absolute poverty
indices.
When poverty lines are different across distributions, and when their ratio
across time or space cannot be interpreted simply as a ratio of price indices,
the normalization of poverty indices by these poverty lines can, however, be
problematic, and is surely open to debate. This is the case, for instance, when
we are interested in comparing the absolute shortfalls of "real" income from
a "real" poverty line, when these real poverty lines vary across populations
'"DAD: Poverty|FGT Index.
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or population subgroups. Examples can arise, inter alia, in comparing the
poverty of families of different sizes and composition, or in comparing poverty
across distributions with different social or cultural bases for the definition of
a poverty line.
To see this more clearly, consider the following example in which all in-
comes and poverty lines are expressed in real terms (namely, they have been
adjusted for differences in the cost of living, and they are therefore compara-
ble). In country A, the poverty line is $1,000, and a poor person i has an income
of $500. Because, say, of cultural and/or sociological differences (these differ-
ences may exist across time or space), the poverty line in country B is larger
and is equal to $2,000, and a poor person j in it has an income equal to $ 1,100.
Who of i and j is poorer? If we adopt the relative view to building poverty
indices, i will be considered the poorer since as a proportion of the respective
poverty lines he is farther away from it than j. If, instead, absolute poverty
indices are used, j will be deemed the poorer since his absolute poverty gap
($900) is by far larger than that of i ($500). Which of these two views should
prevail is then open to debate.
5.7 Decomposing poverty
5.7.1 Growth-redistribution decompositions
It is often useful to determine whether it is mean-income growth or changes
in the relative income shares accruing to different parts of the population that
are responsible for the evolution of poverty across time. Investigating this can
also help assess whether these two factors, mean-income changes and inequal-
ity changes, work in the same or in opposite directions when it comes to the
behavior of aggregate poverty. Similarly, we may wish to assess whether differ-
ences in poverty across countries or regions are due to differences in inequality
or to differences in mean levels of income.
There are several ways to do this. To illustrate them, assume that we wish to
compare distributions A and B to determine if it is the difference in their mean
income (" growth") or the difference in their income inequality (" redistribu-
tion") that accounts for their difference in poverty. The common feature of all
existing growth- redistribution decomposition procedures is
t first, to scale the two distributions A and B such that they have the same
mean, and interpret the difference in poverty across these two scaled distri-
butions as the impact on poverty of their difference in inequality;
2 and second, to interpret the difference in poverty between one of the distri-
butions (say, A) and that same distribution scaled to the mean income of the
other distribution (B) as the impact on poverty of their difference in mean
income.
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Starting from this, the precise growth- redistribution decomposition pro-
cedures that are chosen differ by the solution they apply to a basic problem
known generally in the national-accounts literature as the "index problem".
Specifically here, should we scale A to the mean of B, or B to the mean of A,
to assess the impact of differences in inequality? And, in estimating the impact
of differences in mean incomes, should we compare A with ^4-scaled-to-the-
mean-of-B, or B with B-scaled-to-the-mean-of-A?
The first paper that implemented a growth- redistribution decomposition of
poverty differences (Datt and Ravallion 1992) used the initial distribution as a
reference "anchor point". To see how, it is easiest to use the normalized FGT
indices P(z; a) defined in (5.6), although the growth- redistribution decom-
position methodologies can be used with any relative poverty indices, additive
or not. The change in poverty between A and B is expressed as a sum of a
" growth" (difference in mean income) effect and of a "redistributive" (differ-
ence in relative income shares) effect, plus an error term that originates from
the above-mentioned index problem. This gives11:
(5.23)
/ \
The first expression in the first term on the left of (5.23), PA (^^-\a\, is
poverty in A after A's incomes have been scaled by ̂ B/^A to yield a distribu-
tion with mean fj,g and inequality unchanged. (PA (i^fs0) ~ PA(z',a)j is
thus the difference between two distributions with the same relative income
shares but with (possibly) different mean incomes. When fj,g > HA, this
growth term is negative — this simply says that growth reduces poverty. The
first expression in the second term, PB (aia; a), is poverty in B after B's
incomes have been scaled by [IA/I^B to yield a distribution with mean /J,A.
(PB (~^f!a) — PA (z; a) J is thus the difference between two distributions
with identical mean incomes but with (possibly) different inequality. When the
Lorenz curve for B is everywhere above the Lorenz curve for A, this redis-
tribution term is necessarily negative when a > 1, but it can also be positive
when a < 1.
The error term in (5.23) can be expressed as:
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This error term can be shown to be either the difference between the growth
effect measured using B as a reference distribution and that using A as the
reference distribution,
or the difference between the redistribution effect measured using B as the
reference distribution and the redistribution effect using A as the reference
distribution,
An alternative decomposition uses the posterior distribution B as the ref-
erence distribution for assessing the growth and redistribution effects. This
yields:
(5.27)
Clearly, a middle way between these two alternative decomposition procedures
is to measure the growth effect as the average of the two growth effects, in
(5.23) and (5.27), and likewise to measure the redistribution effect as the aver-
age of the two redistribution effects. Proceeding this way has the advantage of
eliminating the error term in the poverty decomposition, since the error terms
of each of the two alternative decompositions sum to zero. This middle way
is in fact what would be given by the use of the Shapley value to perform a
growth- redistribution decomposition — see the Appendix 4.7 for more de-
tails on the Shapley value. This leads to the following growth- redistribution
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decomposition12:
5.7.2 Demographic and sectoral decomposition of
differences in FGT indices
Equation (5.11) shows how poverty can be expressed as a sum of the poverty
contributions of the various subgroups that make a population. Each subgroup
contributes in proportion to its share in the population and to the level of
poverty found in that subgroup. Hence, we may wish to express changes in
poverty across time or space as a function of differences in these factors. More
precisely, we want to see whether differences in poverty across distributions
can be attributed to differences in demographic or sectoral composition across
these distributions, or to differences in poverty across these demographic or
sectoral groups. We may express this as follows13:
Note that the decomposition in (5.29) suffers from the same index number
problem as the earlier one in (5.23). For example, one could prefer to use
(f>s(k) instead of <f>A(k] to compute the within-group poverty effects. It may
I2DAD: Decomposition[FGT: Growth & Redistribution.
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where 0(fc) = 0.5 (<pA(k) + ^(fe)) and P~(k;z;a) = 0.5 (~PA(k; z;a)
+Ps(k\ z; a)). Note from (5.30) that this decomposition procedure removes
the error term. Depending on the context, the decomposition in (5.30) could
serve to show, for instance, how variations in the size and in the poverty of
various sectors of the economy account for variations of total poverty across
economies, how differences in the size and in the poverty of various demo-
graphic groups explain differences in total poverty across societies, how mi-
gration and differential poverty across regions account for changes in poverty
across time, etc..
5.7.3 The impact of demographic changes
An alternative use of the decomposition in (5.11) computes the impact of
a change in the proportion of the population that is found in a group fc, this
change being accompanied by an exactly offsetting change in the proportion
of the other groups. This may be useful, for instance, if one wishes to predict
the impact of migration or demographic changes on national poverty, keeping
out within-group poverty. Let the population share of a group t, rf>(t), increase
by a proportion A to </>(i)(l + A), with a proportional fall in the other groups'
population share from <j>(k} to (j>(k) (1 - 0(t)A/ (1 - <j>(t))). Note that the
new population shares will add up to 1 since
MDAD: Decomposition[FGT: Sectoral.
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also seem more convenient to weight the within-group poverty effects by the
average population shares, and to weight the demographic and sectoral effects
by the average poverty index. This yields 14:
The net impatct of this pn poverty is then15
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We may instead wish to predict the impact of an absolute increase in the
population share of a group t. Let this change be from (f>(t) to (f>(t) + X, with a
corresponding fall in the other groups' population share that is proportional to
their initial share (a fall from </>(fc) to (j>(k) (1 - A/ (1 - <f>(t)))). The resulting
change in poverty is analogously given as
Note that the only difference between (5.31) and (5.32) comes from the size in
the increase in (j>(i), which is </>(t)A in (5.31) and A in (5.32).
5.7.4 Decomposing poverty by income
components
Let C income components add up to total income X ( p ) , with X(p) =
X^c=i -X"(c)(p)
 and X(c)(p} being the expected value of income component c
at rank p in the distribution of total income. X(c)(p) can be, for instance,
agricultural or capital income, or the income of those living in some geographic
area, or some type of expenditure that enters total expenditure X 16.
We may wish to know by what amount total poverty is reduced by the
presence of an income component. Clearly, we would expect those com-
ponents with a large mean p,x(c) to be more effective in helping to alleviate
total poverty. But we must also take into account the distribution of X^(p).
Suppose for instance that urban capital income is larger than rural capital in-
come, but that poverty is low in urban areas because urban labor income is
large there. Then, it is unclear whether relatively high capital income in ur-
ban areas is more effective at alleviating poverty than the relatively low capital
income in rural areas, where poverty is more concentrated.
The contribution of an income component c to poverty alleviation can be
given by the fall in poverty after -X"(c)(p) is added to initial income. But this
fall depends on what this initial income is. Does it include some of the other in-
come components? This path-dependency difficulty can again be circumvented
by the use of the Shapley value. We start by assuming maximum poverty, that
is, poverty when total income is nil for everyone. We then estimate the con-
tribution of component c to poverty alleviation as the expected value of its
marginal contribution when it is added to anyone of the various subsets of
income components that one can choose from the set of all the components.
6DAD: Decomposition|FGT: Decomposition by Sources,
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When a component is missing from that set for an individual, we assume that
its value is 0.
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index; Duclos and Gregoire (2002) on the link between linear poverty indices
and relative deprivation; Morduch (1998) and Zheng (1993) on the Watts in-
dex; Pattanaik and Sengupta (1995) on the original Sen index; and Shorrocks
(1998) on "deprivation profiles".
Applied poverty studies using these developments have been almost innu-
merable. A small subset of the studies that have been published includes
Coulombe and McKay (1998) (Mauritania), Coulombe and McKay (1998)
(Ghana), Davidson and Duclos (2000) (using LIS data), Gustafsson and Niv-
orozhkina (1996) (Northern countries), Grootart and Kanbur (1995) (Cote
d'lvoire), Gustafsson and Shi (2002) (China), Hagenaars and De Vos (1988)
(the Netherlands), Hill and Michael (2001) (US), Iceland, Short, Garner, and
Johnson (2001) (US), Milanovic (1992) (Poland), Osberg and Xu (1999)
(Canada), Osberg (2000) (Canada and the US), Pendakur (2001) (Canada),
Rady (2000) (Egypt), Ravallion and Bidani (1994) (Indonesia), Ravallion and
Chen (1997) (67 less developed countries), Rodgers and Rodgers (2000) (Aus-
tralia), and Szulc (1995) (Poland).
The empirical links between growth, poverty and inequality have also often
been analyzed in recent years. Studies on whether growth is beneficial to the
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poor, both absolutely and relatively speaking, include Bigsten and Shimeles
(2003) (for Ethiopian evidence), Datt and Ravallion (2002) (for a survey of the
Indian evidence), Dollar and Rraay (2002) (for an influential study of the expe-
rience of 42 countries over 4 decades), Essama Nssah (1997) (for Madagascar
evidence), Ravallion and Chen (1997) (where growth is found to decrease in-
equality as often as it increases it), Ravallion (2001) (where a warning against
the use of cross-country regressions is made), and Ravallion and Datt (2002)
(for differential evidence across Indian states). De Janvry and Sadoulet (2000),
Deininger and Squire (1998) and Ravallion (1998a) also apply causal tests to
determine whether inequality favors or impedes growth. See also Ravallion
and Chen (2003) and Tsui (1996) for the use of the average poverty gap and
the Watts index as indices of whether growth is beneficial to the poor.
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Figure 5.2: The relative contribution of the poor to FGT indices
Figure 5.3: Socially-representative poverty gaps for the FGT indices
Figure 5.4: The cumulative poverty gap (CPG) curve
Chapter 6
ESTIMATING POVERTY LINES
Three major issues arise in the estimation and in the use of poverty lines.
First, we must define the space in which well-being is to be measured. As
discussed in Chapter 1, this can be the space of utility, incomes, "basic needs",
functionings, or capabilities. Second, we must determine whether we are
interested in an absolute or in a relative poverty line in the space considered.
Third, we must choose whether it is by someone's "capacity to function" or by
someone's "actual functioning" that we will judge if that person is poor. We
consider first the issue of the choice between an absolute and a relative poverty
line.
6.1 Absolute and relative poverty lines
An absolute poverty line can be interpreted as fixed in any one of the spaces
in which we wish to assess well-being. Conversely, a relative poverty line
would depend on the distribution of well-being (including the utilities, living
standards, functionings or capabilities) found in a society and would therefore
vary across societies. Considerable controversy exists on whether absoluteness
or relativity is a better property for a poverty threshold. Most analysts would
probably agree that a poverty threshold defined in the space of functionings
and capabilities should be absolute (but even on this there is no unanimity). An
absolute threshold in these spaces would, however, generally imply relativity
of the corresponding thresholds in the space of the commodities and in the
level of basic needs required to achieve these functionings.
There are two main reasons for this. First, the relative prices and the avail-
ability of commodities depend on the distribution of incomes. For instance, as
a society initially develops, rising numbers of people need to travel to work and
to trade, without first being able to afford the costs of private transportation.
Because of increasing returns to scale in the provision of public transportation,
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the affordability and accessibility of public transportation usually also first in-
creases during that development stage. As societies become richer on average,
however, their citizens start making increasing use of private forms of trans-
portation, a phenomenon which causes a fall in the supply and availability of
public transportation, leading to an increase in its relative price. This makes
the capacity to travel (arguably an important capacity) more or less costly, de-
pending on the state of economic development.
Second, not to be deprived of some capability may require the absence of
relative deprivation in the space of some commodities. In support of this, there
is Adam Smith's famous statement that the commodities needed to go without
shame (an oft-mentioned basic functioning) can be to some extent relative to
the distribution of such commodities in a society:
By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably neces-
sary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent
for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, for ex-
ample, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I
suppose, very comfortably though they had no linen. But in the present times, through
the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-laborer would be ashamed to appear in pub-
lic without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful
degree of poverty which, it is presumed, nobody can well fall into without extreme bad
conduct. Custom, in the same manner, has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life
in England. The poorest creditable person of either sex would be ashamed to appear
in public without them. In Scotland, custom has rendered them a necessary of life to
the lowest order of men; but not to the same order of women, who may, without any
discredit, walk about barefooted. In France they are necessaries neither to men nor to
women, the lowest rank of both sexes appearing there publicly, without any discredit,
sometimes in wooden shoes, and sometimes barefooted. Under necessaries, therefore, I
comprehend not only those things which nature, but those things which the established
rules of decency have rendered necessary to the lowest rank of people. (Smith 1776,
Book 5, Chapter 2)
Sen (1985), reinforces this by distinguishing clearly the two dimensions of
capabilities and commodities:
I would like to say that poverty is an absolute notion in the space of capabilities but
very often it will take a relative form in the space of commodities and characteristics
(Sen 1985, p.335).
This view is in fact also consistent with the World Bank's influential definition
of poverty, which says that poverty is the inability to attain a minimal standard
of living (World Bank 1990). This minimal standard consists of
of nutrition and other basic necessities and a further amount that varies from country to
country, reflecting the cost of participating in the everyday life of society. (World Bank
1990, p. 26)
This has led some writers (particularly in developed countries) to conclude that
attempts to preserve some degree of absoluteness in the space of commodities
are untenable:
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In summary, it does not seem possible to develop an approach to poverty measurement
which is linked to absolute standards. While some analysts are uneasy with relativist
concepts of poverty on the grounds that they are difficult to comprehend and can be
seen as somewhat arbitrary and open to manipulation, no real practical alternative to
relativist concepts exists. (Saunders 1994, p. 227)
6.2 Social exclusion and relative deprivation
Complete relativity of the poverty line in the space of commodities would
nevertheless draw poverty analysis very close to the analysis of social exclu-
sion (as exemplified by Rodgers, Gore, and Figueiredo 1995 at the Interna-
tional Labor Organization) and relative deprivation (as propounded for in-
stance by Townsend 1979). Social exclusion entails "the drawing of inappro-
priate group distinctions between free and equal individuals which deny access
to or participation in exchange or interaction" (Silver 1994, p.557). This in-
cludes participation in property, earnings, public goods, and in the prevailing
consumption level (Silver 1994, p.541). Relative deprivation focuses on the
inability to enjoy living standards and activities that are ordinarily observed in
a society. Townsend (1979) defines it as a situation in which
Individuals, families and groups in the population ( . . . ) lack the resources to obtain the
types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities
which are customary or at least widely encouraged or approved, in the society to which
they belong, (p.30)
Equating absolute deprivation in the space of capabilities with relative de-
privation in the space of commodities can, however, be a source of confusion
in poverty comparisons. First, it tends to blur the operational and conceptual
distinction between poverty and inequality. Second, it can hinder the identi-
fication of "core" or absolute poverty in any of the spaces. The identification
of core poverty is, indeed, probably the most important input into the design
of public policy in developing countries. Third, although the ethical appeal of
Sen's capability approach has variously been invoked to justify the use of an
entirely relative poverty line in the space of commodities, Sen himself does
not accept this:
Indeed, there is an irreducible core of absolute deprivation in our idea of poverty, which
translates reports of starvation, malnutrition and visible hardship into a diagnosis of
poverty without having to ascertain first the relative picture. Thus the approach of
relative deprivation supplements rather than supplants the analysis of poverty in terms
of absolute dispossession (Sen 1981, p.17)).
Furthermore,
( . . . ) considerations of relative deprivation are relevant in specifying the 'basic' needs,
but attempts to make relative deprivation the sole basis of such specification is doomed
to failure since there is an irreducible core of absolute deprivation in the concept of
poverty (Sen 1981, p.17).
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Given the measurement difficulties involved in estimating relative poverty
lines that correspond to absolute poverty lines in the space of functionings
and capabilities, analysts often find most transparent to use the space of living
standards as the space in which to define an absolute threshold. If this is done,
however, it must subsequently be admitted that the procedure will imply a set
of thresholds in the space of functionings and capabilities that depend at least
partly on the conditions of the society in which an individual lives. Indeed,
for a given absolute level of living standard in the space of commodities, an
individual's capabilities are generally relative, that is, they depend on his social
and economic environment, at least for functionings such as shamelessness and
participation in the life of the community.
6.3 Estimating absolute poverty lines
Methodologies for the estimation of poverty lines have been most devel-
oped in the context of the fulfillment of basic physiological needs. Although
such methodologies have often been set in a welfarist framework, they also
matter for the basic needs, functioning or capability approaches since these
approaches are also concerned with basic physiological achievements. These
methodologies have recently been most often applied to developing country
contexts.
6.3.1 Cost of basic needs
The estimation of the "cost of basic needs " (CBN) usually involves two
steps. First, an estimation is made of the minimal food expenditures that are
necessary for living in good health; we will denote this by zp. Second, an
analogous estimate of the required non-food expenditures, ZNF, is computed
and added to zp to yield a total poverty line, ZT- We consider now in some
detail each of these two steps.
6.3.2 Cost of food needs
The first step in the computation of a global poverty line is usually to esti-
mate a food poverty line. The determination of a food poverty line generally
proceeds by asking what amount of food expenditures is required to achieve
some minimal required level of food-energy intake (or nutrient intake, such as
proteins, vitamins, fat, or minerals. Early examples of the application of this
approach include Rowntree (1901) and Orshansky (1965). A basket of food
commodities is designed or estimated by "food specialists" such as to provide
those minimally required levels of food-energy intake. The cost of that basket
yields the food poverty line zp.
To illustrate how this exercise can be carried out in practice, consider Figure
6.1, which plots consumption x\(p) and xi(p) of two goods, goods 1 and 2,
0
0
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over a range of percentiles p. For simplicity, Figure 6.1 supposes that good 1
is "income-inelastic" (xi(p) is constant) but that the consumption of good 2
increases with the rank in the distribution of income (it is income elastic). The
idea then is to select a combination of x\(p) and x^(p) that provides a given
level of minimal calorie intake. For the purposes of this illustration, assume
that this minimum energy intake is 3000 calories per day, and that 1 unit of
good 1 and 2 provides 2000 and 1000 calories each respectively. Also assume
that each unit of good 1 and 2 costs q$.
The cheapest way to achieve the minimum calorie intake would be to con-
sume only of good 1, since good 1 is the most calorie-efficient (we can think
of good 1 as "cereals" and good 2 as "meat"). Indeed, each calorie provided by
the consumption of good 1 costs <?$/2000, whereas each calorie provided by
the consumption of good 2 costs twice as much, that is, <?$/1000. 1.5 units of
good 1 (1.5 units *2000 calories/unit =3000 calories) would then be required
for the minimal energy intake to be met, and zp would then equal l.5q$.
This, however, would suppose a food commodity basket that no individual in
Figure 6.1 would be observed to consume. Even at the very bottom of the dis-
tribution of income, individuals consume indeed at least some of good 2 at the
expense of a diminished consumption of the more calorie-efficient good 1. We
should presumably take this information into account if we wished to respect
at least to some extent the cultural and culinary preferences of those whose
well-being we aim to evaluate. This raises the obvious question of which pref-
erences we should consider. Note that the preferred ratio of good 2 over good 1
increases continuously with p in Figure 6.1. For convenience, denote that ratio
by p(p) = x<2(p)/x\(p). Simple algebra then shows that the cost of attaining
the minimum calorie intake is given by zp(p) = 3g$(l + p(p))/(2 + p(p)),
where zp(p) indicates that zp depends on the rank p of those whose prefer-
ences we use to build the commodity basket and to compute the food poverty
line.
Figure 6.1 plots zp(p) and shows that it is not neutral to the choice of p.
Using the preferences of the poorest, we obtain zp(p = 0) = 1.8<?$, but if we
use the preferences of the median population, we get zp(p = 0.5) = 2.1</$.
This is in fact just one example of a more general standard observation in the
literature on poverty lines that the choice of reference parameters matters for
the estimation of poverty lines. In Figure 6.1, the farther are the preferences
p(p) from the most calorie-efficient choice, the more costly is the estimated
food poverty line zp(p). Arguably, the preferences p(p) should be those of
the individuals that are close to the total poverty line, but this is a (partly)
circular argument since p(p) is itself a determinant of that total poverty line.
In practice, an arbitrary value of p is often chosen, reflecting some a priori
belief on the position of those at the edge of the total poverty line. A more
common (though arguably less commendable) procedure is to compute and
Figure 6.1: Engel curves and cost-of-basic-needs baskets
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use an average value of x^(p)/'xi(p) over a range of p, such as the bottom
25% or 50% individuals of a population.
Even if we were to agree on the position p at which we wish to observe
preferences such as p(p), there still remains the awkward fact that preferences
will often vary significantly even at this given value of p. Said differently, there
are in practice many different actual consumption patterns for a group of "typ-
ical poor". One solution is simply to ignore these differences and estimate the
typical poor's average consumption patterns. Following this line of argument,
consumption expenditures on various food items are regressed against income
and the estimated parameters of these regressions are then used to predict the
consumption patterns of the "typical poor". These regressions have often been
parametric — assuming for instance that expenditures on cereals and meat are
globally quadratic or log-linear in total expenditures. It is unlikely, however,
that such parametric forms fit appropriately at all income levels, low and high
alike. A better statistical procedure would probably be to regress consumption
expenditures non parametrically on total expenditures, which would allow for
a better fit of the preferences of those around the "typical poor".
An additionally important issue then is whether variations in culinary tastes
and food habits across socio-economic characteristics should be taken into ac-
count. If no account of such variations are taken, then we can choose as a
reference group that group whose diet minimizes food cost while providing
the minimum required level of food-energy intake. This would typically gen-
erate an unreasonably low level of expenditures for many other groups, with an
implied dietary basket of food commodities that could again be very different
from those they typically consume.
If, however, full account of diversity in culinary tastes were to be taken, a
serious risk would exist of overestimating the poverty lines of those individuals
and groups of individuals with a greater taste for expensive foods (e.g., of
higher quality or better taste). This is commonly the case, for instance, for
urban households, who customarily have more sophisticated culinary tastes
than rural dwellers (for the same overall living standards), and have also greater
access to a larger variety of imported and expensive foods. This procedure
would then assign greater poverty lines to urban versus rural individuals. It
would also mean that the utility equivalents of individual food poverty lines
would depend on the peculiarities of the individuals' food preferences. This
would generally lead to inconsistent comparisons of well-being across urban
and rural inhabitants, and would exaggerate the degree of poverty in the urban
as compared to the rural areas.
We can illustrate this using Figure 6.2. Figure 6.2 shows baskets of two
food commodities, x\ and x%, with three food budget constraints of total food
consumption equal to YO, Yl, and Y2 (these total budgets are expressed in
units of zi). Figure 6.2 also shows a "minimum calorie constraint", along
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which the total calories provided by the consumption of x\ and x% equal the
required minimum level of calorie intake. If no account whatsoever were
taken of preferences, YO would yield the food poverty line. But along the food
budget constraint YO, there is only one point which meets the minimum calorie
constraint (the point at which x\ — YO and xi = 0, and it is of course unlikely
that individuals will choose a food basket to be precisely at that corner. An
individual with preferences UO and budget YO, for instance, would not locate
himself on the minimum calorie constraint. It is only with the more generous
budget constraint Yl that this individual will consume the minimally required
level of calorie intake, as shown on Figure 6.2.
But not all individuals will necessarily choose to be "calorie-sufficient" even
with a total food budget of Yl. Individuals with greater preferences — as in
the case of U2 — for the less-calorie efficient good xi will not choose a food
basket on or above the minimum calorie constraint. Individual with prefer-
ences U2 will instead need Y2 to be calorie-sufficient. Yet, whether individu-
als with preferences Ul and budget Yl are just as well off as individuals with
preferences U2 and budget Y2 is debatable. Such would be the assumption,
however, if we used two distinct poverty lines Yl and Y2 for the two different
tastes.
As mentioned above, such comparability assumptions are often implicitly
made in practice when individuals living in different regions, rural or urban
for instance, are assigned different poverty lines for reasons independent of
differences in needs or prices. As illustrated in Figure 6.2, this supposes that
an individual with "sophisticated" preferences (an urban dweller who has been
accustomed to food variety) needs a higher budget to be as "well off' as an
individual with less expensive preferences (a rural dweller who is content
with eating basic food types). Probably more convincing, however, would be
the view that U2 with Y2 in Figure 6.2 provides greater utility and well-being
than Ul with Yl. Assigning different poverty lines Yl and Y2 would then
lead to inconsistent and biased poverty estimates.
Minimally required food expenditures can also be (and are often) adjusted
for differences in climate, sex, or age, when such differences impact on needs
rather than on tastes (as we discussed above). These expenditures can also
be adjusted for variations in activity levels, although activity levels depend on
the level of one's well-being, and thus on one's poverty status. Activity-level
adjustments would thus generate a poverty line that evolves endogenously with
the standard of living of individuals, a slightly awkward feature for comparing
poverty.
6.3.3 Non-food poverty lines
The subsequent step is usually to estimate the non-food component of the
total poverty line. The most popular method for doing this is simply to go
Figure 6.2: Food preferences and the cost of a minimum calorie intake
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straight to an estimate of the total poverty line by dividing the food poverty
line by the share of food in total expenditures. The intuition behind this is as
follows. The larger the food share in total expenditures, the closer the food
poverty line should be to the total poverty line. Therefore, the smaller should
be the necessary adjustment to the food poverty line (the closer to 1 should be
the denominator that divides the food poverty line). Indeed, dividing zp by
ZF/ZT (the food share) gives ZT- The problem of which food share to use is
of course an important issue. It is a problem analogous to the one discussed
above on what the food basket should be for computing a food poverty line.
Popular practices vary, but often make use of:
A- the average food share of those whose total expenditures equal the food
E: 18.4.5 poverty line;
B- the average food share of those whose food expenditures equal the food
E: 18.4.3 poverty line;
C- the average food share of a bottom proportion of the population (e.g., the
25% or 50% poorest).
In addition to this, another popular method
D- adds to zp the non-food expenditures of those whose total expenditures
E; 18.4.7 equal ZF.
To see how methods A, B and D work and differ from each other, consider
Figure 6.3. Figure 6.3 shows (predicted) total expenditures against various
levels of food expenditures. The regression can be done parametrically, but a
generally better approach would be to predict total expenditures using a non-
parametric regression on food expenditures.1 On each of the two axes is shown
the level of the (previously estimated) food poverty line zp. These two levels
meet at the 45 degree line.
As indicated above, method A makes use of the average food share of those
whose total expenditures equal the food poverty line. Total expenditures equal
the food poverty line, ZF, at point E on Figure 6.3. The food share at point E
is given by the inverse of the slope of the line OE that goes from the origin to
point E. The total poverty line according to method A is therefore given by the
height of a line OE that extends to just above a level of food expenditures zp.
This gives the vertical height of point A as the total poverty line according to
method A.
Method B makes use of the average food share of those whose food expen-
ditures equal the food poverty line. Those who consume zp in food are located
'DAD:Distribution|Non-Parametric Regression.
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at point B on Figure 6.3. Their food share is given by the inverse of the slope
of the straight line that would extend from point O to point B. Hence, dividing
ZF by that food share brings us back to point B, which is therefore the total
poverty line according to method B.
The total poverty line according to method B is more generous than that ac-
cording to method A since the food share used for B is lower than that used for
A. Indeed, method A focusses on the food share of a rather deprived popula-
tion: those who, in total, only spend tfiefood poverty line. Method B focusses
on the food share of a less deprived population: those who, on food only, spend
the food poverty line. Since food shares tend to decline with standards of liv-
ing, method B's food share is usually lower than method A's.
Finally, method D considers the non-food expenditures of those whose total
expenditures equal zp. As for method A, these individuals are found at point E
on Figure 6.3. Their non-food expenditures are given by the length of line EG
on the Figure. Adding these non-food expenditures to zp yields a total poverty
line given by the height of point D.
The choice of methods and food shares and the estimation of the non-food
poverty lines is rather arbitrary, and the resulting estimate of the total poverty
line will also be somewhat arbitrary. Moreover, and perhaps more worryingly,
some of the estimates will also vary with the distribution of living standards,
as in the case of method C where the food share is an average over a range of
individuals. To avoid inconsistencies in poverty comparisons, it would there-
fore seem preferable to use the same food share across the distributions being
compared, and to use methods that do not make estimates overly dependent on
a particular distribution of living standards.
6.3.4 Food energy intake
A slightly different method for estimating poverty lines that is popular in
the literature is the so-called Food-Energy-Intake (FEI) method. Estimates of
observed calorie intakes are first computed and then graphed against observed
(total or food) expenditures. The analyst then estimates the expenditures of
those whose calorie intake is just at the minimum required for healthy subsis-
tence. When these expenditures are on food, this provides a food poverty line,
which can then be used as described above in Section 6.3.3 to provide an es-
timate of a global poverty line. When the expenditures are total expenditures,
the FEI method provides a direct link between a minimum calorie intake and
a total poverty line2. E: 18.4.1
Figure 6.4 illustrates how this method works. The curve shows the level
of expenditure (measured on the vertical axis) that is observed (on average) at
2DAD: Distribution]Non-Parametric Regression.
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a given level of calorie intake (shown on the horizontal axis). The curve is
increasing and convex, since calorie intake is usually expected to increase at
a diminishing rate with food or total expenditures. Above z&, the minimum
calorie intake recommended for a healthy life, we read z, the food or total
poverty line according to the FBI method.
As just exposed, the FBI method may appear straightforward and simple to
implement. A number of conceptual and measurement problems are hidden,
however, behind this apparent simplicity. Note for instance that the line traced
on Figure 6.4 is the expected link between expenditure and calorie intake;
there is in real life a significant amount of variability around this line. How
are we to interpret this variability? If it is due to measurement errors, then we
may perhaps ignore it. If it is due to variability in preferences, then we may
wish to model the calorie-intake-expenditure relationship separately for differ-
ent groups of the population, as is often done in practice, for urban and rural
areas for instance. As in the cost-of-basic-needs method, however, we then run
the risk of estimating higher poverty lines for those groups that have more ex-
pensive or more sophisticated tastes for food. This would lead to inconsistent
comparisons of well-being and poverty, as discussed in Section 6.3.2.
To compute expected expenditure (given the variability of actual observed
spending) at a given calorie intake, we can estimate the parameters of a para-
metric regression linking expenditures to calorie intake. Again, the regression
is often postulated to be log-linear or quadratic. This parametric specification
supposes, however, that the functional relationship between expenditures and
calorie intake is known by the analyst, up to some unknown parameter values.
This is unlikely to be true everywhere, especially for those far from the level of
calorie intake of interest (e.g., those at the lower and upper tails of the distribu-
tion of spending and calorie intake). In such cases, the parametric procedure
will make the estimated expenditure poverty line affected by the presence of
"outliers" that are relatively far from the minimum level of calorie intake.
This procedure will then generate a biased estimator of the "true" poverty line.
A more flexible and arguably better approach would be to estimate the link
between expenditures and calorie intake non parametrically.
6.3.5 Illustration for Cameroon
To see whether differences in some of the methodologies described above
can matter, consider the case of 1996 Cameroon. Table 6.1 shows the result of
estimating food, non-food and total poverty lines for the whole of Cameroon
and for each of its 6 regions separately. Note that the figures are in Francs CFA
adjusted for price differences, with Yaound6 being the reference region. The
food poverty line was estimated using the FBI method at 2400 calories per day
per adult equivalent. A non-parametric regression using DAD was performed
for the whole of Cameroon and separately for each of the 6 regions. The lower
0
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non-food poverty line was obtained (non parametrically) using method D in
section 6.3.3, and the upper non-food poverty line using method B. Again, the
relevant regressions were carried out for the whole of Cameroon and sepa-
rately for each of its 6 regions.
As can be seen, the link between calorie intake and food expenditures varies
systematically across regions. Expected food expenditure at 2400 calories per
day is significantly higher in urban areas (Yaounde, Douala and Other cities)
than in the rural ones. In Douala, for instance, a household would need 408
Francs CFA per day per adult equivalent to reach an intake of 2400 calo-
ries per day. In the Highlands, no more than 170 Francs CFA would on av-
erage be needed. The link between food and total expenditures also varies
across Cameroon's regions. Combined with the different estimates for the food
poverty lines, this leads to very significant variations across regions in the total
poverty lines. Using method D, a lower total poverty line of 589 Francs CFA
is obtained for Douala, but that same poverty line is only 235 Francs CFA for
the Highlands. Note also that the choice of method B vs method D has a very
significant impact on the estimate of the total poverty line. For the whole of
Cameroon, the lower and the upper total poverty lines are respectively 373 and
534 Francs CFA, a difference of 43%.
Unsurprisingly, these large differences across regions and across methods
have a large impact on national poverty estimates and on regional poverty
comparisons. This is illustrated in Table 6.2, which shows the proportion of
individuals underneath various poverty lines for various indicators of well-
being. "Calorie poverty" (first line) is relatively constant across Cameroon.
In the whole of Cameroon, 68.1% of the population was observed to con-
sume less than 2400 calories per day per adult equivalent. This proportion
varies between 59.9% (for Other cities) and 86.5% (for Forests) across regions.
Roughly the same limited variability and the same poverty rankings appear
when food poverty is estimated using for each region its own food poverty line
(third line). However, when a common food poverty line is used to assess food
poverty in each region (second line), national poverty stays roughly unchanged
at around 69% but urban regions now appear significantly less poor than the
rural ones. For instance, the poverty headcount in Douala (42.0%) is now only
half that of the Highlands (82.5%).
The rest of Table 6.2 confirms these lessons. When a common poverty line
is used to compare the regions, rural areas are significantly poorer than urban
ones. When region-specific poverty lines are used, these differences are much
reduced, and the regional rankings are often even reversed. For example, using
a common lower total poverty line (fourth line), the Highlands have a head-
count ratio more than three times that of the urban regions. When regional
lower total poverty lines are used instead, the Highlands become prominently
the least poor of all regions. Setting common as opposed to regional poverty
116 POVERTY AND EQUITY
lines can thus have a crucial impact on poverty rankings and the setting of sub-
sequent poverty alleviation policies. The choice of a lower as against an upper
total poverty line also makes a difference. For the whole of Cameroon, the
proportion of the Cameroonian population in poverty increases from 43.9% to
68.0% when we move from a common lower total poverty line (fourth line) to
a common upper total poverty line (sixth line). Clearly, this changes signifi-
cantly one's understanding of the incidence of poverty in Cameroon.
These results also implicitly warn that the choice of well-being indicators
is not neutral to the identification of the poor. In our context, this is because
the correlation between calorie intake, food expenditure and total expenditure
is imperfect. Table 6.3 indicates, for example, that in bidimensional poverty
analyses using any two of these three indicators of well-being, around 20%
to 25% of the population is characterized as poor in one dimension but non
poor in the other. In the first part of 6.3, we note for instance that 11.2% of
the population would be judged poor in terms of calorie intake but not poor
in terms of food expenditure. Conversely, 9.6% of the population would be
deemed non poor in terms of calorie intake but poor in terms of food expendi-
ture. These proportions are slightly higher for the other bidimensional poverty
analyses, which compare food with total expenditure poverty, and calorie with
total expenditure poverty, respectively.
6.4 Estimating relative and subjective poverty
lines
6.4.1 Relative poverty lines
There are two other popular methodologies for the estimation of poverty
lines. The first deals with purely relative poverty lines, which, as we saw
above, can be useful to determine the commodities needed for "living without
shame" and for participating in the "prevailing consumption level". A relative
poverty line is typically set as a somewhat arbitrary proportion of the mean or
of some income quantile (often the median). Clearly, such a poverty line will
vary with the central tendency of the income distribution, and will not be the
same in constant terms across space and time. One possibly awkward feature
of the use of a relative poverty line approach is that a policy which raises the
income of all, but proportionately more those of the rich, will increase poverty,
although the absolute incomes of the poor have risen. Conversely, a natural
catastrophe which hurts absolutely everyone will decrease poverty if the rich
E:18.3 are proportionately the most hurt3.
Another possibly awkward feature of the use of relative poverty lines is that
an improvement in the absolute incomes of some of the poor, with no change
3DAD: Poverty|FGT Index.
Table 6.1: Estimated poverty lines in Cameroon according to different methods (Francs CFA/day/adult equivalent), for the
whole of Cameroon and separately for its 6 regions
FEI food Lower non-food
poverty line poverty line
Cameroon 256 117
Yaounde 337 143
Douala 408 181
Other cities 347 152
Forests 259 134
Highlands 170 65
Savana 204 78
Lower total CBN
poverty line
373
480
589
499
393
235
282
Upper non-food
poverty line
278
412
588
385
214
186
190
Upper total CBN
poverty line
534
749
995
732
473
357
394
Table 6.2: Headcount according to alternative measurement methods and for different regions in Cameroon (% of the popu-
lation)
Calorie poverty using common calorie poverty line
Food poverty using common food poverty line
Food poverty using regional food poverty lines
Total expenditure poverty using common lower CBN poverty line
Total expenditure poverty using regional lower CBN poverty line
Total expenditure poverty using common upper CBN poverty line
Total expenditure poverty using regional upper CBN poverty line
Proportion of region in total population
Yaounde
73.4
53.1
67.9
19.2
34.7
41.6
59.6
7.1
Douala Other cities
67.3
42
67.5
16.5
38.1
33.4
59
9.6
59.9
44.5
63.2
16
31.8
36.5
58.8
12.7
Forests Highlands
86.5
82.5
82.5
57.7
62.6
83.8
78.1
18.5
64.6
82.5
61.1
58.7
19
81.1
53.1
27.8
Savana Cameroon
61.1
74
61.2
49
29.7
78.7
55.8
24.2
68.1
69.5
66.4
43.9
33.9
68
60.1
100
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Table 6.3: Distribution of the poor according to calorie, food and total expen-
ditures poverty (% of the population)
Calorie poor Calorie non-poor
Poor in food expenditure 58.5 % 9.6 %
Non poor in food expenditure 11.2 % 20.7 %
Poor in total expenditure Non poor in total expenditure
Poor in food expenditure 56.6 % 9.8 %
Non poor in food expenditure 11.3 % 22.2 %
Poor in total expenditure Non poor in total expenditure
Calorie poor 55.8 % 12.3 %
Calorie non poor 12.2 % 19.7 %
in the incomes of the others, may in fact increase poverty. To see why, let
r) and ? be small positive values and let an income distribution be defined as
Q(p) +ri(p), with
and with r) set initially to 0. Choose z = Xfi. The un-normalized FGT index is
then given by
Note that dfj,/dr)\ _# = 2? > 0, which also says that the relative poverty line
A/u increases with an increase in ?. We may then check how increases in rj
affect overall poverty, for a small <;. For the hcadcount index, we find
which says that the headcount necessarily increases whenever someone's in-
come increases, regardless of whether that person is poor or rich. When a > 0,
(6.4)
The term A on the right-hand side of (6.4) is positive: an increase in incomes
increases the relative poverty line and thus tends to increase poverty. When
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po > F(\fj,), the increase in income is beneficial to the rich: the term B is
then nil, and poverty then necessarily increases with 77. When pa < F(\n),
the increase in income benefits some of those below the poverty line, and this
increase in their absolute living standards explains why the term B is then neg-
ative. Whether it is sufficiently negative to offset the positive term A depends
1) on how far below the poverty line these poor are, and 2) on the value of the
ethical parameter a. Hence, even with a > 0, relative poverty may increase
when growth is beneficial to the poor4. E:18.3
6.4.2 Subjective poverty lines
An alternative poverty line methodology relies uses subjective information
on the link between living standards and well-being. One source of information
comes from interviews on what is perceived to be a sound poverty line, using a
question found for instance in Goedhart, Halberstadt, Kapteyn, and Van Praag
(1977):
We would like to know which net family income would, in your circumstances, be the
absolute minimum for you. That is to say, that you would not be able to make both ends
meet if you earned less. (p.510)
The answers are subsequently regressed on the incomes of the respondents.
The subjective poverty line is given by the point at which the predicted answer
to the minimum income question equals the income of the respondents. The
basic intuition for this is that unless someone earns that poverty line, he will
not truly know that it is indeed the appropriate minimum income needed to
"make both ends meet".
This method is illustrated in some detail on Figure 6.5. Each point rep-
resents a separate answer to the above query, namely, the minimum income
judged to be needed to make both ends meet as a function of the actual income
of the respondents. The filled line shows the predicted response of individuals
at a given level of income. For low income levels, this predicted minimum
subjective income is well above the respondents' income. The predicted mini-
mum subjective income increases with actual income, but not as fast as income
itself. Those with below z* answer that they need more than their own income.
Those with income above z* answer that they need on average less than their
own income. At z*, which is also where the 45-degree line crosses the line
of predicted minimum subjective income, that predicted minimum subjective
income equals actual income. The subjective poverty line would therefore be
estimated here as z*.
One difficulty with the subjective approach is the sensitivity of poverty
line estimates to the formulation of the interview questions. Another problem
"DAD: Poverty|FGT Index.
120 POVERTY AND EQUITY
comes from the considerable variability in the answers provided, even within
groups of relatively socio-economically homogeneous respondents. The pres-
ence of this variability is apparent on Figure 6.5 with points sometimes quite
far away from the predicted response line. This variability has some awkward
consequences. On Figure 6.5, for instance, an individual at point a is someone
who would be judged poor according to the subjective income method since
his income falls below z*. An individual at a feels, however, that his income
exceeds the minimum income he feels to be needed (point a is to the right of
the 45-degree line). He would therefore feel that he is not poor. Conversely,
someone at point b feels that he is poor, since his reported minimum income
exceeds his actual income, but he would be judged not to be poor by the sub-
jective poverty line method.
How, therefore, ought we to interpret this variability? Is it due to measure-
ment errors? If so, then we may probably best ignore it. Is it rather that the link
between living standards and true well-being varies systematically even within
homogeneous groups of people? If so, then we might not want to use incomes
or other direct or indirect indicators of well-being to classify the poor and the
non poor. Instead, we should take individuals at their word on whether they
declare themselves to be poor or not. But then, this would clearly raise impor-
tant practical and incentive problems for the design and the implementation of
public policy.
6.4.3 Subjective poverty lines with discrete
information
An alternative approach to estimating subjective poverty lines is to ask re-
spondents whether they feel that their income is below the poverty line, with-
out directly asking what the value of that poverty line should be. Answers are
coded 0 or 1 — according to whether respondents feel that they are poor or
not — alongside the respondents' incomes. The estimate of the poverty line
is that which best reconciles the distribution of those answers with that of the
respondents' incomes.
This is illustrated in Figure 6.6. Each "dot" is an observation of whether
a respondent of a certain income level felt poor (1) or not (0). The working
assumption is that respondents compare their income to a common subjective
poverty line z*. z* is unobserved and must be estimated. One estimation
procedure for z* would be to maximize the likelihood that the respondents'
declarations of poverty status correspond to that which would be inferred by
comparing z* to their incomes. Said differently, the estimator of z* would
minimize the likelihood of observing observations within the ellipses of Figure
6.6. Not everyone with an income below z* says that he is poor; conversely,
not everyone above z* says that he is not poor. These "classification errors"
would be explained by measurement and/or misreporting errors. Hence, on
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Figure 6.6, there are "false poor" and "false rich", as shown within the ellipses
at the bottom left and at the top right of the Figure. Again, this would run
into difficulties if individual preference or need heterogeneity were the true
explanation for the "classification errors".
6.5 References
The literature on the estimation of poverty lines is both significant and
varied. Note that there is often a sharp distinction in tone and in content be-
tween those works which focus on poverty in less developed countries and
those which address poverty in more developed economies.
Early reviews of the literature include Goedhart, Halberstadt, Kapteyn, and
Van Praag (1977) and Hagenaars and Van Praag (1985). An excellent and
comprehensive recent review can be found in Ravallion (1998b) — this chap-
ter has been much influenced by it. Greer and Thorbecke (1986) has been
influential in establishing the FEI method of estimating a poverty line. A
method based on "basic needs budget" is described in Renwick and Bergmann
(1993). The differential effects for poverty measurement of choosing FEI vs
CBN methods for estimating poverty lines can be found inter alia in Ravallion
and Bidani (1994) and in Wodon (1997a).
Barrington (1997), Fisher (1992), Glennerster (2000) and Orshansky (1988)
provide critical reviews of the literature on the setting of the official poverty
line in the United States.
The consequences and the issues that surround the choice between absolute
and relative poverty lines are discussed in Blackburn (1998) (on the em-
pirical sensitivity of poverty comparisons to that choice), de Vos and Zaidi
(1998) (on whether poverty lines should be country specific), Foster (1998)
and Zheng (1994) (on the consequences for the choice of poverty indices),
and Fisher (1995) and Madden (2000) (on the empirical income elasticity of
poverty lines).
Subjective methods for setting poverty lines are discussed and explored in
de Vos and Garner (1991) (for comparisons of results between the US and
the Netherlands), Pradhan and Ravallion (2000) (on perceived consumption
adequacy), Stanovnik (1992) (for an application to Slovenia), Van den Bosch,
Callan, Estivill, Hausman, Jeandidier, Muffels, and Yfantopoulos (1993) (for
a comparison across 7 European countries), Blanchflower and Oswald (2000)
(for reported levels of happiness in Great Britain and in the US), and Ravallion
and Lokshin (2002) (for perceptions of well-being in Russia).
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Figure 6.3: Food, non-food and total poverty lines
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Figure 6.4: Expenditure and calorie intake
Figure 6.5: Subjective poverty lines
Figure 6.6: Estimating a subjective poverty line with discrete subjective information
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Chapter 7
MEASURING PROGRESSIVITY
AND VERTICAL EQUITY
As is well-known, the assessment of tax and transfer systems draws mainly
on two fundamental principles: efficiency and equity. The former relates to
the presence of distortions in the economic behavior of agents, while the lat-
ter focuses on distributive justice. Vertical equity as a principle of distributive
justice is rarely questioned as such, although the extent to which it must be pre-
cisely weighted against efficiency is a matter of intense disagreement among
policy analysts. A principle of redistributive justice which gathers even greater
support is that of horizontal equity, the equal treatment of equals. The HE
principle is often seen as a consequence of the fundamental moral principle
of the equal worth of human beings, and as a corollary of the equal sacrifice
theories of taxation. This chapter and the next cover in turn the measurement
of each of these principles.
7.1 Taxes and transfers
Let X and N represent respectively gross and net incomes, and let T be
taxes net of transfers — the net tax for short. Gross income is pre-tax and/or
pre-transfer income, and net income is post-tax and/or post-transfer income,
that is, N = X — T. For expositional simplicity, we assume in this chapter that
gross incomes are exogenous. This is a common assumption in the literature
on the measurement of the impact of taxes and transfers, although it can fail
to capture the true impact of tax and transfer policies on well-being when these
taxes and transfers are non-marginal.
We can expect a part of the net tax to be a function of the value of gross
income X. Otherwise, taxes would be lump sum and orthogonal to gross
income. We denote this deterministic part by T(X). For several reasons, we
also expect T to be stochastically linked to X. In real life, taxes and transfers
depend on a number of variables other than gross incomes, such as family
0
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size and composition, age, sex, area of residence, sources of income, type of
consumption and savings behavior, and the ability to avoid taxes or claim
transfers. Thus, we can think of T as being a stochastic function of X, with
where v is a stochastic tax determinant.
We denote by JX,AT('J •) the joint cumulative distribution function (cdf)
of gross and net incomes. Let Qx(p), QN(P) and QT(P) be the p-quantile
functions for gross incomes, net incomes and net taxes, respectively. Let
•FjV|z(') be the cdf of N conditional on gross income being equal to x. The
g-quantile function for net incomes conditional on a p-quantile value for gross
incomes is then technically defined as QN(<I\P) = infjs > 0|Fjv|Qx(p)(s) >
q} for q e [0,1], assuming that net incomes are non-negative. QN(q\p) thus
gives the net income of the individual whose net income rank is q among all
those with gross income equal to Qx(p)-
The expected net income of those with Qx(p) is then given by1
and the expected net tax of those with Qx (p) is obtained as
7.2 Concentration curves
An important descriptive and normative tool for capturing the impact of tax
and transfer policies is the concentration curve. As we will see, concentration
curves can help capture the horizontal and vertical equity of existing tax and
transfer systems. They can also serve to predict the impact of reforms to these
systems.
E:18.8.11 The concentration curve for T is2:
where ^T = Jo QT(p)dp = fix — Mw is average taxes across the population.
CT(P) shows the proportion of total taxes paid by the p bottom proportion of
the population.
In practice, concentration curves are usually estimated by ordering a finite
number n of sample observations (Xi, NI), ..., (Xn,Nn) in increasing values
'DAD: Distribution|Non-Parametric Regression.
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of gross incomes, such that X\ < Xi < ... < Xn, with percentiles pi =
i/n, i = l,.,.,n and with Tt = Xi — A/,. For i = 1, ...n, the sample (or
"empirical") concentration curve for taxes (Tj = Xi — Ni) is then defined as
As for the empirical Lorenz curves, other values of CT(P) can be estimated by
interpolation.
The concentration curve Cjv(p) for net incomes is analogously defined as
and typically estimated as
where the A^ have been ordered in increasing values of the associated gross in-
comes X j . Note that CN (p) is different from the Lorenz curve of net incomes,
LN(P), which is defined as:
Empirically, the Lorenz curve for net income is typically estimated as
but where the observations have been re-ordered in increasing values of net
incomes, with N\ < N% < ... < Nn. Thus, CJV(P) sums up the expected value
of net incomes up to gross income percentile p. Ljv(p)> however, sums up net
incomes up to a net income percentile p.
Denote as t the average tax as a proportion of average gross income, with
t = HT/P-X- When t ^ 0, we can show that
For a positive t, this indicates that the more concentrated are the taxes among
the poor (the smaller the difference LX(P) — CT(P}), the less concentrated
among the poor will net incomes be. The reverse is true for transfers (negative
t): the more concentrated they are among the poor, the more concentrated net
income is among the poor. This link will prove useful later in defining indices
of tax progressivity.
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As for the Lorenz curves and the S-Gini indices of inequality introduced
earlier, we can aggregate the distance between p and the concentration curves
C(p) to obtain summary indices of concentration. These indices of con-
centration are useful to compute aggregate indices of progressivity and verti-
cal equity. More generally, they can also serve to decompose the inequality
in total income or total consumption into a sum of the concentration of the
components of that total income or consumption, such as different sources of
income (different types of earnings, interests, dividends, capital gains, taxes,
transfers, etc.) or different types of consumption (of food, clothing, housing,
etc.).
To define indices of concentration, we can simply weight the distance p —
C(p) by an ethical weight K(P), of which a popular form is again given by
K(P; p) in equation (4.8). This gives the following class of S-Gini indices of
concentration, IC(p)3:
7.4 Decomposition of inequality into income
components
7.4.1 Using concentration curves and indices
An S-Gini inequality index for a variable can easily be decomposed as a
sum of the concentration indices of the component variables that add up to
that variable. This can be useful, for instance, for decomposing total income
inequality as a sum of concentration indices for the different sources of income
(employment, capital, transfers, etc.), or total expenditure inequality as a sum
of concentration indices for food and non-food expenditures, say. For exam-
ple, let X(i} and X^) be two types of expenditures, and let X = X^ + X^
be total consumption. Let Cx(1) (p) and Cxm (p) be the concentration curves
of each of the two types of consumption (using X as the ordering variable).
The concentration indices for Xic\, ICx,^ (p)), c = 1,2, are as follows:
3DAD: Redistribution|Coefficient of Concentration.
3 Concentration indices
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Inequality in X can then be decomposed as a sum of the inequality in X ̂  and
in X(2) . The Lorenz curve for total consumption is given by:
which is a simple weighted sum of the concentration curves for each of the
two types of consumption. The index of inequality in total consumption is
similarly a simple weighted sum of the concentration indices of each of the
two types of consumption4:
For given /ux(1) and nxm, the higher the concentration indices 7Cx(1)(p)
and ICxm (p), the larger the S-Gini index of inequality in total consumption.
Moreover, the higher the share yux(c) /fJ-x of the more highly concentrated ex-
penditure, the higher the inequality in total expenditures5. E: 18.8.32
One possible difficulty with the above is that a component which has the
same value for all will be judged by the decompositions in (7.13) and (7.14) to
have a zero contribution to total inequality. This is because CXM (p) = P for all
p and ICx,c} = 0 if component c is equally distributed across all individuals.
It may be argued, however, that in such a case contribution c should be seen as
contributing negatively to total inequality. Being the same for all, component c
indeed decreases the inequality introduced by other components. One way to
capture this is to rewrite the decompositions (7.13) and (7.14) in reference to
Lx(p) and Ix(p)- This gives:
The two terms on the left of each of these last two expressions give respectively
the contributions of components 1 and 2 to the Lorenz curve and the inequality
index of total expenditure X. Those conditions must sum to zero.
4DAD: Decomposition|S-Gini: Decomposition by Sources.
5DAD: Decomposition|S-Gini: Decomposition by Sources.
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7.4.2 Using the Shapley value
An alternative approach uses the Shapley value to express inequality in total
income as a sum of the contributions of inequality in individual income compo-
nents. For expositional simplicity, assume again that there are only two income
components, X ( l ) and X(2). Total inequality is then given by / (-X(i), -^(2))•
Suppose that we replace the two income components X^ and Jf(2) by their
mean value nxm and nxm, to yield / \^tXw,^xm)- Clearly, inequality
would be zero after such a substitution. Total inequality can then be expressed
as:
An estimate of the contribution of component 1 to total inequality would be
given by the second line, and the third line would indicate the contribution of
component 2. These estimated contributions are in general dependent upon
the order in which the components are replaced by their mean value. The
contribution of component 1 could for instance be estimated alternatively as
/ fX(i), / ix ( 2))-
 To solve, this order dependency problem, we can use the
Shapley value to define the contribution of a component c to total inequality as
its expected contribution to inequality reduction when it is added randomly to
anyone of the various subsets of components that one can choose from the set
of all components. With two components, this gives6:
7.5 Progressivity comparisons
7.5.1 Deterministic tax and benefit systems
Let us for a moment assume that the tax system is non-stochastic (or de-
terministic), namely, that v equals a constant zero. Suppose also for now that
this deterministic tax system does not rerank individuals, or equivalently that
6DAD: DecompositionjS-Gini: Decomposition by Sources.
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T^(X) < 1. Furthermore, denote the average rate of taxation at gross in-
come X by t(X) with t(X) = T(X)/X7. Assuming no reranking, a net tax E:18.8.9
(possibly including a transfer or subsidy) T(X) is said to be
• locally progressive at X — x if the average rate of taxation increases with
X, that is, if tw (x) > 0;
« locally proportional at X = x if the average rate of taxation stays constant
with X, that is, if t^(x) = 0;
• and locally regressive at X = x if the average rate of taxation decreases
with X, that is, if t^(x) < 0. E:18.8.10
There are two popular "local" measures to capture the change in taxes and
net income as gross income increases. One is the elasticity of taxes with
respect to X, also called Liability Progression, LP(X):
LP(X) is simply the ratio of the marginal tax rate over the average tax rate at
X. It is possible to show that a tax system is everywhere progressive (namely,
t^-\X~) > 0 everywhere) if LP(X) > 1 everywhere. The larger this measure
at every X, the more concentrated among the richer are the taxes.
One problem with LP(X) is that it is not defined when T(X) = 0, and that
it is awkward to interpret when a net tax is sometimes negative and sometimes
positive across gross income. Another problem is that it is linked to the relative
distribution of taxes, not with the relative distribution of the associated net
incomes.
These problems are avoided by the use of a second local measure of pro-
gression, called Residual Progression (RP(X)), which is the elasticity of net
income with respect to gross income:
Unlike LP(X), RP(X) is well defined and easily interpretable even when
taxes are sometimes negative, positive or zero, so long as gross and net incomes
are strictly positive. It is then possible to show that a tax system is everywhere
progressive (again, this means that t^(X) > 0 everywhere) if RP(X) < 1
everywhere.
There is a nice link between these measures of progressivity and the redis-
tributive impact of taxes.
7DAD: Distribution|Non-Parametric Regression.
134 POVERTY AND EQUITY
Progressivity and inequality reduction
Assuming no reranking, the following conditions are equivalent:
Progressive taxation will thus make the distribution of net incomes unam-
biguously more equal than the distribution of gross incomes, regardless of that
actual distribution of gross incomes. Moreover, if the residual progression for a
tax system A is always lower than that of a tax system B, whatever the value of
X, then the tax system A is said to be everywhere more residual -progressive
than the tax system B, and the distribution of net incomes will always be more
equal under A than under B, again regardless of the distribution of gross in-
comes.
Hence, an important distributive consequence of progressive taxation is to
make the inequality of net incomes lower than that of gross income. Analo-
gously, proportional taxation will not change inequality, and regressive taxa-
tion will increase inequality. The more progressive the tax system, the more
inequality-reducing it is. To check whether a deterministic tax system is pro-
gressive, proportional or regressive, we may thus simply plot the average tax
rate as a function of X and observe its slope. Alternatively, we may estimate
and graph its Liability progression or its residual progression at various values
of X. To check whether a tax system is more residual -progressive (and thus
more redistributive) than another one, we simply plot and compare the elastic-
ity of net incomes with respect to gross incomes. All of this can be done using
non-parametric regressions of T(X) and N against X.8
Another informative descriptive approach is to compare the share in taxes
and benefits to the share in the population of individuals at various ranks in the
distribution of gross income. This is most easily done by plotting on a graph
the ratios T(X)//*r °r T(P)//AT for various values of X or p. If these ratios
exceed 1, then those individuals with those incomes or ranks pay a greater
share of total taxes than their population share. A similar intuition applies
when T(-) is a benefit: a ratio T(X)/HT or T(p)/HT that exceeds 1 indicates
that the benefit share exceeds the population share. If T(X) or T(p) increases
8DAD: Distribution|Non-Parametric Regression.
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v tax system is everywhere
locally progressive.
A competing descriptive tool is to plot the ratio of taxes over gross income,
that is, T(X)/X, perhaps assessed at some rankp to give T(p}/Qx(p)- Such
a graph shows how the average tax rate evolves with gross income or ranks.
When these ratios increase everywhere with X, the tax is everywhere locally
progressive.
7.5.2 General tax and benefit systems
Although graphically informative, the above simple descriptive approaches
present three main problems. First, ifT^(X) > I, the tax system will induce
reranking, even if it is a deterministic function of X. As we will see below,
reranking (and, more generally, horizontal inequity) decreases the redistribu-
tive effect of taxation, besides being of significant ethical concern in its own
right.
Second, and more importantly in empirical applications, taxes are typically
not a deterministic function of gross income, and randomness in taxes will
introduce greater variability and inequality in net incomes than the above de-
terministic approach would predict. X — T(X] may then be an unreliable
guide to the distribution of net incomes, and the above theorems relating local
progression measures to global redistributive impact lose a great part of their
practical usefulness. Randomness in taxes will also introduce further rerank-
ing. These features will reduce the redistributive effect of the tax, and may
even in the most extreme cases increase inequality even when the "determinis-
tic trend" of the tax is progressive — even when t^ (X) > 0.
Third, the actual redistribution effected by taxes depends on the distribu-
tion of gross incomes, and not only on the shape of the tax function T. Said
differently, the actual redistributive effect of Liability or residual progression
will depend on the actual distribution of gross incomes. Arguably, the actual
redistribution operated by a tax system is probably of greater interest than its
potential impact. A tax may be very locally progressive over some ranges of
gross income, but the actual redistributive impact will depend on the interac-
tion of this local progression with the distribution of gross incomes.
7.6 Tax and income redistribution
To deal with these difficulties, we can use the actual distribution of taxes T
and net incomes N (instead of their predicted values T(X) and X — T(X)) to
determine whether the actual tax system is really progressive and inequality-
reducing. This amounts to combining the local measures of progressivity with
the distribution of gross incomes to generate global measures of progressivity.
00000000
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There are two leading approaches for this exercise. The first is the Tax-
redistribution ( TR) approach, and the second is the Income- redistribution (
IR) approach. The global definitions of tax progressivity associated to each
of these approaches are as follows.
 1 For TR progressivity:
(a) A tax T is TO-progressive if9
(b) A benefit B is TK-progressive if10
(c) A tax T(j) is more TK-progressive than a tax T(2) if
11
(d) A benefit B^ is more T7?-progressive than a benefit B(2) if
12
(e) A tax T is more TTJ-progressive than a benefit B if13
E:18.8.3 2 For IR progressivity:
(a) A net tax T is .ffi-progressive if14
(b) A net tax Tm is more .ffi-progressive than a tax (and/or a transfer) jT(2)
if15
These two TR and IR approaches are consistent with the use above of Li-
ability and residual progression in a deterministic tax system. If v = 0 in
'DAD: Redistribution|Tax or Transfer.
10DAD: Redistribution [Tax or Transfer.
"DAD: Redistribution [Tax/Transfer vs Tax/Transfer.
12DAD: Redistribution (Tax/Transfer vs Tax/Transfer.
"DAD: Redistribution [Transfer vs Tax.
I4DAD: Redistribution|Tax or Transfer.
"DAD: Redistribution [Tax/Transfer vs Tax/Transfer.
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(7.1), and ift^(X) > 0 andT^(X) < 1 (namely, no reranking), then,
whatever the actual distribution of gross incomes, T(X) is both TR- and IR-
progressive. Furthermore, if LP^(X) > LP^(X) at all values of X, then
the tax system 1 is necessarily more TR progressive than the tax system 2.
And if RP^X) < RP(2)(X) at all values of X, then the tax system 1 is
necessarily more IR progressive than the tax system 2.
Note that these progressivity comparisons have as a reference point the ini-
tial Lorenz curve. In other words, a tax is progressive if the poorest individuals
bear a share of the total tax burden that is less than their share in total gross
income. As mentioned above, an alternative reference point would be the cu-
mulative shares in the population. This is often argued in the context of state
support — the reference point to assess the equity of public expenditures is
population share. The analytical framework above can easily allow for this
alternative view — for instance, simply by replacing Lx(p) by p in the above
definitions of TR progressivity. This will make more stringent the conditions
to declare a benefit to be progressive, but it will also make it easier for a tax to
be declared progressive — to see this, compare (7.21) and (7.22).
7.7 References
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indices introduced in Mehran (1976). They are discussed inter alia Duclos
(2000), Kakwani (1987), Pfahler (1983) and Pfahler (1987).
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Cassady, Ruggeri, and Van Wart (1996), Formby, Seaks, and Smith (1984),
Formby, Smith, and Thistle (1987), Formby, Smith, and Thistle (1990) and
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benefit systems, and Keen, Papapanagos, and Shorrocks (2000) and Le Breton,
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"transplant-and-compare" procedure) and in Lambert and Pfahler (1992) —
see also the comment by Milanovic (1994a). Yardsticks for assessing the effec-
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in Fellman, Jantti, and Lambert (1999) and Fellman (2001).
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gressivity and redistribution. See in particular Altshuler and Schwartz (1996)
(for the annual vs a "time-exposure" incidence of the US child care tax credit),
Caspersen and Metcalf (1994) (for the annual vs lifetime incidence of value-
added taxes), Greedy and van de Ven (2001) (for the annual vs lifetime inci-
dence of the Australian tax and benefit system), Lyon and Schwab (1995) (for
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(1994) (for the lifetime incidence of US state and local taxes), Nelissen (1998)
(for the lifetime incidence of Dutch social security),
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(1995a) (redistribution in six LIS countries), Borg, Mason, and Shapiro (1991)
(regressivity of taxes on casino gambling), Davidson and Duclos (1997) (pro-
gressivity in Canada), Decoster and Van Camp (2001) (the redistributive ef-
fect of a shift from direct to indirect taxation in Belgium), Dilnot, Kay, and
Norris (1984) ( progressivity in the UK between 1948 and 1982), Duclos and
Tabi (1999) ( redistribution in Canada), Giles and Johnson (1994) ( redistri-
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tax reform), Hanratty and Blank (1992) (the comparative poverty effect of re-
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loglou (2001) (the redistributive effect of social transfers in the European
Union), Hills (1991) (the redistributive effect of British housing subsidies),
Howard, Ruggeri, and Van Wart (1994) (the redistributive effect of taxes
in Canada), Khetan and Poddar (1976) ( redistribution in Canada), Loomis
and Revier (1988) (the redistributive effect of excise taxes), Mercader Prats
(1997) ( redistribution in Spain, 1980-1994), Milanovic (1995) (the redistribu-
tive effect of transfers in Eastern Europe and in Russia), Morris and Preston
(1986) ( redistribution in the UK), Norregaard (1990) (tax progressivity in the
OECD countries), O'higgins and Rnggles (1981) ( redistribution in the UK),
O'higgins, Schmaus, and Stephenson (1989) (comparative redistribution of
taxes and transfers in seven countries), Persson and Wissen (1984) (the im-
pact of tax evasion on redistribution), Price and Novak (1999) (the regres-
sivity of implicit taxes on lottery games), Ruggeri, Van Wart, and Howard
(1994) (the redistributive impact of government spending in Canada), Rug-
gles and O'higgins (1981) (the redistributive impact of government spend-
ing in the US), Schwarz and Gustafsson (1991) ( redistribution in Sweden),
Smeeding and Coder (1995) (redistribution in 6 LIS countries), van Doorslaer,
Wagstaff, van der Burg, Christiansen, Citoni, Di Biase, Gerdtham, Gerfin,
Gross, and Hakinnen (1999) (the redistributive impact of health care financing
in 12 OECD countries), Vermaeten, Gillespie, and Vermaeten (1995) (the re-
distributive impact of taxes in Canada, 1951-1988), Wagstaff and van Doorslaer
(1997) (the redistributive impact of health care financing in the Netherlands),
Wagstaff, van Doorslaer, Hattem, Calonge, Christiansen, Citoni, Gerdtham,
Gerfin, Gross, and Hakinnen (1999) (the redistributive impact of personal in-
come taxation in 12 OECD countries), Younger, Sahn, Haggblade, and Dorosh
(1999) (tax incidence in Madagascar).
Benefit incidence analysis is also regularly carried out in less developed
economies — see, for instance, Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) for the role of
differentiated "program capture" in explaining the evolution of the incidence of
benefits, Sahn, Younger, and Simler (2000) for a dominance analysis of benefit
incidence in Romania, van de Walle (1998a) for a discussion of general issues,
and Wodon and Yitzhaki (2002) for the role of program allocation rules in the
study of benefit incidence.
There have been numerous papers decomposing the Gini indices into sums
of contributions of income sources. These include Aaberge, Bjorklund, Jantti,
Pedersen, Smith, and Wennemo (2000), Achdut (1996), Cancian and Reed
(1998), Gustafsson and Shi (2001), Keeney (2000), Leibbrandt, Woolard, and
Woolard (2000), Lerman (1999), Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), Morduch and
Sicular (2002), Fodder (1993), Podder and Mukhopadhaya (2001), Podder
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(1989), Silber (1993), Silber (1989), Sotomayor (1996), Wodon (1999), and
Yao (1997).
Chapter 8
HORIZONTAL EQUITY, RERANKING
AND REDISTRIBUTION
In this chapter, we examine in more detail a more neglected aspect of the
notion of redistributive justice: horizontal equity ( HE) in taxation (includ-
ing negative taxation).1 Two main approaches to the measurement of HE are
found in the literature, which has evolved substantially in the last thirty years.
The classical formulation of the HE principle prescribes the equal treatment
of individuals who share the same level of welfare before government inter-
vention. HE may also be viewed as implying the absence of reranking: for
a tax to be horizontally equitable, the ranking of individuals on the basis of
pre-tax welfare should not be altered by a fiscal system. Most of the analysis
below will involve ethical indices. We will see that, depending on the choice
of the underlying social welfare function or inequality index, horizontal in-
equity will be captured either by a "classical " horizontal inequity index or by
a " reranking" one.
8.1 Ethical and other foundations
Why should concerns for horizontal equity influence the design of an opti-
mal tax and transfer system? Several answers have been provided, using either
of two approaches. The traditional or "classical " approach defines HE as
the equal treatment of equals (see Musgrave (1959)). While this principle is
generally well accepted, different rationales are advanced to support it. First,
a tax which discriminates between comparable individuals is liable to create
resentment and a sense of insecurity, possibly also leading to social unrest.
Second, the principles of progressivity and income redistribution, which
are key elements of most tax and transfer systems, are generally undermined
This chapter draws exvensively from Duclos, Jaibert, and Araar (2003), where more details can be found.
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by horizontal inequity (HI) — as we shall see in our own treatment below. This
has indeed been one of the main themes in the development of the reranking
approach in the last decades. Hence, a desire for HE may simply derive from
a general aversion to inequality, without any further appeal to other normative
criteria. HI may moreover suggest the presence of imperfections in the op-
eration of the tax and transfer system, such as an imperfect delivery of social
welfare benefits, attributable to poor targeting or to incomplete take-up. It
can also signal tax evasion, which can inter alia cost the government signifi-
cant losses of tax revenue.
Third, HE can be argued to be an ethically more robust principle than
VE. VE asks for the reduction of welfare gaps between unequal individuals.
Depending on the retained specification of distributive fairness, the strength of
the requirements of vertical justice can vary considerably, while the integrity
of the principle of horizontal equity remains essentially invariant. This has
led several authors to advocate that HE be treated as a separate principle from
VE, and thus that HE be one of the objectives over which optimal trade-offs
are assessed for the setting of tax policy.
The theory of relative deprivation also suggests that people often specifi-
cally compare their relative individual fortune with that of others in similar or
close circumstances. The first to formalize the theory of relative deprivation,
Davis (1959), expressly allowed for this by suggesting how comparisons with
similar vs dissimilar others lead to different kinds of emotional reactions; he
used the expression "relative deprivation" for "in-group" comparisons (i.e., for
HI), and "relative subordination" for "out-group" comparisons (i.e., for VE)
(Davis 1959, p.283). Moreover, in the words of Runciman (1966), another im-
portant contributor to that theory, "people often choose reference groups closer
to their actual circumstances than those which might be forced on them if their
opportunities were better than they are" (p.29).
In a discussion of the post-war British welfare state, Runciman also notes
that "the reference groups of the recipients of welfare were virtually bound to
remain within the broadly delimited area of potential fellow-beneficiaries. It
was anomalies within this area which were the focus of successive grievances,
not the relative prosperity of people not obviously comparable" (p.71). Finally,
in his theory of social comparison processes, Festinger (1954) also argues that
"given a range of possible persons for comparison, someone close to one's own
ability or opinion will be chosen for comparison" (p. 121). In an income re-
distribution context, it is thus plausible to assume that comparative reference
groups are established on the basis of similar gross incomes and proximate
pre-tax ranks, and that individuals subsequently make comparisons of post-tax
outcomes across these groups. Individuals would then assess their relative re-
distributive ill-fortune in reference groups of comparables by monitoring inter
alia how they fare compared to similar others, and by assessing whether they
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are overtaken by or overtake these comparables in income status, thus provid-
ing a plausible "micro-foundation" for the use of HE as a normative criterion.
This suggests that comparisons with close individuals (but not necessarily
exact equals) would be at least as important in terms of social and psychologi-
cal reactions as comparisons with dissimilar individuals, and thus that analysis
of HI and reranking in that context should be at least as important as con-
siderations of VE. It also says that, although classical HI and reranking are
both necessary and sufficient signs of HI, they are (and will be perceived as)
different manifestations of violations of the HE principle.
The value of studying classical HI has nonetheless been questioned by a
few authors, who reject the premise that the initial distribution is necessarily
just, or who point out that utilitarianism and the Pareto principle may justify
the unequal treatment of equals (as discussed above). A number of authors
have also expressed dissatisfaction with the classical approach to HE because
of the implementation difficulties it was seen to present. Indeed, since no two
individuals are ever exactly alike in a finite sample, it was argued that analysis
of equals had to proceed on the basis of groupings of unequals which were ul-
timately arbitrary. The proposed alternative was then to link HI and reranking
and to note that the absence of reranking implies the classical requirement of
HE. For instance, Feldstein (1976), p.94, argues that
the tax system should preserve the utility order, implying that if two individuals would
have the same utility level in the absence of taxation, they should also have the same
utility level if there is a tax.
Various other ethical justifications have also been suggested for the require-
ment of no- reranking. For instance, King (1983) argues in favor of adding (for
normative consistency) the qualification "and treating unequals accordingly" to
the classical definition of HE. It then becomes clear that classical HE also im-
plies the absence of reranking. Indeed, if two unequals are reranked by some
redistribution, then it could be argued at a conceptual level that at a particular
point in that process of redistribution, these two unequals became equals and
were then made unequal (and reranked), thus violating classical HE. Hence,
from the above, it would seem that (quoting again from King 1983, p. 102) "a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of horizontal inequity is a
change in ranking between the ex ante and the ex post distributions". We thus
follow each of the approaches in turn, starting with reranking.
8.2 Measuring reranking and redistribution
We first show how to decompose the net redistributive effect of taxes and
transfers into vertical equity (VE) and reranking (RR) components. The VE
effect measures the tendency of a tax system to "compress" the distribution of
net incomes, which is linked to the progressivity of the tax system. The RR
term contributes negatively to the net redistributive effect of the tax system.
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The use of Lorenz and concentration curves and of the associated S-Gini in-
dices of inequality and redistribution will enable this integration of reranking
and horizontal inequity.
8.2.1 Reranking
Recall first the definition of a concentration curve for net income in (7.6).
We can show that CJV(P) wl'l never be lower than the Lorenz curve LN(P),
and will be strictly greater than L^(p) for at least one value of p if there is "
reranking" in the redistribution of incomes. (In a continuous distribution, a
sufficient condition for reranking is that v in (7.1) is not degenerate, namely,
that it is not a constant.) Intuitively, Cjv(p) cumulates some net incomes whose
percentiles in the net income distribution exceed p. These are net incomes
that exceed N(p) and QN(P)- Such high incomes are nevertheless possible,
however, due to the stochastic term v in (7.1). i/v(p) only cumulates the net
incomes which equal QN(P) or less. Hence, Cjv(p) > LN(P)- This can also
be seen by comparing the estimators in equations (7.7) and (7.9). In (7.9), the
observations of Nj are cumulated in increasing values of Nj, but in (7.7), the
observations of Nj are cumulated in increasing values ofXj, which means that
some higher values of Nj may be cumulated before some lower ones.
It is therefore straightforward to conclude that a net tax T will cause rerank-
ing (and hence horizontal inequity) if and only if Cff(p) > -Lj\r(p) for at least
one value of p s]0,1[. The distance C*JV(P) — LN(P)
 can
 therefore be used
s an indicator of reranking
2
. A natural S-Gini index of rerankingind is then
obtained as a weighted distance between the two curves:
Denoting ICff(p) as the index of concentration of net incomes (recall (7.11)),
this index of reranking can also be obtained as
8.2.2 S-Gini indices of equity and redistribution
As for comparisons of inequality and concentration, it is often useful to
summarize the progressivity, vertical equity, horizontal inequity as well as
the redistributive effect of taxes and transfers into summary indices. We can
do this by weighting the differences expressed above by the weights K(P; p)
of the S-Gini indices to obtain S-Gini indices of TR- progressivity (IT(p)
), IR- progressivity and vertical equity (IV(p) ), reranking (RR(p)), and
redistribution (IR(p)):
2DAD: Curves|Lorenz and DAD: Curves]Concentration.
E:18.8.5
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These indices can also be computed as differences between S-Gini indices of
inequality and concentration:
Many of these indices have first been proposed with p = 2, which corre-
sponds to the case of the standard Gini index. IT(p = 2) is known as the
Kakwani index of TR progressivity3, IV(p = 2) is known as the Reynolds- E:18.8.4
Smolensky index of IR progressivity and vertical equity, and RR(p = 2) is
known as the Atkinson-Plotnick index of reranking.
8.2.3 Redistribution and vertical and horizontal
equity
The difference between the Lorenz curve of net and gross incomes is given
by:
The larger this difference, the more redistributive is the tax and benefit system.
Alternatively, the net redistribution can be expressed in terms of S-indices4: E:18.8.6
3DAD: lnequality|Gini/S-Gini Index and DAD: Redistributlon|Coefficient of Concentration.
4DAD: lnequality|Gini/S-Gini Index and DAD: Redistribution|Coefficient of Concentration.
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The first term VE in each of the above two expressions is clearly linked to
the definition of IR- progressivity in equation (7.26). As shown in equation
(7.10), it can also be expressed in terms of TR- progressivity when t ^ 0:
and, using S-indices,
Furthermore, if there is more than one tax and/or benefit that make up T,
we can decompose total VE as a sum of the IR and TR progressivity of
each tax and transfer. Say that there are J such taxes or benefits. Let i^
be the (overall) average tax rate of the tax Tyj, with j = 1,..., J, such that
]Cj=i %) = *• and 'et ^T(J\ (p) and CWm (p) be the concentration curves
net income and taxes corresponding to tax TQJ, with N^ = X — T^ . Then,
we have
and
Cjv(J)(p) — LX(P) and Ix(p) — ̂ CW(p) capture the vertical equity of tax or
transfer j at percentile p, and again can be easily seen to be an element of the
definition of IR- progressivity. Each of these VE contributions can also be
expressed as a function of TR progressivity at p (when t^) ^ 0):
or, using S-Gini indices of IR progressivity, as a function of S-Gini indices of
TR progressivity:
The second term on the right-hand side of (8.11) and (8.12) is the
redistribution-reducing reranking effect. As is well known from the litera-
ture on reranking (see Atkinson, 1979, and Plotnick, 1981, for instance), tak-
ing into account reranking when using rank-dependent inequality indices in-
creases measured inequality and decreases the redistributive effect of taxation,
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and this explains why Jjv generally exceeds ICjv, and also why the difference
can be interpreted as the impact of reranking on the net redistributive effect of
taxation.
To interpret that second term, we may also think of individuals resenting
being outranked by others, but enjoying outranking others, and then assess
their net feeling of resentment by the amount by which the net income of the
richer (than themselves) actually exceeds what the net income of the richer
class would have been had no "new rich" displaced "old rich" in the distri-
bution of net incomes. We can then show that /ijv (!N(P) ~ I@N(P)) is the
expected net income resentment of the poorest person in samples of p — 1
randomly selected individuals, and thus that RR(p) is an ethically-weighted
indicator of such net resentment in the population.
8.3 Measuring classical horizontal inequity and
redistribution
We now turn to the measurement of classical horizontal equity, defined
again as "the equal treatment of equals".
8.3.1 Horizontally-equitable net incomes
One natural avenue for measuring whether equals are treated equally is to
estimate the variability of taxes and net incomes conditional on some initial
value of gross income. We may, for instance, wish to estimate the conditional
variability of T at some value of X. Alternatively, and perhaps better for ex-
positional purposes, we may want to show that conditional variability over a
range of percentiles p of gross income X, and we may thus want to estimate
for example the conditional variance of T at gross income X(p), <r|,(p)5: E: 18.8.7
Recent work has, however, attempted to make the measurement of classical
HI flow from ethical (as opposed to descriptive or statistical) foundations. We
show how this can be done using the popular Atkinson social welfareatk func-
tion W(e) introduced in (4.37). For the distribution of net incomes, this social
welfare function equals:
Recall that the expected net_ income of those at rank p in the distribution of
gross income is given by N(p). Hence, if the tax system were horizontally
5DAD: Distribution|Conditional Standard Deviation.
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equitableand if all individuals at rank p in the distribution of gross income were
granted N(p) in net incomes, the local level of utility would be U (N(p~); e)
and net-income social welfare would equal
The expected net income utility of those at rank p in the distribution of gross
income is, however, equal to
If, instead of U ( N ( p ) ; e ) , we assigned individuals at rank p their expected net
income utility U(p; e), social welfare would equal
Wjf(e) is social welfare using ex ante expected net income; Wjj(e) is social
welfare using ex ante expected net income utility. By the concavity of the
utility function, we have that U(N(p); f) — U(p; e) > 0, and this difference
captures the local utility cost of net income uncertainty at p. Hence, we also
have that WOv(e) = Wjj(e) < Wjf(e), a feature which we can use to capture
the global social welfare cost of HI and its impact on redistribution.
To show the social welfare cost of HI and its impact on redistribution, we
can follow either of two approaches. Recall that we have just provided two
locally horizontally-equitable tax systems:
• one in which each individual_at rank p in the distribution of gross incomes
receives N(p) and utility U(N(p); e) ,
• and one in which each of these individuals receives U(p; e).
In the first case, Wff(e) < Wjy(e) but mean income is the same under
the two distributions N(p) and N(p) since /^jv = 0 JQ N(q\p)dq dp =
fo N(p)dp = fj,jf. Hence, a consequence of HI is to increase inequality and
to decrease the redistributive fall in inequality brought about by tax and benefit
systems. This is further developed in Section 8.3.2.
The second case imposes a horizontally-equitable local distribution of utility
U(p) that equals the ex ante expected local utility. Compared to the actual
distribution of net incomes, this reduces inequality but maintain the_overall
level of social welfare. Hence, it must be that average income under U(p) is
lower than under N(p). It also implies that the cost of inequality is lower with
U(p). This is further developed in Section 8.3.3.
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8.3.2 Change-in-inequality approach
Let the equally distributed equivalent (EDE) incomes for Wjv(e). Wjj(e)
and Wjj(e) be £jv(€)> £;v(e) anc^ %(e)' respectively. As before, inequality can
be measured by the differences between those £ and the corresponding fj,, as a
proportion of [i. Now observe that
since Hjf = //AT and Wjf(e) > Wjj(e). Hence, HI increases inequality. The
overall redistributive change in inequality that results from the effect of taxes
and transfers can then be expressed as
Note also that, by (4.35), (8.25) is equivalent to £;v(e) ~£x(e) wnen the mea
of X and N are the same.
Hence, using (8.25) we obtain the following decomposition of the net re-
distributive change in inequality6:
VE represents the decrease in inequality yielded by a tax which treats equals
equally. Thus, VE can be interpreted as a measure of_the underlying vertical
equity of horizontally-equitable net taxes X(p) — N(p). HI measures the
fall in redistribution attributable to the unequal post-tax treatment of pre-tax
equals. The excess of /jy(e) over Ijf(e) is due to the appearance of post-ta
income inequality within groups of pre-tax equals.
8.3.3 Cost-of-inequality approach
In the above change-in-inequality approach, average income is kept the
same while comparing distributions of actual and horizontally equitable net
incomes. Social welfare and inequality do, however, vary across the distri-
butions of N(p) and N(p). In the second approach, the cost-of-inequality
approach, social welfare is kept the same across the distributions being com-
pared but the mean income required to attain this level of welfare varies. Each
element of the decomposition in this section thus corresponds to a difference
in means at equal social welfare WOv(e).
'DAD: Redistribution|Duclos & Lambert (1999) and DAD: Redistribution|Dudos, Jalbert & Araar
(2003).
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The cost of inequality in the distribution of net income can be expressed as:
Recall that CV(e) represents the level of per capita net income that society
could use for the elimination of inequality with no loss of social welfare.
Let Cp(e) represent the cost of inequality subsequent to a flat (or propor-
tional, and thus inequality neutral) tax on gross incomes that generates the
same level of social welfare as the distribution of net incomes. Denote the
average income under this welfare-neutral flat tax by /J,p. The net effect of
redistribution on the cost of inequality then becomes:
Since £N(e) = p.N - Cjv(e) = fj,F - CF(e) and since £N(e) = /j,N(l -
IN(C)) = /•'Hi ~ Ix(t))>we also nave
which is positive if Ix(t) > IN(£)- The more progressive the net tax system,
the greater the value of AC. If the net tax system is progressive, the greater
the value of e, the greater the redistributive fall in the cost of inequality.
We then write the decomposition of the total variation in the cost of in-
equality as7:
The redistributive fall in the cost of inequality then decomposes into two ef-
fects.
First, Cjj is the cost of inequality under a (horizontally-equitable) certainty-
equivalent level of net income at all ranks p. This certainty-equivalent net in-
come is given by £(/(p; e) = U^~^ (U(p; e)) at rank p. Hence, for constant
social welfare, an horizontally-equitable tax system corresponds to a distribu-
tion of £y (p; e) to each individual at pre-tax percentile p.
Second, Cp (e) — Cjj(e) in (8.30) measures the difference in the cost of
inequality of two horizontally equitable tax systems, the first being a flat tax
system, and the second granting everyone his certainty equivalent level of net
income, with both systems yielding the same level of social welfare WN-
Cp(e) — C-jj(e) is positive if the tax system is progressive in an ex ante,
'DAD: Redistribution|Duclos & Lambert (1999) and DAD: Redistribution|Duclos, Jalbert & Araar
(2003).
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certainty-equivalent, sense. In such a case, the distribution across percentiles
of the certainty-equivalent net incomes is less inequality costly than the distri-
bution of gross incomes.
8.3.4 Decomposition of classical horizontal
inequity
We may also wish to know at which percentile or for which population
group HI is more pronounced, and by how much it contributes to total classical
HI. For this, define the local cost of classical violations of HE atp as:
This is the "risk-premium" of net income uncertainty at percentile p, and it
is thus a money-metric cost of local classical HI at p. It is then possible to
show that aggregating (8.31) using population weights yields the global index
of total classical HI in (8.30):
8.4 References
The literature on horizontal inequity has evolved very significantly over the
last 25 years. Recent literature surveys can be found in Jenkins and Lam-
bert (1999), Lambert and Ramos (1997a) and Lambert (2001) (see also the
comment by Plotnick (1999) and the earlier reviews of Musgrave (1990) and
Plotnick (1985)). See also Balcer and Sadka (1986), Feldstein (1976), Hettich
(1983), Lambert and Yitzhaki (1995) and Stiglitz (1982) for a treatment of hor-
izontal equity as a separate principle from vertical equity, and Kaplow (1989),
Kaplow (1995) and Kaplow (2000) for a critique of the principle of horizontal
inequity.
The early reranking approach was much influenced by Atkinson (1979),
Plotnick (1981) and Plotnick (1982) (for the RR(2) index), and King (1983)
(for a normative link between inequality, mobility and reranking). See also
Chakravarty (1985) for normative links between inequality and reranking,
Dardanoni and Lambert (2001) for a statistically-based look at the associa-
tion between gross and net incomes, Duclos (1993) for the general form of
the IR(p) indices, Jenkins (1988a) for a "within-group " horizontal equity
focus, Kakwani and Lambert (1999) for a ///-related analysis of tax discrim-
ination, Kakwani and Lambert (1998) for an axiomatic construction of equity
measures, Rosen (1978) for a (rare) utility-based evaluation of horizontal in-
equity, and Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) for reasons for which reranking may
decrease inequality.
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Classical horizontal equity has seen extensive developments particularly in
the last 10 years: see, for instance, Aronson, Johnson, and Lambert (1994),
Aronson and Lambert (1994), Aronson, Lambert, and Trippeer (1999) and
van de Ven, Greedy, and Lambert (2001), for the use of the Gini for calcu-
lating both reranking and classical horizontal inequity; Duclos and Lambert
(2000), for a cost-of-inequality approach; and Auerbach and Hassett (2002)
and Lambert and Ramos (1997b), for a change-in-inequality approach.
Empirical enquiries into the extent of horizontal inequity have also been
relatively numerous. They include inter alia Ankrom (1993) for comparative
Swedish, British and American evidence, Berliant and Strauss (1985) for the
US federal income tax system, Bishop, Formby, and Lambert (2000) for the
effects of noncompliance and tax evasion, Greedy (2001) and Greedy (2002)
for the impact of non-uniform indirect taxes on horizontal inequity in Aus-
tralia, Greedy and van de Ven (2001) for the impact on measured horizontal
inequity of using different equivalence scales and of using annual vs lifetime
income, Decoster, Schokkaert, and Van Camp (1997) for indirect taxation and
horizontal inequity in Belgium, Duclos (1995b) for the role of imperfections in
poverty alleviation programs, Jenkins (1988b) and Nolan (1987) for the extent
of reranking in the UK, Sa Aadu, Shilling, and Sirmans (1991) for whether
the treatment of capital gains on owner-occupied housing matters for horizon-
tal inequity, and Stranahan and Borg (1998) for whether an implicit "lottery
tax" is a source of horizontal inequity.
The advances in the measurement of horizontal inequity have also led to a
desire to decompose the overall measurement of redistribution as a function
of progressivity, vertical equity, reranking and classical horizontal inequity.
This is done inter alia in Duclos (1993) (with the S-Gini ), Duclos (1995b)
(with redistributive imperfections), Kakwani (1984) and Kakwani (1986) by
using the Gini index but not attempting to measure classical horizontal in-
equity; and in Aronson, Johnson, and Lambert (1994), Aronson and Lambert
(1994), van Doorslaer, Wagstaff, van der Burg, Christiansen, Citoni, Di Bi-
ase, Gerdtham, Gerfin, Gross, and Hakinnen (1999) (for health financing in
12 OECD countries), Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1997) (for health financing
in the Netherlands), Wagstaff, van Doorslaer, Hattem, Calonge, Christiansen,
Citoni, Gerdtham, Gerfin, Gross, and Hakinnen (1999) (for personal income
taxes in 12 OECD countries), all using the Gini index and incorporating
both reranking and classical horizontal inequity. See also Wagstaff and van
Doorslaer (2001) for a decomposition of total tax progressivity in components
such as the progressivity of tax credits, marginal tax rates, allowances and
deductions.
PART III
ORDINAL COMPARISONS OF POVERTY
AND EQUITY
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Chapter 9
DISTRIBUTIVE DOMINANCE
9.1 Ordering distributions
We have, up to now, focussed mostly on measuring and comparing cardi-
nal indices of poverty and equity. As discussed in Chapter 4, this has several
expositional advantages. The greatest of these advantages is probably that of
focussing on only one (or a few) numerical assessments of poverty and equity.
It is then relatively straightforward to compare poverty and equity across distri-
butions just by comparing the values of these cardinal indices. The conclusions
are then (seemingly) "clear-cut".
There are, however, important reasons to consider instead ordinal compar-
isons of poverty and equity. The most important one is that comparisons of
cardinal poverty and equity indices (comparisons across time, regions, socio-
demographic groups, or comparisons of policy regimes, for instance) may be
disturbingly sensitive to the choice of indices and poverty lines. For instance,
we might find for some poverty lines and indices that poverty is greater in a
region A than in a region B, but we then find the opposite for other lines and in-
dices. We could support the introduction of a particular fiscal policy or macroe-
conomic adjustment program for some social welfare indices, but could be in
doubt as to whether the same support would be warranted with other indices.
Since there is rarely unanimity as to the right choice of poverty lines and dis-
tributive indices, it is clear that such sensitivity can seriously undermine one's
confidence in comparing distributions or in making policy recommendations.
9.2 Sensitivity of poverty comparisons
To see this better in the context of poverty comparisons, consider the hypo-
thetical example of Table 9.1. The second, third and fourth lines in the table
show the incomes of three individuals in two hypothetical distributions, A and
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B. Thus, distribution A contains three incomes of 4, 11 and 20 respectively.
The bottom 3 lines of the table show the value of the two most popular indices
of poverty, the headcount F(z) and the average poverty /J,a(z) indices, at two
alternative poverty lines, z = 5 and z = 10. Recall from Section 5.1.2 that the
poverty headcount gives the proportion of individuals in a population whose
income falls underneath a poverty line. At a poverty line of 5, there is only one
such person in poverty in distribution A, and the headcount is thus equal to
0.33. The average poverty gap index is the sum of the distances of the poor's
incomes from the poverty line, divided by the total number of people in the
population. For instance, at a poverty line of 10, there are 2 people in poverty
in B, and the sum of their distances from the poverty line is (10-6)+(10-9)=5.
Divided by 3, this gives 1.66 as the average poverty gap in B for a poverty
line of 10.
At a poverty line of 5, the headcount in A is clearly greater than in B, but
this ranking is spectacularly reversed if we consider instead the same head-
count index but at a poverty line of 10. The ranking changes again if we use
the same poverty line of 10 but now focus on the average poverty gap H3(z)\
fj,9A(10) = 2 < 1.66 = yU-^(lO). Clearly, the poverty ranking A and B can be
quite sensitive to the precise choice of measurement assumptions.
Table 9.1: Sensitivity of poverty comparisons to choice of poverty indices and
poverty lines
First individual's income
Second individual's income
Third individual's income
F(5)
F(10)
M"UO)
Distribution A
4
11
20
0.33
0.33
2
Distribution B
6
9
20
0
0.66
1.66
9.3 Ordinal comparisons
The alternative to comparing the value of one or a few cardinal indices is to
check whether rankings of poverty and equity are valid for a class of ethical
judgments. These classes are denned over classes of indices as well as over
ranges of poverty lines (for poverty comparisons). In other words, we do not
wish to quantify poverty or equity. We only want to determine whether poverty
and equity is higher or lower in one distribution than in another, for a class of
ethical judgments. When inferred, an ordinal ranking of poverty and equity
across distributions or policies establishes the sign of the differences across
these distributions or policies of everyone of the cardinal poverty and equity
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indices of that class. Note that it can say only whether poverty and equity is
higher in one distribution or for one policy than for another, but not by how
much. In the article in which he introduces his famous inequality index (or
"concentration ratio"), Gini (1914) criticizes the curve introduced earlier by
Lorenz (1905) exactly along those lines:
This graphical approach presented two drawbacks (...):
a) it does not provide a precise measurement of concentration
b) it does not allow to assess, not even in some circumstances, when or where con-
centration is stronger. In fact, if two curves cross each other (...), it is not always
possible to say if one denotes a stronger concentration than the other,
(translated in Gini 2005, p. 24.)
Ordinal comparisons of poverty do not, therefore, provide precise numeri-
cal values to compare with numerical indicators of other aspects or effects of
government policy, such as the policy's administrative or efficiency cost. This
is seemingly their main defect. It is arguably also their greatest advantage.
As seen above in the context of Table 9.1, differences in simple poverty in-
dices can be deceptive when it comes to ranking distributions. They can also
quantify deceptively differences across distributions. To illustrate this, con-
sider Table 9.2 with distributions A and B and a poverty line z = 1. The three
FGT poverty indices P(l; a) agree that poverty has not increased in moving
from A to B. But the quantitative change in poverty varies significantly with
the value of a. With the poverty headcount, poverty remains the same, but the
average poverty gap falls by 33% and the P(z; a = 2) index falls by 56%.
Table 9.2: Sensitivity of differences in poverty to choice of indices
Distributions
A
B
Difference';
First" Second*
0.25
0.5
2
2
P(l;a = 0)
0.5
0.5
no change
P(l;a = l)
0.375
0.25
fall of 33%
P(l;a = 2)
0.28125
0.125
fall of 56%
"First individual's income.
''Second individual's income.
cChanges in poverty from A to B.
A focus on ordinal comparisons can save most of the considerable energy
and time often spent on selecting poverty lines and poverty indices. It can
avoid inter alia the difficult debate on the choice of appropriate theoretical
and econometric models for estimating poverty lines. It can also escape ar-
guments on the relative merits and properties of the many distributive indices
that have been proposed in the social welfare literature, and of which the previ-
ous chapters introduced only a few. Again, this is because ordinal distributive
comparisons simply order distributions, and for this, differences in numerical
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indices do not need to be estimated. For instance, we will see later in Sec-
tion 10.1 that we can order robustly distributions A and B in Table 9.1 for
all "distribution-sensitive" poverty indices and for any choice of poverty line.
If such an ordering is considered sufficiently strong and informative, then, in
comparing A and B, we can effectively stop quibbling on whether we should
use the Watts index or the average poverty gap as a poverty index, and on
whether the poverty line should be 5 or 10.
In short, ordinal poverty comparisons can sometimes be robust to the choice
of measurement assumptions, since they will sometimes be valid for wide
classes and ranges of such assumptions. When the problem is simply of re-
solving which of two policies will better alleviate poverty, or determining
which of two distributions displays the greatest level of social welfare, or
assessing which of two distributions is the most equal, ordinal comparisons
can sometimes be sufficiently informative, and cardinal estimates will then not
be needed.
9.4 Ethical judgements
9.4.1 Dominance tests
As we will see in detail below, ordinal comparisons of poverty and equity
involve using classes of distributive indices. It is useful to define these classes
by referring to "orders of normative (or ethical) judgements", an order being
denoted as s = 0,1,2,.... An ethical judgement of order s thus serves to
define a class of indices also of order s. Whether an ordering of poverty and
equity is valid for all of the indices that are members of a class of order s is
empirically tested through dominance tests, which happen to be convenient
variants of well-known stochastic dominance tests also of order s. When two
dominance curves of a given order do not intersect, all indices that obey the
ethical principles associated to this order of dominance then rank identically
the two distributions. Hence, a dominance test of order s serves to test whether
some distributive ranking is valid for all of the indices of a class of order s, and
that class of order s can be interpreted through the use of ethical judgements
of the same order s.
9.4.2 Paretian judgments
A first natural property of normative judgements is that a society should be
judged improved whenever the income of one of its members increases and
no one else's income decreases. For poverty, this would mean that indices
of poverty should (weakly) fall whenever someone's income increases, every-
thing else being the same. ("Weakly fall" means that the index should at the
very least not increase following the change, and conversely for "weakly in-
crease". This caveat applies to all of the ethical statements considered in this
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book.) For social welfare comparisons, this would imply that social wel-
fare indices should increase following this improvement in someone's income.
Such indices thus obey the Pareto principle: they must respond favorably to
Pareto-improving changes in the distribution of income.
To see this formally, consider the case of a social welfare function, W(y),
that depends on a vector y = (j/j, . . . , yn) ofn income levels.
Pareto principle
Lety = (j/i, ...,j/n),') > 0 be any positive constant, and y = (j/ i , . •• i j / j +») , . . . , ! /» ) •
Then the social welfare function W obeys the Pareto principle if and only if W (y) <
W (y) for all possible pairings of y and y.
Because the ethical condition imposed by the Pareto principle is very weak,
we can consider all of the indices that obey that principle to be members of a
class of ethical order 0. The poverty indices belonging to a class of order 0
would for instance all fall whenever someone's income increases, everything
else being the same. Note that the case of relative poverty might seem to
provide an exception to this principle, since an increase in someone's income
could increase the relative poverty line and possibly also increase the poverty
index. To deal with this possible exception, it is best to think of the poverty
line as constant in the current discussion of ethical principles.
All of the indices which obey the Pareto ethical condition then belong to
(poverty or social welfare) classes of order s = 0. It has, however, long been
recognized that searches for strict Pareto improvements in distributions of in-
comes are generally doomed to failure, because of fundamental randomness in
economic status and because of strong heterogeneity in preferences, endow-
ments and markets. For a distributive change to be strictly Pareto improving,
it must indeed not decrease anyone's income, whatever one's peculiar circum-
stances. This is unlikely ever to be empirically observable, even if we were to
focus only on those with incomes below some poverty line. Besides, checking
for Pareto -improving temporal changes would require the use of panel data in
order to observe individual-specific changes in incomes. Such panel data are
rare, and even if we had access to them, they would still not enable us to infer
Pareto -improvements over an entire population (as opposed to only over an
available sample). To be valid, searches for strict Pareto improvements also
plausibly require no change in population size and composition, a difficulty
with which we deal below through the use of the anonymity and population
invariance principles.
9.4.3 First-order judgments
It is thus natural and logical to consider ethical principles of order higher
than that of the Pareto principle. In the light of the above, a plausible higher-
order ethical judgement would require that the distributive indices be anony-
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mous in the incomes of the individuals. That is, ceteris paribus, whether it is an
individual named a rather than b that enjoys some level of income should not
affect the value of a distributive index. It also follows from this property that
interchanging two income levels should not affect distributive indices: these
indices thus obey the symmetry or anonymity principle. Formally, we have
(for a social welfare function W):
Anonymity principle
Let M be an nxn permutation matrix (a permutation matrix is composed of O's and
1's, with each row and each column summing to 1) and let y = My'. Then the social
welfare function W obeys the anonymity principle if and only if W (y) = W (y) for
all possible pairings of y and y.
Clearly, this principle would not be acceptable for an index of horizontal
equity, but it would seem relatively uncontroversial for comparing inequality,
social welfare or poverty across anonymous distributions.
There is another principle that we have implicitly imposed since the begin-
ning of this book and that also goes beyond the Pareto principle. It is usually
called the population invariance principle, and it simply states that adding
an exact replicate of a population to that same population should not affect
distributive comparisons. For a social welfare function W, we thus have:
Population invariance principle
Let y be a vector of size 2n, with y = (yi,yi,y2,y2,,...,yn,yn) and with y, = yj,
j = l,...,n. Then the social welfare function W obeys the population invariance
principle if and only if W (y) = W (y) for all possible pairings of y and y.
As indicated on page 40, imposing this principle simplifies exposition sig-
nificantly by enabling the use of quantiles and the normalization of population
size to 1. The population invariance principle is thus implicitly imposed ev-
erywhere throughout the book.
First-order classes of distributive indices then regroup all of the indices
that show a social improvement when the income at some percentile in the
population increases and when no other income changes. These indices have
properties that are analogous to those of Paretian indices: ceteris paribus, the
larger the individual incomes, the better off is society. They are in addition
symmetric in income since they obey the anonymity principle.
Even with the above anonymity constraint, it is likely that some of the first-
order distributive indices will clash in their distributive ranking. Some of the
first-order poverty indices could declare a policy reform to worsen poverty,
while others might indicate that the reform improves poverty. To resolve this
ambiguity, we may move to a second-order class of distributive indices. As
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above, this is done by constraining distributive indices to obey additional ethi-
cal principles.
To do this, assume that distributive indices must show a social improvement
whenever a mean-preserving redistributive transfer from a richer to a poorer in-
dividual occurs. This corresponds to imposing the well-known Pigou-Dalton
principle on social judgements. To see this formally, consider again the case
of a social welfare function W(y).
Pigou-Dalton principle
Let r/ > 0 be any positive constant, and let y = (3/1,. . . , yj + r\ yt — r j , . . . , yn),
with yj + r/ < yt — ij. Then the social welfare function W obeys the Pigou-Dalton
principle if and only if W (y) < W (y) for all possible pairings of y and y.
The second-order classes of distributive indices thus contain those in-
dices that have a greater ethical preference for the poorer than for the richer.
They display a preference for equality of income and are therefore said to be
distribution-sensitive. For instance, all other things being the same, the more
equal the distribution of income among the poor, the lower the level of poverty.
Ceteris paribus, if a transfer from a richer to a poorer person takes place, all
second-order social welfare indices will increase and all second-order inequal-
ity and poverty indices will fall. Note again that all indices that belong to a
second-order class of poverty and welfare indices also belong to the first-order
class of relevant indices.
There are often sound ethical reasons to be socially more sensitive to what
happens towards the bottom of the distribution of income than higher up in
it. We may thus be less concerned about a "bad" disequalizing transfer higher
up in the distribution of income than lower down. To make this more precise,
imagine four levels of income, for individuals 1,2,3, and 4, such that j/2 — y \ =
2/4 — 2/3 > 0 and y\ < yz. Let a marginal transfer of $1 of income be made
from individual 2 to individual 1 (an equalizing transfer) at the same time as
an identical marginal $1 is transferred from individual 3 to individual 4 (a
disequalizing transfer). This is called in the literature a "favorable composite
transfer".
Note that the equalizing transfer is made lower down in the distribution of
income than the disequalizing transfer. This can be seen by the fact the re-
cipient of the first transfer, individual 1, has a lower income than the donor of
the second transfer, individual 3, since 2/3 > y\. For a given distance between
recipients and donors, the social improvement effect of equalizing transfers
is decreasing in the income of the recipient. Said differently, Pigou-Dalton
transfers lose their social improvement effects when recipients are more afflu-
ent.
Second-order indices which respond favorably to such a "favorable com-
posite transfer" obey the transfer-sensitivity principle and therefore belong
to the third-order class of indices. Again, such a favorable composite transfer is
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made of a beneficial Pigou-Dalton transfer within a lower part of the distribu-
tion, coupled with a reverse Pigou-Dalton transfer within an upper part of the
distribution. Third-order welfare indices will increase following this change,
and third-order poverty and inequality indices will fall. Formally, we have (for
a social welfare function W)\
Transfer-sensitivity principle
Let r] > 0 and y, - yt = yi - yk > 1r\ with yt < yk.
Also let y = ( j / i , . . . , j /< +r/,... ,yj - 7 7 , . . . ,yt - r / , . . . ,yi +77, ...,yn). Then
the social welfare function W obeys the transfer-sensitivity principle if and only if
W (y) < W (y) for alt possible pairings of y and y.
Note that the favorable composite transfer considered above involves no change
in the variance of the distribution since yj — yt = yi — yk-
We can, if we wish, define subsequent classes of indices in an analogous
manner. To define fourth-order indices, for instance, we consider a combina-
tion of two exactly opposite and symmetric composite transfers, the first one
being favorable and occurring within a lower part of the distribution, and the
second one being unfavorable and occurring within a higher part of the distri-
bution. The indices that respond favorably to this combination of composite
transfers can then belong to the class of fourth-order indices.
As can be seen, higher-order transfer principles essentially postulate that, as
the order increases, the relative ethical weight assigned to the effect of income
changes occurring at the bottom of the distribution also increases. Thus, as
the order s of the class of distributive indices increases, the indices become
more and more sensitive to the distribution of income among the poorest. At
the limit, as s becomes very large, only the income of the poorest individual
matters in comparing poverty and social welfare across two distributions. In
that sense, the poverty and social welfare indices become more and more
Rawlsian as s increases.
9.5 References
Much of normative welfare economics has been influenced by the philo-
sophical work of Nozick (1974), Rawls (1971) (see Rawls 1974 for a very
short synthesis addressed to economists) and Sen (1982). The combined work
of Kolm (1976a) and Kolm (1976b) was the first to introduce the transfer-
sensitivity condition into the inequality literature, and Kakwani (1980) subse-
quently adapted it to poverty measurement. See also Davies and Hoy (1994)
(who describe that condition as a Rawlsian extension of the Lorenz criterion),
Shorrocks (1987) for a complete characterization of the transfer-sensitivity
principle, and Zheng (1997) for an informative discussion of it. Higher-order
principles can be interpreted using the generalized transfer principles of Fish-
burn and Willig (1984) — see also Blackorby and Donaldson (1978) for a
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description of these principles as becoming "more Rawlsian". surveys of
the normative and axiomatic foundations of modern inequality measurement
can be found in Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (1999) and Chakravarty
(1999).
Other papers which explore variations to the normative principles typically
used in distributive analysis are Mosler and Muliere (1996) (for an alternative
principle of transfers), Ok (1995) (for a "fuzzy" measurement of inequal-
ity), Ok (1997) (for ranking over opportunity sets), Salas (1998) (for marginal
population invariance), Zoli (1999) (for a positional transfer principle when
Lorenz curves intersect), and Tarn and Zhang (1996) (for an alternative Pareto
principle defined in terms of growth over the poor).
Experimental evidence on the normative attitudes of individuals and soci-
eties towards the measurement of poverty and equity has also grown fast in the
last decades. Methods and results can be found in Amiel and Cowell (1992)
(on attitudes to inequality — which question the acceptability of transfer and
decomposability principles), Amiel and Cowell (1999) (on attitudes to poverty,
social welfare and inequality), Amiel and Cowell (1997) (on attitudes towards
poverty measurement), and in Amiel, Greedy, and Hurn (1999) (on quantify-
ing inequality aversion using Okun (1975)'s "leaky bucket experiment"). A
survey of such attitudes can be found in Corneo and Gruner (2002).
Fong (2001) tests whether normative attitudes can be explained by self-
interest or by values about distributive justice. Dolan and Robinson (2001)
further explore whether there is a "reference point" problem in such studies,
and Ravallion and Lokshin (2002) reports that expectations about future levels
of well-being can influence individuals' desire for redistributive policies.
See also Stodder (1991) for empirical evidence as to why inequality aver-
sion can matter for ranking distributions, and Christiansen and Jansen (1978)
for an example of the estimation of social preferences using the revealed struc-
ture of an existing tax system (the Norwegian one).
A number of studies have recently also attempted to distinguish between
attitudes towards inequality and towards risk aversion: see inter alia Amiel,
Cowell, and Polovin (2001), Beck (1994), Cowell and Schokkaert (2001), and
Kroll and Davidovitz (2003).
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Chapter 10
POVERTY DOMINANCE
To see how the material of Chapter 9 can be used practically to test for
the robustness of poverty comparisons, we focus for simplicity on classes
of additive poverty indices denoted as IIs (z+], where s stands again for the
"ethical order" of the class and where z+ will stand for the upper bound of the
range of all of the poverty lines that can reasonably be envisaged. The additive
poverty indices P(z) that are members of that class can be expressed as
where z is a poverty line and ir(Q(p)', z) is an indicator of the poverty status of
someone with income Q(p).
We can also think of the function ir(Q(p)', z) as the contribution of an indi-
vidual with income Q(p) to overall poverty P(z). Hence, we can also assume
that Tr(Q(p)', z) = 0 if Q(p) > z. This ensures that the poverty indices ful-
fill the well-known poverty focus principle, which simply states that changes
in the incomes of the rich should not affect the poverty measure. The use of
quantiles in equation (10.1) also ensures that the poverty indices P(z) obey
the anonymity (see page 160) and population invariance principles (see page
160). For expositional simplicity, also assume that 7r(Q(p); z) is continuously
differentiable in Q(p) between 0 and z up to an appropriate order, and denote
the ith-order derivative of n(Q(p); z) with respect to Q(p) as 7rW(<2(p); z}.
The first class of poverty indices (denoted by II1 (z+)) then regroups all of
the poverty indices
« that decrease when someone's income increases
• and whose poverty line does not exceed z+.
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Formally, indices within Hl(z+) are such that:
where the Pareto principle (page 159) appears through the form of a non-
positive first-order derivative ir^(Q(p); z).
The second class of poverty indices, II2 (z+), contains those first-order in-
dices that have a greater ethical preference for the poorer among the poor — re-
call the Pigou-Dalton principle of page 161. Increasing the income of apoorer
individual is better for poverty reduction that increasing by the same amount
the income of a richer person. The absolute value of the first-order derivative
is therefore decreasing with Q(p), and the indices are thus convex in income.
This class n2(z+) is then:
We will discuss further below the role of the continuity condition TT(Z, z) = 0.
Clearly, U2(z+) C IIl(z+), but not the reverse.
Technically, obeying the "transfer-sensitivity " principle requires for the
P(z) indices that their second-order derivative ir^(Q(p); z) be decreasing in
Q(p). Poverty indices belonging to the third-order class of poverty indices
n3(£+) are then defined as:
As before, H3(z+) C tt2(z+).
Subsequent classes of poverty indices are defined in an analogous manner.
Generally speaking, poverty indices P(z) will be members of class IIs (z+) if
(-l)s ^s\Q(p);z] < 0 and if TT^(Z,Z) = 0 for i = 0,1,2..., s-2. As the
order s of the class of poverty indices increases, the indices become more and
more sensitive to the distribution of income among the poorest. At the limit,
and as mentioned above, only the income of the poorest individual matters
in comparing poverty across two distributions. Increasing the order s makes
us focus on smaller subsets of poverty indices, in the sense that IIs (z+) C
Tls-1(z+).
All poverty indices seen in Chapter 5 fit into some of the classes defined
above. The poverty headcount F(z) clearly belongs to II1 (z+) (whenever z <
z+). As we will see, it also plays a crucial role in tests of first-order dominance.
But it does not belong to the higher-order classes since it is not continuous at
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the poverty line. The average poverty gap belongs to T[1(z+) and to H2(z+),
but not to the higher-order classes. The square of the poverty gaps index be-
longs to n1^), II2(z+) and n3(«+), but not to n~4(z+). More generally, the
FGT indices, for which 7r(Q(p); z) = g(p; z)a, belong to Ha(z+) when a >
s - 1 and z < z+. The Watts index belongs to Hl(z+) and to U2(z+), but not
to II3(z+) since it does not obey the -K^>(Z, z) = 0 restriction. A transforma-
tion of the Watts index, by which v(Q(p); z) = g(p; z) [ln(z) — In (Q*(p))],
would, however, belong to II3 (z+). The Chakravarty and Clark et al. indices
belong to II1 (z+) and II2 (z+), and so do as well the S-Gini indices of poverty.
We can now see how to determine whether poverty in A is greater than in
B for all indices that are members of any one of these classes. For this, there
exist two approaches: a primal and a dual one. We consider them in turn.
10.1 Primal approach
10.1.1 Dominance tests
We are interested in whether we may assert confidently that poverty in a dis-
tribution A, as measured by PA(Z), is larger than poverty in a distribution B,
Pg(z), for all of the poverty indices P(z) belonging to one of the classes of
poverty indices defined above. We are therefore interested in checking whether
the following difference in poverty indices AP(z) = PA (z) — PB(Z) is posi-
tive:
where on the second line a change of variable has been effected and where
A/(y) is the difference in the densities of income. To demonstrate the domi-
nance conditions, we will make repetitive use of integration by parts of (10.5).
This process will involve the use of stochastic dominance curves Ds(z), for
orders of dominance s = 1,2,3,.... Dl(z) is simply the cdf, F(z), namely,
the proportion of individuals underneath the poverty line z. The higher order
curves are iteratively defined as
Thus, D2(z) is simply the area underneath the cdf curve for a range of incomes
between 0 and z. This is illustrated in Figure 10.1. The curve shows the cdf
F ( y ) at different values of y. The grey-shaded area underneath that curve (up
to z) thus gives D2(z).
Defined as in (10.6), dominance curves may seem complicated to calculate.
Fortunately, there is a very useful link between the dominance curves and the
popular FGT indices, a link that greatly facilitates the computation of D3(z).
Figure 10.1: Primal stochastic dominance curves
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We can indeed show that
where c = l/(s — 1)! is a constant that can be basically ignored. Therefore, to
compute the dominance curve of order s, we need only compute the FGT index
at a = s - 1, which is P(z; a = s - 1) (see (5.7)). Recall that P(z; a = 1)
is the average poverty gap. Hence, the dominance curve of order 2 is simply
the average poverty gap at different poverty lines. This can also be seen
on Figure 10.1. The distance between z and y gives (when it is positive) the
poverty gap at a given value of income y. For y = y', for instance, Figure 10.1
shows that distance z — y'. dF(y'} — as measured on the vertical axis — gives
the density of individuals at that level of income. The rectangular area given
by the product of (z — y1) and dF(y'} then shows the contribution of those with
income y' to the population average poverty gap. Integrating all such positive
distances between y and z across the population thus amounts to calculating
the average poverty gap — again, this is the sum of individual rectangles of
lengths (z — y} and heights dF(y], or simply the grey-shaded area of Figure
10.1.
Let us now integrate by parts equation (10.5). This gives:
where ADs(y) is defined as DsA(y) —D
s
B(y). If we wish to ensure that AP(z)
is positive for all of the indices that belong to H1 (z+), we need to ensure that
(10.8) is positive for all of the poverty indices that satisfy the conditions in
(10.2), whatever the values of their first-order derivative ̂ l\y\ z), so long as
that derivative is everywhere non-positive between 0 and z+. For this to hold,
we simply need that (recall that Dl(y) = F(y))1:
We refer to this as first-order poverty dominance of B over A. The result can
be summarized as follows:
First-order poverty dominance (primal):
The dominance condition in (10.10) is relatively stringent: it requires the
headcount index in A never to be lower than the headcount in B, for all possi-
ble poverty lines between 0 and z+'. If, however, the condition is found to hold
'DAD: Dominance|Poverty Dominance.
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in practice, a very robust poverty ordering is obtained: we can then unambigu-
ously say that poverty is higher in A than in B for all of the poverty indices
in U1(z+) (including the headcount index). Since (almost) all of the poverty
indices that have been proposed obey this restriction, this is a very powerful
conclusion indeed. Note again that this ordering is valid for any choice of
poverty line up to z+.
Moving to second-order poverty dominance, we integrate equation (10.8)
once more by parts and find that:
Recall that the indices that are members of II2(z+) are such that 7r(2'(<3(p); z) >
0 when Q(p) < z and with TT(Z, z) = 0. Hence, if we wish AP(z) to be posi-
tive for all of the indices that belong to H2(z+), we must have that:
This is second-order poverty dominance of B over A; it can be summarized
as:
Second-order poverty dominance (primal )2:
Recall from 10.7 that D2(z) = P(z; a = 1). Second-order poverty domi-
nance thus requires the average poverty gap in A to be always larger than the
average poverty gap in B, for all of the poverty lines between 0 and z+. If the
condition in (10.13) is found to hold in practice, then we can say that poverty
is higher in A than in B for all of the poverty indices that are continuous at the
poverty line and that are equality preferring (their second-order derivative is
positive). That, of course, also includes the average poverty gap itself. Most
of the indices found in the literature fall into that category, a major exception
being the headcount and the Sen index. And that ordering is again valid for
any choice of poverty line between 0 and z+.
We can repeat this process for any arbitrarily higher order of dominance, by
successive integration by parts and by determining the conditions under which
all of the poverty indices P(z) that are members of a class ns(z+) will indicate
more poverty in A than in B, and this for all of the poverty lines z between
0 and z+. This gives the following general formulation of s order poverty
dominance:
2DAD: Dominance|Poverty Dominance.
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sth-order poverty dominance (primal )3:
This condition is illustrated in Figure 10.2 for general s-order dominance,
where dominance holds until z+, but would not hold if z+ exceeded za. Check-
ing poverty dominance is thus conceptually straightforward. For first-order
dominance, we use what has been termed "the poverty incidence curve", which
is the headcount index as a function of the range of poverty lines [0, z+]. For
second-order dominance, we use the "poverty deficit curve", which is the area
underneath the poverty incidence curve or more simply the average poverty
gap, again as a function of the range of poverty lines [0, z+]. Third-order
dominance makes use of the area underneath the poverty deficit curve, or
the square-of-poverty-gaps index (also called the poverty severity curve) for
poverty lines between 0 and z+. Dominance curves for greater orders of
dominance simply aggregate greater powers of poverty gaps, graphed against
the same range of poverty lines [0, z+].
10.1.2 Nesting of dominance tests
The condition (10.13) for second-order dominance is less stringent than
(10.10) for first-order poverty dominance. To see why, consider (10.6) again.
When first-order dominance over [0, z+] holds, then second-order dominance
over [0, z+] must also hold. Hence, when we find that the poverty indices
in U1(z+) show more poverty in A, we also know that the poverty indices
in II2(z+) will do the same. That is of course consistent with the fact that
n2(z+) c n1(z+).
Suppose, however, that we have that AD2(y) > 0 for all y 6 [0, z+], but
not that ADl(y) > 0 forall y e [0, z+]. Hence, we have first-order, but
not second-order, dominance. Poverty is larger in A for all of the indices in
II2(z+) but not for all those in II1(2+). This is possible since II1(«+) is a
larger set than II2 (z+).
These relationships are in fact sequentially valid for higher orders as well.
This is illustrated in Figures 10.3 and 10.4. Figure 10.3 shows that a class of
indices Us+1(z+) is a subset of the lower-class of indices ns(z+). Whenever
an ordering is made over ns(z+), it is also necessarily valid over the subset
ns+1(z+). Figure 10.4 analogously illustrates the size of the sets of distribu-
tions (A, B) that can be ordered by the dominance condition in (10.14). The
greater the value of s, the more likely can a couple (A, B] fall into those sets,
and therefore the more likely can they be compared unambiguously by that
3DAD: Dominance]Poverty Dominance.
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dominance condition. Taken jointly, Figures 10.3 and 10.4 show the trade-off
that exists between wishing to assert whether A really has more poverty than B
(Figure 10.4), and wishing to assert this for as large a class of poverty indices
and poverty lines as possible (Figure 10.3).
For a simple illustration of these relationships, consider a comparison of
distributions A and B in Table 9.1 on page 156. The first-order dominance
condition (10.10) only holds if z+ is lower than 9. Hence, we can conclude
that A has more poverty than B for any choice of first-order indices so long
as the poverty line is less than 9. Indeed, it is not hard to find some first-order
indices that will show more poverty in B when z exceeds 9: the headcount
between 9 and 11 clearly shows more poverty in B. We can, however, verify
that the second-order condition is obeyed for any choice of z+. This then
implies that all second-order indices (those that are members of n2(z+)) will
show more poverty in A, regardless of the choice of poverty line. This is
quite a robust statement, since it is valid for all distribution-sensitive poverty
indices (the headcount is not distribution-sensitive, hence it does not always
indicate more poverty in A) and again for any choice of poverty line. Again,
as mentioned above, second-order poverty dominance is a criterion that is
less stringent to check in practice than first-order dominance. The price of this,
however, is that the set of indices over which poverty dominance is checked is
smaller for second-order dominance than for first-order dominance.
10.2 Dual approach
There exists a dual approach to testing first-order and second-order poverty
dominance, which is sometimes called a p, percentile, or quantile approach.
Whereas the primal approach makes use of curves that censor the population's
income at varying poverty lines, the dual approach makes use of curves that
truncate the population at varying percentile values. The dual approach has in-
teresting graphical properties, which makes it useful and informative in check-
ing poverty dominance.
10.2.1 First-order poverty dominance
To illustrate this second approach, we focus on indices that aggregate poverty
gaps using weights that are functions of p:
Note that using aggregates of poverty gaps as in (10.15) is more restrictive
than using functions v(Q(p); z) defined separately over Q(p) and z, as is done
in (10.1). When the poverty lines are the same across distributions (as was
implicitly assumed above for the primal approach, and as is almost always
174 POVERTY AND EQUITY
assumed to be the case in practice), the dominance rankings are, however, the
same for the two approaches, as we will see below.
Membership in the (dual ) first-order class n1(z+) of poverty indices only
requires that the weights u>(p) be non-negative functions of p:
If we want to check whether AF(z) = FA(Z) — TB(Z) is positive for all of
the indices that belong to II1 (z+), we need only assess whether gA(p', z+) >
SB(P', z+) for all p € [0,1], This yields the following dual first-order poverty
dominance:
First-order poverty dominance (dual)4:
Condition (10.17) requires poverty gaps to be nowhere lower in A than in B,
whatever the percentiles p considered. It thus amounts to ordering the poverty
gap curves. It is not difficult to show that this is also equivalent to checking
the primal first-order poverty dominance condition in (10.10). In other words,
if we can order poverty over II1 (z+), then we can also do so over II1 (z+), and
vice versa. In fact, first-order poverty dominance (primal or dual) implies or-
dering all poverty indices (additive or otherwise) that are (weakly) decreasing
in income. To check for such a wide degree of ethical robustness, we can use
either the primal or the dual first-order poverty dominance condition.
First-order poverty dominance
The following conditions are equivalent:
1 Poverty is higher in A than in B for any of the poverty indices that obey
the focus (see p.165), the anonymity (p.160), the population invariance
(p.160) and the Pareto (p.159) principles and for any choice of poverty line
between 0 and z+;
2 PA(z; a = 0) > PB(Z; a = 0) for all z between 0 and z
+;
3 9A(p\ z+) > <?B(P; z+) for all p between 0 and 1.
10.2.2 Second-order poverty dominance
Membership in the dual second-order class n2(z) of poverty indices re-
quires that the weights w(p) be positive and decreasing functions of the ranks
"DAD: Curvesj Poverty Gap.
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P-
To show what dominance condition applies to (10.18), recall that G(p; z) is the
Cumulative Poverty Gap (CPG) curve, and integrate by parts (10.15):
For AF(z) to be positive for all of the indices that belong to n2(z+) (and
therefore also for all poverty lines z < z+), we need to order the CPG curves.
The result is summarized as:
Second-order poverty dominance (dual) 5:
Again, we can show that the condition in (10.20) is equivalent to the primal
second-order poverty dominance condition in (10.13). In other words, if and
only if TA(z) - rB(z) > 0 for all T(z) e iP(z+), then PA(z) - PB(z) > 0
for all P(z) 6 II2(z+). Thus, to check robustness of poverty ordering over all
distribution-sensitive poverty indices, we can use either the primal or the dual
second-order poverty dominance condition. This is summarized as follows:
Second-order poverty dominance
The following conditions are equivalent:
1 Poverty is higher in A than in B for any of the poverty indices that obey
the focus (see p.165), the anonymity (p.160), the population invariance
(p.160), the Pareto (p.159) and the Pigou-Dalton (p.161) principles and for
any choice of poverty line between 0 and z+;
Dual conditions for higher-order poverty dominance are not as convenient
and simple as those just stated for first- and second-order dominance. It is
therefore usual to check higher-order dominance using the primal conditions
of (10.14). Stated in terms of ethical principles, third-order dominance reads
for instance as:
5DAD: Curves|CPG.
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Third-order poverty dominance
The following conditions are equivalent:
1 Poverty is higher in A than in B for any of the poverty indices that obey
the focus (see p.165), the anonymity (p.160), the population invariance
(p.160), the Pareto (p.159), the Pigou-Dalton (p.161) and the transfer-
sensitivity principles (p.161) and for any choice of poverty line between
Oand2+ ;
10.3 Assessing the limits to dominance
Whether we use the primal or the dual approach, testing for poverty domi-
nance involves specifying an upper bound z+ for the ordering of the dominance
curves. This bound can presumably be obtained from empirical or ethical work
on what reasonable range of poverty lines should be used to compare poverty.
It can of course also be specified arbitrarily by the researcher. An alternative
strategy is to use the available sample information and estimate directly from
that information the upper bound up to which a distributive comparison can
be inferred to be robust. We can then interpret this statistics as a "critical"
bound. In the light of the results above, this critical bound will limit the range
of poverty lines over which we will be able to order poverty across A and B.
Assume for instance that a primal poverty dominance curve A(y) for A
is initially higher than that for B for low values of y, but that this ranking is
reversed for higher values of y. Let C+(s) be the first crossing point of the
curves, such that DsA(£
+(s)) = DsB(£
+(s)). Distribution B then has less
poverty than distribution A for all of the poverty indices in IIs(z+), so long
as z+ < C+(s)- As the notation implies, this calculation can be done for any
desired order s of poverty dominance.
It may be, however, that we feel (for some order s) that C+(s) is too low.
Said differently, being able to order poverty only over a relatively narrow range
[0, (+ (s)] may seem unsatisfactory. We may change this by moving to a higher
order of dominance. Indeed, we can show that C+(s) is increasing in s, with
C+(s + 1) > C+(«). whenever D"A(z} > D
s
B(z) for some z < C
+(s) and
DsA(z) > D
s
B(z) for all z < C
+(s)- We may thus increase the range of poverty
lines over which a poverty ranking is robust by moving up to a higher class of
indices.
This is illustrated in Figure 10.5, where z+ < z++. For the sake of il-
lustration, suppose that the first-order dominance curves of A and B cross
somewhere between 0 and z++. It is then impossible to order poverty over
all of the indices that belong to Hl(z++). Assume, however, that decreasing
the upper bound from z++ to z+ does rank the distributions over Tl1(z+), and
that increasing the order of dominance from 1 to 2 while maintaining the up-
0000000
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per bound at z++ also ranks the distributions in terms of poverty. In either
case, poverty is now ordered, but over different sets. The alternative is then
to choose between an ordering on indices that are ethically more restrictive
(such as II2(z++)), and an ordering on indices with a more restrictive range of
poverty lines (such as II1 (2+)).
10.4 References
Methods for testing poverty dominance are relatively recent, and postdate
much of the literature on inequality and social welfare dominance. One of the
early influential papers is Atkinson (1987) — that paper also introduced the
idea of "restricted" dominance. The theoretical poverty dominance conditions
have been further and rigorously explored in Foster and Shorrocks (1988b) and
Foster and Shorrocks (1988c). Bounds to poverty dominance are discussed
in Davidson and Duclos (2000). Zheng (2000a) provides a different approach
based on "minimum distribution-sensitivity" poverty indices.
The Pigou-Dalton principle has been framed alternatively as a strong and
as a weak axiom for the study of poverty indices (see Donaldson and Wey-
mark (1986) and Zheng (1999a)). In the weak version, the axiom says that
the poverty index must increase following a transfer from one individual to an-
other wealthier individual, providing that both are initially below the poverty
line and that the transfer does not lift the wealthier person above this threshold.
The strong axiom postulates that the index must increase even if this transfer
pushes the higher-income recipient above the poverty line. The strong formu-
lation of the axiom is usually preferred.
Del Rio and Ruiz Castillo (2001), Jenkins and Lambert (1998a), Jenkins
and Lambert (1998a), Jenkins and Lambert (1998b) and Spencer and Fisher
(1992) discuss the use of CPG (or "TIP") curves (initially proposed by Jenk-
ins and Lambert 1997) for second-order poverty dominance, surveys and
integrative reviews of the literature can be found in Zheng (1999a), Zheng
(2000b) and Zheng (2001a). US applications include Bishop, Formby, and
Zeager (1996) (for the marginal impact of food stamps on US poverty) and
Zheng, Gushing, and Chow (1995) (for another US application).
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Figure 10.3: Poverty indices and ethical judgements •— The sets of poverty
indices that belong to the classes H''(z+), i = 1,2,3
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Figure 10.4: Poverty dominance and income distributions — The sets of dis-
tributions that are ordered by the dominance conditions A.D!(jy) > 0, y < z+,
and i = 1,2,3
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Figure 10.5: Classes of poverty indices and upper bounds for poverty lines
Chapter 11
WELFARE AND INEQUALITY DOMINANCE
11.1 Ethical welfare judgments
As for poverty, we may wish to determine if the ranking of two distributions
of income in terms of social welfare is robust to the choice of social welfare
indices. Of course, one way to check such robustness would be to verify the
welfare ranking of the two distributions for a large number of the many social
welfare indices that have been proposed in the literature. This, however, would
certainly be a tedious task. Besides, new social welfare indices can always be
designed.
A simpler and more powerful alternative is to apply tests of welfare dom-
inance. Unlike for poverty, welfare dominance tests take into account the
whole distributions of income, as opposed to just the censored distributions
used for poverty comparisons.
As for poverty dominance, there are two testing approaches, a primal (income-
censoring) and a dual (percentile-truncating) one. The primal approach has the
advantage of being applicable to any desired (however large) order of domi-
nance, and uses curves of the well-known FGT indices for an infinite range of
"poverty lines" or income censoring points. The dual approach is practically
convenient only for first and second order dominance, but it uses curves that
are graphically instructive and that have been documented extensively in the
literature. As for poverty dominance, if, for first and second order dominance,
a welfare ranking is obtained using one of these two testing approaches, the
same ranking will be obtained using the other approach. In other words, the
two approaches are equivalent in terms of their ability to rank distributions
robustly over classes of first- and second-order social welfare indices.
As for poverty dominance, for both of these approaches we will make use of
classes of social welfare indices defined by the reactions of indices to changes
1
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in or reallocations of income. These social welfare indices do not need to be
additive, but for expositional convenience assume that they are defined in the
simple rank-dependent utilitarian format of W in (4.28):
The first-order class of social welfare indices regroups all of the symmetric
(or anonymous) social welfare indices that are increasing in income. In terms
of (11.1), this can be formulated as the class fi1 with
The second-order class of social welfare indices regroups all of the first-order
indices that are increasing in mean-preserving equalizing transfers. Recall
that such transfers redistribute one dollar of income from a richer to a poorer
person. These indices thus obey the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. Using
(11.1) again, this suggests the class of fi2 indices:
The third-order class of social welfare indices includes all of the second-
order indices that further obey the transfer-sensitivity principle — requiring
that equalizing transfers have a greater impact on social welfare when they
occur lower down in the distribution of income. Expressed in terms of (11.1),
this requirement forces <JJ(P) to be a constant and requires the concavity of
individual utility functions to be decreasing in income. This suggests fi3:
As hinted above on page 162, higher orders of classes can be defined anal-
ogously. Generally speaking, membership in a higher-order class of social
welfare indices requires these indices to be more sensitive to the income of
the very poor. Membership in 0s implies membership in f?5"1, and for s-
order additive welfare indices, we also need that ( — l ) ^ U ^ ( Q ( p ) ) < 0 for
i = l,...,s.
11.2 Tests of welfare dominance
As for poverty dominance, both primal and dual conditions can be used
for testing first- and second-order welfare dominance. The two types of tests
order social welfare on exactly the same class of indices.
.2
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First-order welfare dominance
The following conditions are equivalent:
1 Social welfare is larger in B than in A for any of the social welfare indices
that obey the Pareto (p.159), the anonymity (p.160) and the population in-
variance principles (p.160);
First-order welfare dominance can thus be checked by verifying whether the
headcount index is higher for A than for B for all poverty lines z. There is
therefore a useful analogue between tests of poverty and welfare dominance.
Ordering two distributions of incomes overthe first-order class of social wel-
fare indices can also be done by comparing the incomes of the two distribu-
tions over the entire range of percentiles. Graphically, it requires checking
that "Pen's parade of dwarfs and giants" be everywhere higher in B than in
A, whatever the percentiles being compared. The two distributions "parade"
simultaneously alongside each other, and the distributive analyst observes if
one parade dominates everywhere the other.
A similar result can be stated for second-order welfare dominance. To
see this, first recall the definition of the Generalized Lorenz curve GL(p) (see
(4.44) on page 65):
The Generalized Lorenz curve sums all incomes up to quantile Q(p), and is
therefore the cumulative Pen's parade. We then obtain:
Second-order welfare dominance
The following conditions are equivalent:
1 Social welfare is larger in B than in A for any of the social welfare in-
dices that obey the Pareto (p.159), the anonymity (p.160), the population
invariance (p. 160) and the Pigou-Dalton (p. 161) principles;
'DAD:Curves|Quantile.
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An exactly similar result applies for higher-order welfare dominance. As
for poverty dominance, the dual conditions are less convenient and are omitted
here.
Higher-order welfare dominance
The following conditions are equivalent:
Checking for s-order welfare dominance thus simply requires comparing the
FGT indices for a = s — 1 over all possible poverty lines.
11.3 Inequality judgments
As for poverty and welfare dominance, we can define classes of relative
inequality indices over which to check the robustness of the inequality order-
ings of two distributions of income. As we will see, these classes of inequality
indices have properties which are analogous to those of the classes of so-
cial welfare indices. They react to income changes or income reallocations
in a manner that depends on the order of the classes to which the indices be-
long. Unlike social welfare functions, however, relative inequality indices also
need to be homogeneous of degree 0 in all income. This means that an equi-
proportionate change in all incomes will not affect the value of these relative
inequality indices.
Consider first the class T1(/+) of inequality indices of the first-order. Recall
that income shares (or normalized quantiles) are given by Q(p) = Q(p)/n.
T1(/+) is a class of inequality indices that is not usually considered in the lit-
erature because it censors at /+ the effects of changes affecting income shares.
Indeed, besides being homogeneous of degree 0 in income, the indices that are
members of T1(Z+) are such that, for a given mean, inequality decreases when
an individual's income increases, so long as that individual's income share does
not exceed l+. Said differently, the inequality indices in T1(/+) are decreasing
in the income shares of those with Q(p) < l+. If the income of an individual
with income share greater than l+ changes, then an index that is a member of
Tl(l+) cannot change. We can think of keeping mean income constant, fol-
lowing these changes, through a decrease in the income of those individuals
2DAD: Curves] Generalized Lorenz.
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with income shares exceeding l+, since that will not by definition affect the
first-order inequality indices. In addition to being symmetric in income, these
indices are therefore in some loose sense of the Pareto type.
The Pareto principle underlying T1(Z+) is thus an alternative ethical prin-
ciple to the well-known Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, which has been
at the heart of inequality analysis for several decades. But the scope of this
Pareto principle is censored: it only applies to income shares below l+. This
makes the first-order class of inequality indices a poverty-like class. For this
reason, we will not have that T2 c Tl(l+).
The Pigou-Dalton principle will postulate that a mean-preserving transfer
of income from a higher-income person to a lower-income person decreases
inequality, whatever the income shares of those affected by this income reallo-
cation. All of the inequality indices that belong to the class T2 of second-order
inequality indices obey this principle and decrease after a mean-preserving
equalizing transfer. These inequality indices are also said to be Schur-convex.
Almost all of the frequently used inequality indices (including the Atkinson,
S-Gini and Generalized entropy indices, with the notable exception of the vari-
ance of logarithms) are members of T2.
Those inequality indices that belong to the class T3 of third-order inequal-
ity indices also belong to T2, and weakly decrease after a favorable composite
transfer. This includes the Atkinson indices and some of the Generalized en-
tropy indices, but not the S-Gini indices, classes Ts of higher order inequality
indices can be similarly defined. For instance, to be members of the class of
fourth-order inequality indices, inequality indices must be members of T3 and
must be more sensitive to favorable composite transfers when they take place
lower down in the distribution of income. Again, all of the Atkinson indices
belong to T4. The higher the value of s, the more Rawlsian are the indices
since the more sensitive they are to the income shares of the poorest.
Comparing the definitions of the classes Qs and Ts, note that when the
means of the distributions are equal, the social welfare ranking is the same
as the inequality ranking, in the sense that if I A > IB f°r all / in Xs, then
WA < WB for all W in fis, and vice versa. In such cases, checking for
inequality dominance can be done by checking for welfare dominance.
When the means are not equal, we can normalize all incomes by their mean
(this does not affect relative inequality), and then use the welfare dominance
results described in Section 11.2 for J7S to check for dominance over a class Ts
of relative inequality indices. Hence, to check for inequality dominance, we
can simply test for welfare dominance once incomes have been normalized
by their mean. When B has more welfare than A at order s, we can say that
IB is lower than I A for all of the inequality indices that belong to Ts.
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11.4 Tests of inequality dominance
As indicated above, checking for inequality dominance can be done most
easily by using the welfare dominance conditions of Section 11.2 and normal-
izing incomes by their mean. For the primal dominance curves, we will thus
need the normalized stochastic dominance curve D (In), defined as
D (l/j.) is nicely linked to the normalized FGT indices P(z\ a):
where c is as before a constant that we can ignore. Thus, estimating the nor-
malized dominance curve at l/i and order s is equivalent to computing the
normalized FGT index for a poverty line equal to l/j, and for a equal to s — 1.
Similarly, for dual dominance conditions, we may use the poverty gaps
normalized by mean income :
This leads to:
First-order restricted inequality dominance
The following conditions are equivalent3:
1 -j
Note that the condition DA(\fj.) > DB(\n~) is easily interpreted. It simply
compares the proportion of those with income less than I times the mean in A
and in B. If there are fewer such individuals in B than in A, for all I < l+,
inequality is greater in A for all of the indices in T1^"1").
Second-order inequality dominance
The following conditions are equivalent4:
3DAD: DominancelInequality Dominance.
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1 Relative inequality is larger in B than in A for any of the inequality indices
that obey the anonymity (p. 160), the population invariance (p. 160), and the
Pigou-Dalton (p. 161) principles;
Testing for second-order inequality dominance can thus be done simply by
comparing the usual normalized average poverty gap for A and for B for all
possible proportions of the mean as poverty lines. An alternative equivalent
test is that of comparing the Lorenz curves for A and B. This is the well-known
and classical Lorenz test, which has long been considered the golden rule of
relative inequality rankings. Dual conditions for higher-order (i.e., third-order)
inequality dominance have also been proposed in the literature, but they are
again less convenient to use than the primal conditions.
A general s-order inequality dominance condition is then simply stated as:
s-order inequality dominance
The following conditions are equivalent 5;
11.5 Inequality and progressivity
We can combine some of the results derived above to what we saw in Chap-
ter 7 on the measurement of vertical equity in order to link progressivity and
inequality dominance.
First, in the absence of reranking, it is clear that a tax and/or a transfer that
is TR- or IR -progressive, will decrease all of the inequality indices that are
members of T2. This is most easily seen by considering equations (8.11) and
(8.13) and by noting that CW(p) = LN(P) when there is no reranking. For
IR progressivity, this follows from the fact that a concentration curve for net
income that lies above the Lorenz curve of gross income pushes the Lorenz
3DAD: Dominance[lnequality Dominance.
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curve of net income upward. This decreases inequality for all second-order
indices of inequality.
Further, again in the absence of reranking, if a tax and/or transfer T\ is
more IR-progressive than a tax and/or transfer T%, then T\ necessarily reduces
inequality by more than T-z when inequality is measured by any of the inequal-
ity indices that belong to T2. This can be seen by the sum of the IR- pro-
gressivity terms in (8.15) (see also equation (8.11)) and by noting again that
CN(P) = LN(P) in the absence of reranking.
We may also be concerned about the impact of a tax and benefit system on
the class of first-order inequality indices, viz, on those indices that are mono-
tonic in some lower income shares, but not always monotonic in cumulative
income shares. To check whether this impact reduces first-order inequality in-
dices, we must check whether T(X)/X is always lower than /J-T^X for all of
the X that are below some censoring point l+/j,. This supposes again, however,
that the tax does not induce reranking. When it does, one way to account for
the reranking effect is to compute "income growth curves", which are given
by (N(p) — X(p)}/X(p) . (We will return to these curves in the context of
the discussion of pro-poor growth in Section 11.8.) When these curves ex-
ceed the growth in average income — given by (/J,N — Hx)/Hx — for all
p < FX(I+IJ-X)> then all of the first-order inequality indices in T1(i+) will
fall.
11.6 Social welfare and Lorenz curves
It often occurs that two income distributions A and B are compared us-
ing estimates of average income and inequality separately. Using second-
order dual conditions, it is straightforward to combine these estimates to as-
sess whether social welfare is greater in A than in B by noting from (4.44)
thatGL(p) = p,L(p).
Say that we dispose of the entire Lorenz curves of each of the two distri-
butions. Figure 11.1 shows four cases of comparisons of average income and
inequality across these two distributions. In Case 1, A Lorenz-dominates B,
and it also has a higher average income. Hence, there is generalized-Lorenz-
dominance of A over B, and we are therefore assured that WA — WB > 0 for
all W 6 H2. In Case 2, A also dominates B according to the Lorenz crite-
rion, but HA < HB'> because of this, GL/A(P) crosses GLsip) and there can
be no unambiguous second-order social welfare ranking. HA •> HB is indeed
a necessary condition for welfare dominance of A over B for any order of
dominance. Comparing the slopes of each of these two curves gives, however,
the quantiles at various percentiles p. Since these quantiles are visibly larger
in A than in B for a large lower range of p, A has less poverty than B for
a large range of possible poverty lines and for many poverty indices. Case 3
depicts an ambiguous ranking of inequality across A and B. However, because
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fjLA is we'l above /IB, the Generalized Lorenz curve for A is above that for B.
Finally, Case 4 shows a circumstance in which inequality and social welfare
rankings clash. A has unambiguously less inequality than B according to the
Lorenz criterion, but p. A being significantly below HB, A has unambiguously
less social welfare than B according to the generalized-Lorenz criterion and
to second-order social welfare dominance.
11.7 The distributive impact of benefits
The impact of government benefits and transfers on the distribution of
incomes can also be visualized using curves that are linked to the poverty,
social welfare and inequality dominance curves.
Say, for instance, that the expected benefit at rank p of some government
program — or some economic change — is given by B(p). (This could be
estimated non-parametrically.) An impact indicator of the cumulative effect of
that benefit up to rank p is given by:
with HB = GCs^-)- In analogy to the Generalized Lorenz curve, we may call
GCs(p) a Generalized concentration curve. GCs(p) shows approximately
the absolute contribution of the bottom proportion p of the population to the
per capita benefits. The impact GCsip] is only approximate since it ignores
the possible rerankingof individuals by the program. The concentration curve
of the benefit up to rank p can then be defined as:
Recall that the concentration curve CB(P) at p gives the percentage of the total
benefits that accrue to those with initial rank p or lower. Using CB(P) and
GCB(P) can help assess the distributive effect of the program. For instance:
1 For understanding the approximate impact of the benefit on social welfare,
we may wish to test whether B(p) is always positive, regardless of p. If
so, then the benefit will tend to increase social welfare for all first-order
welfare indices. If not, we can test if GCB(P) is always positive regardless
of p. If so, then the approximate impact of the benefit is to increase social
welfare for all second-order welfare indices.
2 For understanding the approximate impact of the benefit on poverty, we
proceed basically as in point 1 just above, with the only difference that we
assess the curves ~B(p) and GCB(p) only for all p 6 [0, F(z
+)}. If 2?(p) is
always positive over that range of p, then the benefit will tend to decrease
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poverty for all first-order poverty indices II1 (2+), and if (7(7.8 (p) is always
positive for all p € [0, F(z+)], then the approximate impact of the benefit
is to decrease poverty for all poverty indices in II2(z+).
3 For assessing the impact of the benefit on inequality and relative poverty,
we may compare B(p)//j,g with X(p)//j,x, and CB(P) with Lx(p)- Com-
paring B(P)/HB with X(p)/nx sheds light on the approximate impact of
the benefit on first-order inequality indices, whereas comparing CB(P) with
L(p) shows the approximate impact of the benefit on second-order inequal-
ity indices. We compare these curves for all p e [0,1] if we are concerned
about the whole population, for all p e [0, F(z+)] if we are only concerned
about the poor, or for all p 6 [0, F(l+/j,)] if we are concerned about first-
order inequality indices.
11.8 Pro-poor growth
Assessing whether distributional changes are " pro-poor" has become in-
creasingly widespread in academic and policy circles. We will see that it is
relatively straightforward to use the tools developed above to make such an as-
sessment. There are, however, two important issues that we must first discuss.
The first issue is whether our pro-poor standard should be absolute or rela-
tive. This is equivalent to asking whether we should be interested in the impact
of growth on absolute poverty or on relative inequality. It is indeed important
to distinguish between expectations that growth should change the incomes of
the poor by the same absolute or by the same proportional amount — these
expectations are conceptually not the same, and their empirical realization also
varies significantly.
The second issue is whether pro-poor judgements should put relatively
more emphasis on the impact of growth upon the poorer of the poor. This is
equivalent to deciding whether our pro-poor judgements should obey higher-
order ethical principles such as the Pigou-Dalton principle. We will consider
two orders of pro-poor judgements: the first will obey the focus, the anonymity
and the Pareto principles, and the second will also obey the Pigou-Dalton prin-
ciple.
11.8.1 First-order pro-poor judgements
Let a distributive change entail a movement from a distribution X(p) to a
distribution N(p). Let "income growth curves" be defined as the proportional
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change in income observed at various percentiles 6:
If the income-growth curve is positive everywhere over p e [0,1], then it is
clear from the first-order welfare dominance results of page 183 that the
change increases social welfare for all of the welfare indices that belong to
fl1. It is also clear from the first-order poverty dominance results of page 174
that the change decreases poverty for all of the poverty indices that belong to
II1(oo) (and thus for all those that obey the first-order — focus, Pareto and
anonymity — ethical principles). This result is valid for any choice of poverty
lines.
A test with a greater chance to succeed is to check whether the income-
growth curve is positive everywhere over p e [Q,Fx(z+)]. If so, then the
distributive change decreases poverty for all poverty indices P(z) that belong
to Ii1(z+). In such circumstances, the change can be called "absolutely pro-
poor", in the sense that the poor benefit in absolute terms from the distributive
change. We then have:
First-order absolute pro-poor judgements
The following statements are equivalent:
1 A movement from X to N is first-order absolutely pro-poor for all choices
of poverty lines between 0 and z+;
2 Poverty is higher in X than in N for all of the poverty indices that obey
the focus (p. 1 65), the population invariance (p. 160), the anonymity (p. 1 60)
and the Pareto (p. 159) principles and for any choice of poverty line between
Oandz+;
3 Px(z; a = 0) > PN(Z; a = 0) for all z between 0 and z+;
4 g(p) > 0 for all p between 0 and Fx(z
+).
Income growth curves can also be used to test whether a distributive change
is "relatively pro-poor", in the sense that the change increases the incomes of
the poor at a faster rate than that of the incomes of the rest of the population.
For that purpose, we only need to compare the income growth curve g(p) at
various percentiles to the growth in mean income. If the income growth curve
at all p e [0, F(z+)} is higher than the growth in mean income, then the change
can be said to be first-order relatively pro-poor. An exactly equivalent test can
be done by comparing the normalized quantiles for the initial and posterior
6DAD: Curves|Pro-Poor.
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incomes — recall that normalized quantiles Q(p) = Q(p)/fJ, are just incomes
as a proportion of mean income. If the normalized quantiles of the poor are
increased by the change, then the change is first-order relatively pro-poor. We
thus have:
First-order relative pro-poor judgements
The following statements are equivalent:
11.8.2 Second-order pro-poor judgements
Testing for first-order pro-poor judgements can be demanding. It requires
all quantiles of the poor to undergo a rate of growth that is either positive
(for absolute judgements) or at least as large as the growth rate in average in-
come (for relative judgements). We may want to relax this on the basis that a
large rate of growth for the poorer among the poor may sometimes be deemed
ethically sufficient to offset a low rate of growth for some percentiles of the
not-so-poor. This therefore says that pro-poor judgements could give greater
weight to the growth experience of the poorer among the poor. Implementing
this is done by forcing pro-poor judgements to obey the Pigou-Dalton princi-
ple.
Second-order absolute pro-poor judgements
The following statements are equivalent:
1 A movement from X to N is second-order absolutely pro-poor for all
choices of poverty lines between 0 and z+;
2 Poverty is higher in X than in N for all of the poverty indices that obey the
focus (p.165), the anonymity (p.160), the population invariance (p.160),
the Pareto (p.159) and the Pigou-Dalton principles (p.161) and for any
choice of poverty line between 0 and z+;
22111
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Recall that the cumulative income up to rank p is given by the Generalized
Lorenz curve. Denote its proportional change by 7
A sufficient condition for a second-order absolute pro-poor change is then
that the growth in cumulative incomes be positive:
As for first-order pro-poor judgements, we may wish second-order judge-
ments to require that the incomes of the poor at least keep up with those of the
rest of the population. This yields:
Second-order relative pro-poor judgements
The following statements are equivalent:
1 A movement from X to N is second-order relatively pro-poor for all
choices of poverty lines between 0 and z+;
2 PX(\HX\ ce = 1) > Pjv(A/iAr; a = 1) for all A between 0 and z+//j,x-
If the above conditions hold for z+ = oo, then the change also reduces all of
the inequality indices that are members of T2. From the Theorem on second-
order inequality dominance of page 186, this is therefore also equivalent to
checking whether the Lorenz curve is pushed up by the distributive change.
A sufficient condition for second-order relative pro-poorness can also be
implemented by comparing the growth in the cumulative incomes of the poor
to the growth in average income. If, for all p lower than F(z+), the percentage
growth in the cumulative incomes of a bottom proportion p of the population
is larger than the percentage growth in mean income, then the change can be
said to be second-order relatively pro-poor:
Income growth curves and cumulative income growth curves may also be
used to assess the impact of a distributive change on relative poverty. The
procedure is similar to that of checking whether the change is pro-poor — we
compare income growth for the poor to the growth of some central tendency
of the income distribution. One difference with the measurement of pro-poor
growth is that the central tendency of interest may be some quantile (such as
median income) if the relative poverty line is set as a proportion of that quantile
7DAD: Curves|Pro-Poor.
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11.9 References
Methods for establishing inequality dominance surprisingly predate those
for establishing welfare dominance in welfare economics. The seminal works
are those by Atkinson (1970), Dasgupta, Sen, and Starret (1973) and Kolm
(1969) for inequality dominance, and Shorrocks (1983) and Foster and Shorrocks
(1988c) for welfare dominance. Foster and Shorrocks (1988a) explore the
links between relative poverty and relative inequality dominance (see also
Davidson and Duclos 2000 and Formby, Smith, and Zheng 1999). Welfare
economists have made extensive use of the literature on the ranking of distri-
butions under risk aversion — see among many others Fishburn and Vickson
(1978), Pratt (1964), Whitmore (1970) and Yitzhaki (1982b).
Descriptions and theoretical foundations of dual stochastic dominance tools
can be found inter alia in Pen's parade of "dwarfs and giants" (Pen 1971, Chap-
ter 3), in Yaari (1987), in Moyes (1999) (for links with Lorenz curves), and in
Davies and Hoy (1995) and Muliere and Scarsini (1989) (for when Lorenz
curves intersect).
Empirical tests for inequality and welfare dominance are numerous; they
include inter alia Bishop, Formby, and Smith (1991d) (Lorenz dominance in
the US), Bishop, Chow, and Formby (1991b) (first-order and truncated dom-
inance), Bishop, Formby, and Thistle (1991e) (Pen or "rank" dominance),
Bishop, Formby, and Smith (1991c) (Lorenz dominance across 9 countries),
Bishop, Formby, and Thistle (1992) (convergence of US regional distribu-
tions), Bishop, Formby, and Smith (1993) (welfare and inequality dominance
using LIS data), Chen, Datt, and Ravallion (1994) (comparisons of 44 less
developed countries), Gouveia and Tavares (1995) (Portuguese distributions),
Makdissi and Groleau (2002) (Canadian distributions), Ravallion (1992) (In-
donesia), Sahn and Stifel (2002) (applied to nutritional data), and Wang, Shi,
and Zheng (2002) (comparing inequality and social welfare in China).
Numerous methods and indices have been proposed recently for assessing
whether distributive changes are pro-poor. See, for instance, McCulloch and
Baulch (1999) for the difference between a post-change poverty headcount
with that headcount which would have occurred if all had gained equally;
Kakwani, Khandker, and Son (2003) for a "poverty equivalent growth rate"
which computes (using estimates of poverty elasticities) the growth rate that
would have been needed to achieve some poverty change without a change in
the distribution of relative incomes, and then compares that growth rate to
the growth rate in mean income; Kakwani and Pernia (2000) for a pro-poor
index given by the ratio of the actual change in poverty over the change that
would have been observed under distributional neutrality, and then compares
its value to 1; Dollar and Kraay (2002) for a comparison of the growth rate in
average income to the growth rate in the incomes of the lowest quintile; Raval-
lion and Chen (2003) for a comparison of the growth rate in average income
1
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to a "population weighted" average growth rate of the initially poor percentiles
of the population — this can also be done using the area underneath the in-
come growth curve g(p) defined in (11.11); Klasen (2003) for a comparison
of the growth rate in average income to "population" and "poverty weighted"
average growth rates; Essama-Nssah (2004) for the use of an ethically-flexible
weighted average of individual growth rates that does not make use of poverty
lines; Datt and Ravallion (2002) for an example of the popular use of growth
elasticities of poverty measures; and Son (2004) for a "poverty growth curve"
that displays the growth rate in the mean income of a bottom proportion p of
the population — the cumulative income growth curve G(p) of (11.12) — and
compares it to the growth rate in mean income.
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Figure 11.1: Inequality and social welfare dominance
Case 1 Case 2
Case 3 Case 4
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Chapter 12
POVERTY ALLEVIATION: POLICY AND
GROWTH
12.1 The impact of targeting
For policy purposes, it is often as useful to assess the impact of reforms to a
benefit or public expenditure program as it is to evaluate the effect of existing
programs. For administrative or political reasons, it may indeed be impossi-
ble to eliminate or to amend dramatically the structure of existing programs.
Hence, comparing a current tax or benefit program with a situation in which it
is supposed not to exist may not be very useful for practical purposes. Marginal
reforms to such programs are nevertheless often feasible, and we therefore fo-
cus on them in this chapter. As we will see, focusing on marginal reforms also
has the advantage of making it possible to measure the welfare impact of such
reforms independently of the behavioral adjustment that individuals may make
in reaction to these reforms.
We consider five such marginal reforms in this chapter. The first reform one
channels public expenditure benefits to members of specific and easily observ-
able socio-economic groups. The main issue then is: for which socio-economic
group is additional public money best spent to reduce aggregate poverty? The
second type of reform consists in an increase in public expenditures that raises
all incomes in some socio-economic groups by some proportional amount.
Again, an important question is: For which socio-economic group would this
increase in public expenditures reduce aggregate poverty the fastest? This sec-
ond type of reform can also be thought as (for instance) a process that increases
the quality of infrastructure and the quantity of economic activity in a particu-
lar .group or region in a way that affects proportionally all incomes and that is
thus distributionally neutral in the sense of not affecting inequality within the
groups affected.
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The third type of reform considers a change in the price of some com-
modities, either through some macroeconomic or external shocks, or through
a change in commodity taxes or subsidies. How is the distribution of well-
being, and poverty in particular, affected by such a price change? The fourth
question we ask is: what type of reform to a system of commodity taxes and
subsidies could we implement, with no change in overall government revenues,
but with a fall in poverty? That is, which commodities should be prime targets
for a reduction in their tax rate or for an increase in their rate of subsidy and
which others should see their tax rate increase? The fifth and last type of re-
form affects proportionally all incomes of a certain type — such as some type
of farm income, the labor income of some type of workers, etc... Which sort
of income sources should the government attempt to bolster if the primary aim
is to alleviate poverty?
For all such reforms, we measure their poverty impact by the change in the
FGT poverty indices that they cause. Recall that the use of the FGT indices
is closely connected to checks for stochastic dominance and for the ethical
robustness of poverty changes. Hence, we can use the methods below to deter-
mine how the reforms affect poverty as measured not only by the FGT poverty
indices, but also by all of the poverty indices that obey some ethical conditions.
For instance, if we find that some form of targeting decreases a FGT index of
some a value for a range [0, z+] of poverty lines, then we know that the re-
form will also decrease all poverty indices of ethical order a + 1, whatever the
choice of a poverty line within [0, z+] .
12.1.1 Group-targeting a constant amount
We consider first the effect of a transfer of a constant amount of income to
everyone in a group k. For this, recall that the FGT index can be decomposed
The per capita cost to the government of granting an equal amount rj(k) to
each member of a group k is equal to:
Aggregate poverty after such transfers equals P(k; z; a):
Poverty alleviation: policy and growth 201
To determine which group k should be of greatest priority for the targeting
of government expenditures, we need to determine for which group k targeted
government expenditures (in the form of %) reduce aggregate poverty the most
per government dollar spent. In other words, we need to compare across k the
aggregate poverty reduction benefits of targeting one government dollar to a
group k.
When a ^ 0, we can show that the marginal reduction of aggregate poverty
per dollar of per capita government expenditures is given by1:
and, for the normalized FGT, by:
To reduce P(z\ a) the most, we must therefore target those groups for which
P(k; z; a — 1) is the greatest. It is thus simply the FGT index with a - 1 that
guides policy based on reducing FGT with a. The greater the value of a, the E:18.8.45
greater the chance that we will favor those groups where extreme poverty is
highest. E: 18.8.34
When a = 0, the per dollar reduction of aggregate poverty is given by
f ( k ; z), the group k's density of income at the poverty line2:
We must then target those groups with the greatest density of people just
around the poverty line, regardless of how much poverty there is below that
poverty line — another consequence of the insensitivity of the headcount in-
dex to the distribution of incomes below z.
Table 12.1 summarizes the marginal poverty impact of targeting a constant
amount to everyone in the population, or only to those in a group k. The impact
is shown both for the normalized and un-normalized FGT indices. The bottom
part of the table shows the poverty impact relative to the overall per capita cost
of the targeting program.
12.1.2 Inequality-neutral targeting
Consider now a transfer that increases by a proportion \(k) — 1 the in-
come Q(k;p) of each member of a group k. The increase in income is thus
'DAD: Poverty|Lump-sum Targeting.
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Table 12.1: The impact on poverty of targeting a constant marginal amount to everyone in the population or in a group k
Panel A: Marginal poverty impact
Impact on:
Population poverty
Group k poverty
Impact on:
Population poverty
Group k poverty
Target everyone in the population
Un-normalized FGT with a > 1
Target everyone (and only those) in group k
Un-normalized FGT with a > 1
Normalized FGT with a > 1
Normalized FGT with a > 1
Panel B: Marginal poverty impact divided by the marginal per capita cost
Impact on:
Population poverty
Group k poverty
Impact on:
Population poverty
Group k poverty
Target everyone in the population
Un-normalized FGT with a > 1
Target everyone (and only those) in group k
un-normalized FGT with a > 1
Normalized FGT with a > 1
Normalized FGT with a > 1
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(A(fc) — l)Q(k;p). The FGT index for group k after such a transfer is then3:
For a / 0, the marginal impact of a change in A(fc) is given by
for the normalized FGT index. E:18.8.37
How (12.8) (and (12.9)) varies across values of k depends on two factors.
First, there is the factor [P(k; z; a) — zP(k; z; a — 1)}. Groups in which there
is a significant presence of extreme poverty will tend to see their P(k; z; a)
poverty indices fall significantly with a, and will thus exhibit a large value of
[P(k; z; a) — zP(k; z; a — I)]. We may thus expect that these groups should
be a priority for government targeting. However, those groups with consid-
erable incidence of extreme poverty are also those for which a proportional
increase in income has the least impact on the average income of the poor —
since there is then little income on which growth may have an effect. Hence,
whether those groups with a higher incidence of extreme poverty will exhibit
a higher value of [P(k; z; a) — zP(k; z;a — 1)] is ambiguous.
The second factor that enters into (12.8) is population share </>(&). Ceteris
paribus, targeting government expenditures (in the form of an increase in
A(fc)) to groups with a higher population share will naturally tend to decrease
overall poverty faster. But this fails to take into account that a given increase
in X(k) will generally be more costly for the government to attain for groups
with a large share of the population. Because of this, we may instead wish to
compare across groups the ratio of the benefit in poverty reduction to the group
per capita increase in income. Assume for simplicity that the cost of this group
per capita income increase is entirely borne by the government. The per capita
revenue impact of such a transfer on the government budget equals 8R/d\(k),
where:
3DAD: Poverty|lnequality-neutral Targeting.
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When a ^ 0, the reduction of aggregate poverty per dollar spent per capita is
then
for the normalized FGT index. To reduce P(z; a) the fastest, the government
should therefore target those groups for which the term on the right is the great-
est in absolute value. Compared to (12.8), (12.11) and (12.12) do not feature
population shares since these shares are cancelled by the revenue impact of
the government transfer. There now appears, however, the term ju(fe) in the
denominator. Indeed, if it must bear the entire cost of the income increase,
the government will have to pay more to achieve a given increase in \(k) for
those groups with a high average income than for those groups with a lower
average income level. Finally, and for the same reasons as those mentioned
above, whether those groups with a higher incidence of extreme poverty will
exhibit a higher value of [P(k; z; a) — zP(k; z; a — 1)] is ambiguous.
When a = 0, the per-dollar reduction of aggregate poverty following a
proportional-to-income transfer is given by
Those groups with a high density of income at the poverty line, and whose aver-
age income is small, are then a prime target for poverty-efficient proportional-
to-income transfer scheme.
Table 12.2 summarizes the marginal poverty impact of Inequality-neutral
targeting either to everyone in the population, or to only those in a group k.
The impact is shown both for the normalized and un-normalized FGT indices;
as for Table 12.1, the bottom part of the table shows the poverty impact relative
to the overall per capita cost of the targeting program.
12.2 The impact of changes in the poverty line
Variability of poverty line estimates across time, space, or poverty analyses
and institutions can occur for several reasons. There may be methodological
uncertainty and divergences as to how poverty lines should be estimated (recall
Chapter 6). Estimation (sampling and non-sampling ) errors also occur for
purely statistical and survey reasons (see Chapters 16 and 17). Poverty lines
may also be updated with time due to new data becoming available, or due
1
Table 12.2: The impact on poverty of inequality-neutral targeting within the entire population or within a group k
Panel A: Marginal poverty impact
Target everyone in the population
Impact on:
Population poverty
Group k poverty
Un-normalized FGT with a > 1 Normalized FGT with a > 1
Target everyone (and only those) in group k
Impact on:
Population poverty
Group k poverty
Un-normalized FGT with a > 1 Normalized FGT with ct > 1
Panel B: Marginal poverty impact divided by the marginal per capita cost
Target everyone in the population
Impact on:
Population poverty
Group k poverty
Un-normalized FGT with a > 1 Normalized FGT with a > 1
Target everyone (and only those) in group k
Impact on:
Population poverty
Group k poverty
Un-normalized FGT with a > 1 Normalized FGT with a > 1
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to the evolution of some form of socially representative or reference income.
Whatever the reason, it may be useful, given this uncertainty, to assess how
responsive poverty measurement will be to such variability in poverty line
estimates.
To do this, consider first the case of the un-normalized FGT indices. We
find that
For the headcount index, what matters is thus the income density at the poverty
line. For higher-a indices, the sensitivity to the poverty line is given simply
by P(z; a — 1). The elasticity of FGT indices to the poverty line then follows
as
Note that the elasticity of the headcount index has a useful graphical interpre-
tation. Consider Figure 12.1 which shows the income density f(y) at different
values of y. The area underneath the f(y) curve up to y — z gives the head-
count P(a = 0; z) = F(z). The value of zf(k; z) is given by the size of the
rectangle with width z and height /(z) in Figure 12.1. Hence, the elasticity
of the headcount with respect to the poverty line is simply the ratio of the
rectangular area z f ( k ; z) over the shaded area F(z). This elasticity is larger
than 1 whenever the poverty line z is lower than the (first) mode of the distri-
bution, and will in fact be above 1 in Figure 12.1 for any poverty line up to
approximatively z'. For poverty lines larger than z', the poverty elasticity falls
below 1. Thus, it is only for societies in which the headcount is initially high
that we can expect the elasticity of the headcount with respect to the poverty
line to be lower than 1. Otherwise, a change of 1% in the poverty line will
cause a change of more than 1% in the headcount index.
For normalized FGT indices, we obtain4:
for the corresponding elasticities. Although expressed differently, the elastici-
ties in (12.15) and (12.17) are the same.
4DAD: Poverty|FGT Elasticity.
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12.3 Price changes
The level of prices is an important determinant of the distribution of in-
comes, and can therefore matter significantly for poverty analysis. Govern-
ments can affect their levels directly or indirectly, through the use of sales and
indirect taxes, competition policy, export taxes and import duties, subsidies
on food, education, energy or transportation, etc..
To see how changes in prices (and therefore how price-changing reforms)
can impact poverty, let y be a household-specific level of exogenous income,
and express consumers' preferences as •&. The indirect utility function is given
by V(y, q; tf), where q is a vector of consumer and producer prices. We define
a vector of reference prices as qR — this is necessary to assess consumers'
well-being at constant prices. Denote the real income in the post-reform situ-
ation by yR, where yR is measured on the basis of the reference prices qR. yR
is implicitly defined by v (yR, qR; $) = v (y, q; i9), and explicitly by the real
income function yR = R (y, q, qR; $), where
By definition, yR gives the level of income that provides under qR the same
utility as y yields under q.
We then wish to determine how real incomes are affected by a marginal
change in prices. Let xc (y, q; i?) be the net consumption of good c (which
can be negative if the individual or household is a net producer of good c) of
a consumer/producer with income y, preferences •d and facing prices q. Let
qc be the price of good c. We thus have y = ̂  qc
xc(y, q', $)• Differentiating
(12.18), we find:
Using Roy's identity and setting reference prices to pre-reform prices, this
leads to:
Equation (12.20) says that the observed pre-reform net consumption of
good c is a sufficient statistic to know the impact on real income of a marginal
change in the price of good c. This simple relationship is also valid for rationed
goods. Equation (12.20) gives a "first-order approximation" to the true change
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in real income that occurs following a change in the price of good c. The ap-
proximation is exact when the price change is marginal. It is less exact if the
price change is non-marginal and if the compensated demand for good c varies
significantly with qc.
Assume that preferences t? and exogenous income y are jointly distributed
according to the distribution function F(y, -d). The conditional distribution of
i? given y is denoted by F(i) \y), and the marginal distribution of income y is
given by F(y). Let preferences belong to the set 0, and assume income to be
distributed over [0, a]. Expected consumption of good c at income y is given
by xc(y,q), such that
where E$ indicates that the expected consumption of good c is taken over
all preferences in the set 0. By (12.20), —xc(y, q) is also proportional to the
expected fall in real incomes of those with income y following an increase in
Let xc(q) then be the per capita consumption of good c, defined as xc(q) =
Jo xc (y, q) dF ( y ) . By (12.20), xc(q) is also the average welfare cost of an
increase in the price of good c. As a proportion of per capita consumption,
consumption of good c at income y is expressed as xc(y, q) = xc(y, q)/xc(q).
We can now see how the FGT indices P(z\ a) are affected by a change in
the price of good c. (For un-normalized FGT indices, we simply multiply the
results by za.) Using (12.20), we find that:
where f ( z ) is again the density of income at z. When graphed over a range of
poverty lines z, this effect generates the so-called "consumption dominance"
CDc(z; a) curve of a good c
5:
Note that the impact on poverty depends on a and z. By (12.22), CDc(z;a =
0) only takes into account the consumption pattern of those precisely at z. The
impact of an increase in the price of good c on the headcount index will be
large if there are many individuals bordering the poverty line (/(z) is then
large) and/or if these individuals consume much of good c (xc (z, q
R) is then
SDAD: Curves|C-Dominance and DAD: PovertylImpact of Price Change.
E:18.8.39
E:18.8.40
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large). The CDc(z; a = 1) curve gives the absolute contribution to total con-
sumption of good c of those individuals with income less than z. It is therefore
an informative statistics on the distribution of consumption expenditures, sim-
ilar in content to the generalized concentration curve GCX<! (p) for good c —
which gives the absolute contribution to total xc consumption of those below
a certain rank p. For a = 2,3,..., progressively greater weight is given to the
shares of those with higher poverty gaps.
12.4 Tax and subsidy reforms
The above section gave us the tools needed to assess the impact of marginal
price changes on poverty. We may also use these tools to assess whether
a revenue-neutral tax and subsidy reform could be implemented that would
reduce aggregate poverty.
For this, we need to take into account the government budget constraint, and
more particularly the net revenues that the government raises from a policy of
commodity taxes and subsidies. Let t be the vector of tax rates on the C goods.
Setting producer prices to 1 and assuming them to be constant (for simplicity)
and invariant to changes in t, we then have q — 1 + t and dqc = dtc, where
tc denotes the tax rate on good c. Let per capita net commodity tax revenues
be denoted as R(q). They are equal to R(q) = Y^=i tc%c(q)- Without loss of
generality, assume that the government's tax reform increases the tax rate on
the jih commodity and uses the extra revenue raised to decrease the tax rate
(or to increase the subsidy) on the Ith commodity. Revenue neutrality of the
tax reform requires that
Now define 7 as
The numerator in (12.25) gives the marginal tax revenue of a marginal increase
in the price of good I, per unit of the average welfare cost that this price increase
imposes on consumers. Equivalently, this is 1 minus the deadweight loss of
taxing good I, or the inverse of the marginal economic efficiency cost of funds
(MECF) from taxing I (see Wildasin (1984)). The denominator gives exactly
the same measures for an increase in the price of good j. 7 is thus the economic
(or "average") efficiency of taxing good I relative to taxing good j. We may
thus interpret 7 as the efficiency cost of taxing j relative to that of taxing I (the
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MECF for j over that for I). The higher the value of 7, the less economically
efficient is taxing good j.
By simple algebraic manipulation, we can then rewrite equation (12.24 ) as
which fixes dqj as a revenue-neutral proportion of dqi. This last relationship
yields a nice synthetic expression for the impact on a FGT index P(z; a) of a
revenue-neutral tax reform that increases the tax on a good I for the benefit of
a fall in the tax on a good j6:
We then wish to check whether such a tax reform would lead to a fall in
poverty. For the fall to "ethically robust", we would want to check that it
occurs for any one of the poverty indices of some ethical order and for a range
of poverty lines. To test this, it is useful to define normalized CD curves and to
denote them as CDc(z', a). Normalized CD curves are just the above-defined
CDC curves for good c normalized by the average consumption of that good,
xc(q):
CD curves are thus the ethically weighted (or social) cost of taxing c as a pro-
portion of the average welfare cost. Comparing normalized CDc(z; a) curves
thus allows comparing the distributive benefits of decreasing tax rates (or in-
creasing subsidies) across commodities, per dollar of average welfare benefit.
If CDi(z; a) > CDj(z; a) > 0, then poverty falls faster per dollar of average
welfare benefit if taxes on I are decreased (instead of taxes on j)7.
For overall social efficiency, we must also take into account the parameter
of economic efficiency, 7. This parameter translates tax revenue into average
welfare changes. Suppose that we were to envisage a revenue neutral tax re-
form that decreases t; but increases tj. It follows from (12.27) that this tax
reform is poverty reducing is and only if
'DAD: Poverty|Impact of Tax Reform.
7DAD: Curves|C-Domlnance.
E:18.8.30
Poverty alleviation: policy and growth 211
Recall from (12.25) that when 7 exceeds 1, the economic efficiency cost of
taxing j exceeds that of taxing I. Considering economic efficiency alone then
suggests increasing ti and decreasing tj.
The left-hand-side of (12.29) shows the distributive benefit of the reform.
It compares the fall in poverty following a decrease in i; versus that following
of a fall in tj, in each case per dollar of average welfare gain. Ignoring eco-
nomic efficiency considerations, decreasing i; and increasing tj is then poverty
reducing if that difference is positive. Condition (12.29) therefore says that de-
creasing t; but increasing tj reduces poverty if the distributive benefit of such
a reform is larger than its economic efficiency cost.
We may then check whether a tax reform is "poverty efficient" and ethically
robust by verifying whether the following condition holds8: E:18.8.52
To interpret (12.30), it is useful to recall the general poverty dominance results
of (10.14). Using (10.14), it follows that if condition (12.30) holds, then all of
the poverty indices that are members of the class ila+1(«+) (of ethical order
a + 1) will decrease following a revenue-neutral fall in tj and a rise in tj. This
can be summarized as:
sth-order poverty dominant tax reform: A revenue-neutral marginal
tax reform that decreases i; and increases tj will decrease all poverty
indices that are members of ns(z+) if and only if9 E: 18.8.41
Considering the relationship between poverty and welfare dominance (see
page 184), a similar result holds for welfare dominance:
sth-order welfare dominant tax reform: A revenue-neutral marginal
tax reform that decreases if and increases tj will increase all social
welfare indices that are members of Hs if and only if
12.5 Income-component and sectoral growth
It is just a matter of notational change to use the tools developed above
to assess the poverty impact of growth in some income component, in some
sector of economic activity, or for some socio-economic group. We will then
be able to assess, for instance, by how much aggregate poverty would fall per
8DAD: Dominance|lndirectTax Dominance.
IJDAD: Dominance Indirect Tax Dominance.
212 POVERTY AND EQUITY
percentage of growth rate in the industrialized sector (a sectoral change), or
per dollar of growth in agricultural income (an income component that enters
into aggregate income), or in some region.
12.5.1 Absolute poverty impact
Assume that total income X is the sum of C income components, with
quantile X(p) = ]>30=i XcX^(p), where Acis a factor that multiplies income
component X^ and where X (c)(p) is the expected value of income compo-
nent c at rank p in the distribution of total income. Again, X^ (p) can be, for
instance, agricultural or capital income, or the income of those living in some
geographic area.
The derivative of the normalized FGT index with respect to Ac is then given
where this CDc(z; a) curve can now be interpreted as a " component domi-
nance" curve for income component X(^. It can be defined formally as11:
Multiplied by a proportional change dXc, CDc(z; a) gives the marginal change
in the FGT indices that we can expect from growth in a component c. Note
that the derivative of the un-normalized index P(z\ a) is simply zaCDc(z; a).
We can intuitively expect, however, that a given percentage change will have
a larger poverty impact when it applies to a larger sector or income component.
To take this element into account and to normalize by the importance of the
component, we may wish instead to compute the change in the FGT indices per
dollar of per capita growth in the overall economy, when that growth comes
exclusively from growth in a component c. This is given by the normalized
CD curves for component c12:
or by —zaCDc(z\ a) for the un-normalized FGT index.
Note that the richer the society, the lower will the fall in poverty tend to
be per dollar of per capita growth. This is so for two reasons. First, a richer
IODAD: Poverty]Income-Component Proportional Growth.
'DAD: Curves|C-Dominance.
2DAD: CurvesjC-Dominance.
E:18.8.42 by10
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society will tend to have a lower level of poverty and fewer poor, and hence
there is less scope in such an environment for poverty to decrease significantly
in absolute terms. This is captured in (12.34) by a lower value of /(z) and of
[z — X(p)}+. Second, in a richer society, a 1% increase in some component
will generate a larger level of per capita growth in dollar terms. This is cap-
tured by a larger /J-x^-, • Both factors will thus tend to push (12.35) downwards.
Thus, growth will arithmetically tend to have a smaller absolute poverty impact
in richer societies.
12.5.2 Poverty elasticity
An alternative indicator of the poverty impact of growth is the elasticity of
poverty with respect to overall growth, where again that overall growth comes
strictly from growth in a component X^y From (12.35), this is given by
for both normalized and un-normalized FGT indices. Expressed as elastici-
ties, the impact of income component and sectoral growth will tend to revert
to comparable magnitudes between rich and poor countries. As shown by the
right-hand-side of (12.36), that magnitude will mostly depend on the impor-
tance of component X^ among the poor (the term CDc(z; a)/P(z; a)) as
a proportion of the importance of component X^ in total income (the term
M-X^/Wr).
Note, therefore, that the use of poverty elasticities as opposed to poverty
changes will often give a different picture of where growth is (or has been)
most effective in reducing poverty. Using absolute poverty changes (12.35)
will usually suggest that growth reduces poverty most in poorer countries; us-
ing elasticities (12.36) may instead imply that growth reduces poverty most in
richer countries.
12.6 Overall growth elasticity of poverty
How fast can inequality-neutral growth in the economy be expected to re-
duce poverty? On which group can inequality-neutral growth be expected to
reduce aggregate poverty the fastest? And in which group would poverty fall
the fastest due to such growth ?
Using (12.8) above, it can be shown that the elasticity of total FGT poverty
with respect to total income — when growth in total income comes exclusively
from inequality-neutral growth in group k — equals ey(k; z; a)13: E:18.8.47
'DAD: Poverty|FGT Elasticity.
214 POVERTY AND EQUITY
Equations (12.37) and (12.38) can be used and interpreted in a number of
interesting ways.
1 Replacing P(k; z; a) by P(z; a), P(k\ z; a - 1) by P(z; a - 1), f ( k ; z]
by f ( z ) , and p,(k) by fj, in (12.37) and (12.38) gives as a special case the
elasticity of total poverty with respect to inequality-neutral growth in the
overall economy, sy(z; a).
2 Replacing P(z; a) by P(k; z; a), F(z) by F(k; z) and /j, by ft(k) in (12.37)
and (12.38) yields the elasticity of poverty in group k with respect to
inequality-neutral growth in the income of that same group.
3 As discussed above, the most beneficial source of growth (for over-
all poverty reduction) may not come from those groups with greatest
poverty. Groups in which poverty is highest will tend to have a large
[P(k; z; a) — zP(k; z; a — 1)], but we also need to consider the ratio of
fj,(k) to fj,: high poverty in a group can also be associated with a high level
of average income.
4 The growth elasticity of the headcount, "^/ffi, has a nice graphical in-
terpretation. To see this, consider Figure 12.1 where the density f(y) of
income at different y is shown. Recall that the area underneath the f(y)
curve up to y = z gives the headcount F(z). The term z • f ( z ) in (12.38)
is the area in Figure 12.1 of the rectangle with width z and height f ( z ) .
Hence, the elasticity (in absolute value) of the headcount with respect to
inequality-neutral growth is given in Figure 12.1 by the ratio of the rectan-
gular area z • f ( z ) over the shaded area F(z).
It is clear, then, that this elasticity is larger than one whenever the poverty
line z is lower than the (first) mode of the distribution. In fact, it will be
above one in Figure 12.1 for any poverty line up to approximatively z'. For
poverty lines larger than z', the growth elasticity will in absolute value fall
below 1.
This can have important policy consequences. For societies in which the
poverty line is deemed to be lower than the mode (which is usually not far
Figure 12.1: Growth elasticity of the poverty headcount
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from the median), then the headcount in these societies will fall at a pro-
portional rate that is faster than the growth rate in average incomes. But
for societies in which the headcount is initially high (larger than 0.5, say),
we can expect the growth elasticity of the headcount to be lower than 1.
This implies that inequality-neutral growth can be expected to have a pro-
portionately smaller impact on the number of the poor in poorer societies
than in richer ones.
5 The growth elasticity of the average poverty gap, ey(z; a = 1), also has
a nice interpretation. Denote the average income of the poor by ^p(z) =
Jo Q(p)dp/F(z). ev(z; a = 1) can then be expressed as:
Hence, the growth elasticity of the average poverty gap is simply (minus)
the ratio of the poor's average income to the poor's average distance to the
poverty line. Because this only takes into account the average income of
the poor, however numerous or few they may be, the elasticity ey(z; a = 1)
can easily be misleading. A society A with a small headcount and with a
given /J,P(Z) and a society B with a much larger headcount but the same
HP(z) will exhibit the same growth elasticity, although intuitively we might
feel that growth would decrease poverty more in B than in A.
12.7 The Gini elasticity of poverty
12.7.1 Inequality and poverty
It may also be of interest to predict how changes in inequality will affect
poverty. The immediate difficulty here is that, unlike the case of growth in
mean income, it is not immediately obvious which pattern of changing in-
equality we should consider. Indeed, as discussed above, a natural reference
case for analyzing the impact of growth is the case of inequality-neutral growth
— all incomes then vary proportionately by the same growth rate in mean in-
come. For inequality changes, which inequality index should we use to mea-
sure inequality? And, supposing that we were to agree on the choice of such
a summary inequality index, which of the many different ways in which that
index can change by a given amount should we choose? Each of these different
ways can have a dramatically different impact on poverty.
To make this difficulty slightly more concrete, suppose that we wish to un-
derstand the impact of an increase in the Gini index on the poverty headcount
(this is often done in aggregate "inequality-poverty-growth regressions"). Also
suppose that this increase in the Gini comes from a mean-neutral increase
by some constant in the gap between two quantiles Q(pi) and Q(p-}), with
P2 — Pi = ?7 > 0. From (4.12), note that the impact of this on the Gini is the
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same, whatever the value of p\. There are, however, several possible reactions
of the headcount following this increase in the Gini :
Clearly, even in this very special setting, the relationship between poverty and
inequality is far from being unambiguous.
So trying to predict the effect on poverty of a process of changing inequality,
through the use of a single inequality index, is really to ask too much of sum-
mary indices of inequality. There cannot exist any stable structural relation-
ship between inequality indices and poverty, even assuming mean income to
be constant. This in fact casts serious doubt on the structural soundness of the
many studies that regress past changes in poverty indices upon past changes
in inequality indices, and which then try to explain or predict the impact of
changing inequality on poverty.
12.7.2 Increasing bi-polarization and poverty
What can be done, however, is to illustrate how some peculiar and simplis-
tic pattern of changing inequality can affect poverty. Such an illustration can
be made using the single-parameter (A) process of bi-polarization shown by
equation (4.15). How does poverty change when inequality changes due to
this bi-polarization ? For this, we use the most popular indices of poverty and
inequality, the FGT and the Gini indices (the result is exactly the same if we
use the broader class of S-Gini indices). Assume that the change in inequal-
ity comes from a A that moves marginally away from 1. The impact on the
normalized FGT index is given by
Thus, the elasticity of the (normalized and un-normalized ) FGT poverty in-
dices with respect to the Gini index is obtained as £G(z; a)14,
4DAD: Poverty|FGT Elasticity.
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for a > 0. When the headcount is used, we have
and thus15
Note that even with this highly simplified process of changing inequality, the
impact on poverty is ambiguous. It depends in part on the sign of (/j, — z).
When mean income is below the poverty line, an increase in the Gini index
can — and, for the headcount index, will — imply a fall in poverty.
12.8 The impact of policy and growth on
inequality
12.8.1 Growth, fiscal policy, and price shocks
We may now turn to the impact of policy and growth on inequality. The ap-
proach we use enables us to consider the impact on inequality of several ways
in which income changes may occur. One is growth that takes place within a
particular socio-economic group. Another is growth that affects the value of
some income sources — such as agricultural income or informal urban labor
income. Another is the impact of price changes, which affect real income
and its distribution. One more is the impact of changes in some tax or benefit
policies, such as changing the subsidy rates on some production or consump-
tion activity, or increasing the amount of monetary transfers made to some
socio-economic groups.
For each such income-changing phenomenon, we may be interested in the
absolute amount by which inequality will change, or in the absolute amount by
which inequality will change for each percentage change in mean real income,
or in the elasticity of inequality with respect to mean income.
Assume that we have as above that total income X is the sum of C
components, X^, to which we apply again a factor \c to yield X(p) =
X^L! AcX(c)(p). We then have that ^x = Y%=i^cVx(cy If we are inter-
ested in total consumption, then we may think of the X^c) as different types of
consumption expenditures. If we are thinking of tax and benefit policy, then
some of the X(c) may be transfers or taxes. If we are alternatively concerned
with the impact of sectoral growth on income inequality, then we may think
of the X(c) as different sources of income, or of the income of different socio-
"DAD: Poverty|FGT Elasticity.
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economic groups. By how much, then, is inequality affected by variations in
Ac?
1 6
\Ye will consider two ways of measuring inequality, the Lorenz curve and
the S-Gini inequality indices — of which the traditional Gini is again a special
case. The derivative of the Lorenz curve of X with respect to Ac is given by:
Equation (12.44) therefore gives the change in the Lorenz curve per unit of
AC, that is, per 100% proportional change in the value of X^. Say that we
predict that income component X^ will increase by approximately 10% over
the next year17. We can then predict that the Lorenz curve LX(P) will move E:18.8.49
by approximately 10% of (12.44) over that same period. How big an impact
this will be on inequality will depend of course on the size of the proportional
change, on the importance of the component (/^x(c))>
 and on the concentration
of the component relative to that of total incomes (the difference Cx(c) (p) —
Lx(p}).
A similar result is obtained for the Gini indices18: E:18.8.50
Thus, if for instance the removal of a subsidy or the advent of an external shock
is foreseen to increase by 10% the price of a good -X"(c)> the Gini index can be
predicted to move by approximately - 
(The negative sign comes from the fact that an increase in the price of a con-
sumption good leads to a fall in the real value of the expenditures made on that
good.) The impact per dollar of change in per capita income is then given by
We may also wish to assess the impact on inequality of a change in Ac per
100% of mean income change. This is given by
"'DAD: InequalitylIncome-Component Proportional Growth.
17DAD: Curves|Lorenz and DAD: Curves|Concentration.
'"DAD: InequalityjGini/S-Gini index and DAD:Redistribution|Coefficient of Concentration.
220 POVERTY AND EQUITY
for the Lorenz curve and by
for the Gini indices. These expressions are simple to compute and have a
nice interpretation. Multiplying the above two expressions by the propor-
tional impact that some change in X^ is predicted to have on total per capita
income gives the predicted absolute change in inequality. For instance, if
we predict that growth in rural areas will lift mean income in a country by
5%, then the Lorenz curve of total income LX(P) will shift by approximately
0.05 f Cx-(c)(p) — Lx(p)}, where X(c) is rural income. If rural income is
more concentrated among the poor than total income, this will push the Lorenz
curves up; otherwise, growth in rural income will increase inequality.
Finally, we may prefer to know the elasticity of inequality with respect to
/Of i when growth comes entirely from •X'(c)- It is given by
for the Lorenz curve and by
for the Gini indices. Thus, a proportional increase in taxes that reduces
total mean net income by 1 percent will change the Gini index by 1 —
ICx,c)(p)/Ix(p) percent, where ICx,^ is the concentration index of taxes
-X"(c)- This will decrease inequality if taxes are more concentrated than net
income: ICx,c)(p)/Ix(p) > !• The elasticity of the Lorenz curve and of the
Gini indices with respect to /Of (c) when growth comes entirely from a propor-
tional change in X/c\ is finally given by
12.8.2 Tax and subsidy reforms
As in the case of poverty (recall Section 12.4), it is useful to assess the
impact of a price reform (through consumption and production taxation) on
and
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inequality. Assume that we are interested in the effects of a revenue-neutral
marginal tax reform that increases the tax on a good j for a benefit of a fall
in the tax on a good 1. Recall that 7 is the MECF for j over that for I — the
larger the value of 7, the lower the fall in t\ that we can generate for a given
revenue-neutral increase in tj. Denoting real income by yR, the impact of a
marginal revenue-neutral increase in the price of good j is then
on the Lorenz curve and an impact
on the Gini indices19. When 7 = 1, viz, when the marginal economic effi- E: 18.8.48
ciency of taxing I and j is the same, expressions (12.54) and (12.56) reduce to
a proportion of the difference between the concentration curves and the con-
centration indices for the two goods. For instance, the change in the S-Gini
inequality indices is then given by:
It is then better for inequality reduction to tax more the good that is less con-
centrated among the poor, for the benefit of a reduction in the tax rate on the
other good, which is less concentrated among the rich.
We may also wish to express the above changes in inequality per 100%
change in the value of per capita real income. This is then given by
9DAD: Curves|Lorenz and DAD: CurvesjConcentration.
1
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for the Lorenz curve and
for the Gini indices.
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the presence of an externality (peak car transport); Besley and Kanbur (1988),
for the impact of marginal changes in food subsidies on FGT poverty indices;
Creedy and van de Yen (1997), Creedy (1998a) and Creedy (1998b), for
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the impact of price changes and inflation on well-being and social welfare;
Liberati (2001), Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1995), Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1996),
Yitzhaki and Thirsk (1990), Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) and Yitzhaki and
Lewis (1996), for the impact of marginal indirect tax reforms on classes of
social welfare indices using "marginal" dominance analysis; Lundin (2001);
for marginal dominance analysis for a marginal tax reform affecting the impor-
tance of an externality (the presence of carbon dioxide); Makdissi and Wodon
(2002), for the use of CD curves in the analysis of marginal poverty dom-
inance; and Yitzhaki (1997), for the impact on inequality of marginal price
changes.
This page intentionally left blank 
Chapter 13
TARGETING IN THE PRESENCE
OF REDISTRIBUTES COSTS
The lump-sum targeting schemes analyzed in Chapter 12 assumed that there
exist characteristics on which governments can condition benefit transfers.
For instance, we modelled the impact on poverty of giving $ 1 to everyone that
belonged to some socio-demographic group k. These transfers were not de-
creasing with levels of income since we implicitly assumed that income levels
were not directly observable. The tools derived in Chapter 12 enabled us, how-
ever, to identify on which observable socio-economic characteristics we should
condition transfers to reduce poverty fastest.
We will suppose now that the distribution of population characteristics (in-
cluding the levels of original income) can be observed without costs (for expo-
sitional simplicity), but that there exist costs to granting state support. We will
see that the optimal targeting rules that follow are different from those of the
traditional study of optimal income taxation, where labor supply and income
generation are endogenous but where redistributive imperfections are generally
ruled out. Instead, assume that the behavior of agents is fixed (e.g., constrained
by labor market conditions) under alternative income support rules, except for
the feature that such agents may freely choose whether to participate in the
income support programs. Given the plausible presence of redistributive costs
whose size may vary with individuals, the state then wishes to minimize the
value of a poverty index, taking into account either the opportunity cost of
government expenditures or the constraint of an aggregate redistributive bud-
get for poverty alleviation. As we will see, the existence of redistributive costs
leads to policy criteria that weigh efficiency as well as redistributive objec-
tives. It also has important implications for the consideration of the principles
of vertical and horizontal equity.
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13.1 Poverty alleviation, redistributive costs and
targeting
Redistributive costs can first arise from the efforts made by governments
to monitor true levels of income. They can be interpreted in a sense as the
certainty-equivalent costs of the presence of imperfect information. The more
difficult is it to ascertain accurately someone's true income, the greater the
expense of removing the associated information imperfections. Redistributive
costs can also be incurred by benefit recipients and they may then have to be
deducted from the gross impact of state support in order to yield net poverty
relief. For expositional simplicity, we assume here that all costs take the form
of a participation burden and that they are borne directly by the participating
poor.
Assume that the poverty alleviation objectives of the state are to minimize
the poverty index, P(z):
where m is the initial income of individual i, z is the poverty line, and NBi is
the net benefit to individual i of the availability of a non-negative gross benefit
B*. As we shall define it below more precisely, NBi is no greater than B*
since it is reduced by the administrative and participation costs involved in
transferring B*.
The government allocates a total per capita budget B to the minimization
of poverty, such that
with Bi being the level of gross benefit actually expended to support individual
i.
Let B* then represent the benefit offered to individual i, and denote by Cj
the non-negative cost to i of accepting B*. If B* is less than q, then the
benefit awarded Bi and the net benefit NBi will be zero. When B* > Cj, then
Bi = B* and NBi = B* - Cj. Define an indicator function I[x] that takes the
value 1 when x is true and 0 when x is false. Then
costs Cj are only incurred when B* is taken up. Think for instance of c; as an
administrative cost necessary to grant support to i. B* is then the level of gross
expenditures which the state would consider spending on i, Bi is the level of
gross expenditures actually spent on i, and NBi is tne level of benefit net of
administrative costs that eventually reaches the individual.
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The government thus wishes to choose the various B*,i = 1, . . . ,n, to
minimize (13.1) subject to (13.2). Note that NBi and Bi are not differentiable
with respect to B* at the point at which i just accepts state support, viz, when
B* = Cj. This causes no analytical difficulty since as we will see the optimum
solutions for the B* never have to lie at these corner points.
Define A as the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint, and
Ti^1) as the non-negative derivative of TT with respect to y. For now, assume
that TT is continuous, differentiable and convex — we will discuss later the
important headcount case for which TT does not fulfill these conditions. The
government then wishes to ensure that the following condition is met at the
optimum values of Bi and A (given by B* and A*) for each of the i in receipt
of state support:
The optimum value of A reflects the social opportunity cost of spending public
resources. Note that a benefit offer B* below Cj will not matter, for then Bi =
NBi = 0, that is, it has neither a cost nor a benefit.
Whether i should derive any net benefit at the optimum solution depends
on its original income j/j and on the redistributive cost Cj that he faces. Figure
13.1 illustrates this dependency. The straight line \B* displays the opportunity
cost in social welfare of granting i a benefit B*. The receipt of such a benefit
will bring a net benefit NBi that will decrease TTJ (the contribution of i to the
poverty index P) once the redistributive cost has been paid off. The shape of
— TTj above 0 depends on the convexity of the function TT (yi + NB^; z ) and on
the original income yi. Individuals for whom it is possible to find a level of
expenditure B* for which TT(J/J; z) — ir(yi + B* — c»; z) > \B* will be granted
stated support. Whether TT(J/J; z) — 7r(j/j+.B* — C;; z) eventually reaches \B* —
and whether, therefore, the poverty alleviation benefit of granting state support
to i is worth its opportunity cost — will thus also hinge on the size of Cj, the
size of the redistributive costs.
Four cases are shown on Figure 13.1. Individual 1, with expenses c\, will
receive benefit B^, with a net benefit reward of NBi = Bj — c\. Individual
2, who faces the same redistributive cost but has a higher original income, will
barely be deemed eligible, just as is the case with individual 3 with a lower
y but a much higher c. Once benefit recipients, however, individuals 2 and 3
will receive what may be a sizeable net and gross benefit, thus showing an im-
portant discontinuity in the function of optimal state support. From the above
optimality condition (13.4), we may indeed note that, when B? is received, the
corresponding net benefit equalizes the post-benefit income (net of redistribu-
tive costs) of all benefit recipients. In other words, we have at the optimum
that:
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Individual 4, who enjoys a relatively large y and also faces high costs, does
not benefit from the optimal program. Hence, all those individuals with:
• original income greater than 3/2 and costs greater than 02,
• or original income greater than 3/2 and costs greater than 02,
« or original income greater than 7/3 and costs greater than 03,
• or original income greater than 3/3 and costs greater than 03
ought not to receive income support. The greater the redistributive cost Cj, the
less the chance of receiving a positive B*, but the greater the optimal B* is if
support should be granted. Furthermore, the greater his original income j/j, the
less likely an individual is to take up a positive B* and the smaller is B* if it is
received.
13.2 Costly targeting
13.2.1 Minimizing the headcount
Consider now the case in which P(z) = F(z) is the headcount.
•"" (Vi + NBi; z) is then discontinuous at the point at which j/j + NBi reaches
z. This leads the state to distribute Bj in such a way as to raise to z as many
of the individuals as possible. In order to do this, it will grant income support
z — yi + Cj first to that poor individual for which that amount is lowest, then
to that poor individual with the second lowest z — yt + c,, and so on, until the
budget has run out. This relatively straightforward optimal policy is similar
to Proposition I of Besley and Coate (1992) in the absence of redistributive
costs. We illustrate it on Figure 13.2 supposing that z = 1 and that the budget
runs out at an individual with z — y + c = 0.52, that is, when the government
spends half of the poverty line on a recipient. It is clear from the Figure that
individuals with original incomes closer to the poverty line are more likely to
be optimal benefit recipients. Conditional on being an optimal recipient, how-
ever, the expense generated in being awarded a benefit decreases with income
and increases with costs.
13.2.2 Minimizing the average poverty gap
Consider now the average poverty gap as P(z). It is continuous but not
continuously differentiable everywhere in y, + NBi. Choosing to minimize
the average poverty gap leads the state to choose benefit recipients such as
to maximize the returns in poverty gap reduction per unit of government ex-
penditure. In other words, the state wishes to minimize the aggregate level of
redistributive costs incurred for a given total budget spent on the poor. Or,
said again differently, the state attempts to fill as much as possible of the total
h
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poverty gap, avoiding as much as possible spending on wasteful redistributive
costs.
Because there are fixed costs to granting income support, once an opti-
mal benefit recipient has been identified, the state wishes to spend on him as
much as is necessary to raise his net income to z. Thus, the government's opti-
mal strategy is to compute an "efficiency" ratio (2 — j/i) / (2 — j/t + c,) of full
poverty gap reduction over benefit expenditure for each individual i, and grant
benefit B* = z — i/j + Cj first to that individual i with that greatest efficiency
ratio, then B*, = z — yj + Cj to that individual j with the second highest ratio,
etc., until the budget is depleted. Because some income support to some rela-
tively poor individuals may yet involve relatively high redistributive costs, the
state may find it preferable to grant income support to some richer individuals
among the poor.
An individual i should then benefit from state support if the fall in his
poverty gap does not fall below the opportunity cost of that fall. For all such
benefit recipients, the state also wishes to raise their net income to the poverty
line, z, with gross benefits and expenditures equal to Bi = z — yt + Cj. Hence,
at the optimum, an individual i will receive state support if
where A* is the opportunity cost of government resources at the optimum. A
decision-maker may feel, for instance, that the benefit of a $1 reduction in the
poverty gap is at the margin worth $2 in taxes, with a consequent value of
A* = 0.5. Thus, for individuals to be optimal benefit recipients, the social ben-
efit of poverty gap reduction, net of the redistributive costs, must exceed the
opportunity cost of gross state support. Otherwise, government expenditures
would be better spent elsewhere than on poverty relief.
The identification of an optimal set of benefit recipients can thus be made
on the basis of an opportunity cost, A*, and on the interaction of z, j/» and q.
From (13.6), we see that all i with
will be optimal recipients of state support Bi = z — m + c;. A value of A*
equal to 1 would eliminate all i with Cj greater than zero. The lower the value of
A*, the lower the opportunity cost of government expenditures, and the easier
it is for poor individuals to qualify for state support. Condition (13.7) above
thus explicitly defines a set of income support recipients with a border fixed
by a linear trade-off between Cj and y,. To locate precisely that border, the
opportunity cost of government expenditures (A*) must be found or set. This
can be done in at least three ways:
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• through setting A* directly, taking into consideration the social welfare
value of reducing the aggregate tax burden;
« through setting a budget level that reflects the government's political or
economic "capacity" to pay, and then deriving the implied value of A*;
• through identifying a point (j/j, Cj) that lies precisely on the border of the
"eligibility set", and then calculating the implied A*.
Let us illustrate the third way — which is both easy to follow and easy to
interpret. At the borderline of eligibility, we note that:
Suppose, for instance, that we judge an individual with Ci/z = 0.25 and
yi/z = 0.5 to be deemed just barely eligible to state support. It follows from
(13.8) that A* = 2/3. This says that a $2 decrease in the average poverty gap
is deemed, at the margin, socially worth a $3 increase in per capita taxes. With
this information, the entire set of optimal benefit recipients can be identified.
The derived value of A* = 2/3 says, for instance, that all those with no original
income at all would yet receive no state support if their redistributive costs ex-
ceeded 50% of z. All those deemed eligible will receive Bj = z — yi + Cj, and
will see their net income raised to z. This is illustrated on Figure 13.3 where z
is again set to 1. Both the likelihood of being an optimal benefit recipient and
the expense made when awarding a benefit are decreasing with incomes and
redistributive costs.
13.2.3 Minimizing a distribution-sensitive
poverty index
Consider finally the case in which the optimal state support policy must be
geared towards minimizing the average of the squared poverty gaps, namely,
P(z\ a = 2). As for the above, individuals found to be optimal beneficiaries of
state support will be those whose fall in poverty exceeds the opportunity cost
of the gross expenditures needed to decrease their poverty, viz, those for whom
we can find a Bi such that
For beneficiaries (recall (13.5)), we will have that yi + B? — Ci = e, where e is
that constant to which the net income of all benefit recipients should be raised.
Developing (13.9), we find that recipients will meet the condition that:
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Because the return to decreasing the squared poverty gap decreases as net in-
come approaches z, redistributive policy will benefit i only if A* < 2 (z — yi),
the initial marginal social, welfare return to raising i's income. If this condition
were not satisfied, i would not receive income support even if cj were nil.
Equation (13.10) implicitly defines the set of the optimal recipients based on
their values of j/j and Cj. Those with low T/J or low cj will be granted support.
The value e to which the level of all recipients' income will be raised depends
implicitly on the opportunity cost A*. The optimality condition requires that
the marginal welfare gain of increasing Bj (when Bj = B*) is precisely equal
to the opportunity cost A* of such additional expenditure. If the welfare gain
were higher than its opportunity cost, it would be preferable to increase support
to the relevant i (instead of granting assistance to a new, additional recipient)
since redistributive costs Cj would then already have been "sunk". Hence, it
must be that
Using (13.10) and (13.11), the border of the eligibility set can now be defined
by
To define the set of optimal recipients, we therefore need
« either to set directly the opportunity cost of state expenditures, A*;
• to agree on a poverty alleviation budget B;
• to identify one of the border points of the eligibility set;
» or to rule on the value e. at which the net income of all benefit recipients
should be raised.
In everyone of these cases, a value judgement is expressed on the social value
of using costly redistributive tools. This value judgement determines the set of
the recipients as well as the level of their post-transfer income.
Take the same "borderline" individual as above, with ci/z = 0.25 and
yi/z = 0.5. For such a border point, we find e/z = 0.809 and \*/z = 0.382.
Using (13.12), it follows that when j/j = 0, for instance, redistributive costs
can go up to Cj/z = 1.71 as a proportion of the poverty line before income
support is withdrawn. For all benefit recipients, net income will be raised to a
proportion e/z = 0.809 of the poverty line, with state expenditure on i equal
to Bt = 0.8092 — yi + Cj. Incomes will not be raised to the poverty line
since, above j/j + NBf = 0.809z, the marginal welfare gain of additional state
expenditure is lower than its opportunity cost.
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Figure 13.4 summarizes graphically these policy implications for the
P(z; a = 2) index by showing the set of the optimal recipients as a func-
tion of their original income y and of the redistributive costs c that supporting
them generates. The vertical axis shows the level B of expenditures which it is
optimal to grant to individuals according to their value of y and c. For ease of
reading, all variables are normalized by the poverty line z, which is equivalent
to setting z — 1. The set of optimal recipients is clearly non convex, although
as we will discuss below, the optimal level of state expenditure shows local
linearities with respect to incomes and redistributive costs.
13.2.4 Optimal redistribution
There are several important lessons to be gained from the above discussion,
and in particular from Figures 13.2, 13.3 and 13.4. First, state support for the
eligible poor compensates them fully for their lower original income and/or
higher redistributive costs. In other words, once they become recipients, they
should receive support large enough to raise their net income to the level of
that of all other optimal recipients.
Second, the case of c = 0 is clearly a special case in which there are fewer
support discontinuities. In the more general framework in which redistributive
costs c > 0 are allowed, however, some largely intuitive results do not hold any
more. It is not true, for instance, that the state is indifferent as to the identity
of the poor with the same yt: as seen above, values of c affect who should be
targeted for poverty relief. Figure 13.4 also shows that all individuals with zero
costs are optimal recipients of state support regardless of their own resources.
With higher costs, however, optimal eligibility quickly becomes restricted to
the very poor. As redistributive costs rise, the social gain of supporting those
with relatively high incomes rapidly falls below the opportunity cost of state
resources. Hence, as long as there prevails at least some redistributive cost,
not all individuals should be raised to the same final net income, but an opti-
mal selection needs to be made on the basis of original income and levels of
redistributive costs.
This last result does not require variability in the redistributive costs across
individuals. The more positive the correlation between levels of original in-
come and redistributive costs, the greater the chance that poor individuals
would be deemed optimal recipients of state support. But so long as redistribu-
tive costs are strictly positive, there will be some poor who will not be optimal
benefit recipients. This can be seen on Figure 13.4 for those individuals with
y/z at or slightly below 0.8, who become suddenly ineligible with small in-
creases in their c/z. This discontinuity of the optimal level of state support as
a function of original income also naturally occurs when using poverty indices
that are discontinuous in income (such as the poverty headcount). Redistribu-
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live costs introduce these discontinuities for continuous poverty indices as
well.
Third, the model above suggests some features of optimal redistribution
policy that are somewhat disturbing, at least when considered in the context
of the usual discussions of efficiency and equity. On account of the variability
of redistributive costs across individuals, some relatively richer individuals
might be deemed optimal recipients of income support whereas some poorer
individuals might be denied such support. Supporting the poorer and not the
richer may generate a greater level of vertical equity and of redistribution, but
this is clearly not necessarily optimal if individuals differ in ways (other than
their original income) that are relevant to the redistributive effectiveness of the
state.
Finally, note in Figure 13.4 that all optimal recipients will receive enough
support to raise their net income to 0.8090. There are, however, many individ-
uals with original income less than 0.8090 who will not qualify for state sup-
port and whose final income will consequently have to remain below 0.8090.
Once optimal state support has been allocated, therefore, some of the origi-
nally poorer individuals will enjoy a level of net income above that of formerly
richer individuals.
This reranking of individuals in the dimension of net incomes and welfare
is especially likely when richer individuals present high levels of redistributive
costs. It will also occur among those richer and poorer individuals that face
identical redistributive expenses. Even more significantly, there are some orig-
inally richer individuals with a relatively low c, that will be denied support and
end up worse off than some initially poorer individuals with higher c,. Classi-
cal horizontal inequity also occurs: individuals with the same original incomes
are not all treated alike by the state. If deemed to be socially important, the
consideration of horizontal inequity as a social evil would thus necessarily put
a constraint on such policies.
13.3 References
The literature on optimal income taxation is large and varied. A review can
be found in Slemrod (1990), Stern (1984) and Tuomala (1990) — see also
Kanbur, Keen, and Tuomala (1994a). The literature typically allows for labor
supply and income generation to be endogenous, but generally supposes the
absence of redistributive imperfections — see Stern (1982) for an exception to
this.
Budgetary rules under the more specific objective of poverty reduction are
discussed in Bourguignon and Fields (1990), Bourguignon and Fields (1997),
Kanbur (1985), and Chakravarty and Mukherjee (1998). Additional works on
optimal income taxation and optimal benefit provision include Besley (1990)
(for a comparison of means testing and universal provision of public assis-
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tance), Besley and Coate (1992) and Besley and Coate (1995) (on the desirabil-
ity of workfare constraints), Greedy (1996) (for a comparison of means testing
and linear taxation for poverty reduction), Fortin, Truchon, and Beausejour
(1990) (on comparing workfare and negative income tax systems), Glewwe
(1992) (for designing benefit allocation rules when income is not observed),
Haddad and Kanbur (1992) (for the potential role of intra-household alloca-
tion issues), Immonen, Kanbur, Keen, and Tuomala (1998) (for a comparison
of means testing and categorical benefit provision), Kanbur, Keen, and Tuo-
mala (1994b) (for differences in the optimal rules implied by welfarist and
non- welfarist social objectives), Keen (1992) (for the link between needs and
optimal allocations of benefits), Thorbecke and Berrian (1992) (for general-
equilibrium optimal budgetary rules), Viard (2001) (for a theory of optimal
categorical transfer payments), and Wane (2001) (for optimal taxation when
poverty generates negative externalities on society).
236 POVERTY AND EQUITY
Figure 13.2: Optimal set of benefit recipients and levels of state expenditure
B, with a = 0 and z = 1
Figure 13.3: Optimal set of benefit recipients and levels of state expenditure
B, wilh a = 1 and z = I
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Figure 13.4: Optimal set of benefit recipients and levels of state expenditure
B, with a = 2, z = 1 and e = 0.809.
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PART V
ESTIMATION AND INFERENCE FOR DIS-
TRIBUTIVE ANALYSIS
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Chapter 14
AN INTRODUCTION TO DAD: A SOFTWARE
FOR DISTRIBUTIVE ANALYSIS
14.1 Introduction
DAD — which stands for "Distributive analysis/Analyse distributive" —
is designed to facilitate the analysis and the comparison of social welfare,
inequality, poverty and equity using micro (or disaggregated) data. It is freely
distributed and its use does not require purchasing any commercial software.
DAD's features include the estimation of a large number of indices and curves
that are useful for distributive comparisons. It also provides various statistical
tools to enable statistical inference. Many of DAD's features are useful for
estimating the impact of programs (and reforms to these programs) on poverty
and equity.
The first version of DAD was launched in September 1998. It initially
came to life following a request by the Canadian International Development
Research Centre (IDRC) to Universite Laval to support research then carried
out in Africa in the context of the IDRC's program on the Micro Impacts of
Macro-economic and Adjustment Policies (MIMAP). Improved versions of
DAD subsequently appeared as errors and bugs were corrected and as attempts
were made to make it more reliable, more flexible and broader in scope. The
current version (January 2006) is 4.4.
Several factors motivated us in the process of building DAD. First, there
seemed to be an ever increasing need for developing-country analysts to carry
out poverty and inequality "profiles". Much of development policy is indeed
now assessed through poverty criteria, and this is carried out among other
things through the elaboration of poverty assessments, poverty reduction strat-
egy papers (the now well-known PRSP's), poverty and social impact analyses,
etc.. Much of this distributive assessment had earlier typically been done by
foreign consultants and by international organizations' technical staff. Little
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was left in the form of national capacity building and local empowerment fol-
lowing these largely external exercises. Local researchers and national policy
analysts typically felt alienated by these poverty assessments that they often
did not understand and that they could not usually influence. To break that
segregation between foreign experts and local policy makers and analysts, it
seemed useful to introduce tools that would benefit developing country ana-
lysts pedagogically and operationally.
Second, micro-data accessibility was increasingly becoming less of a prob-
lem to developing-country researchers. This followed what had occurred in
more developed countries some 20 years earlier when data tapes and records
started to circulate widely in research centers and universities. This was made
possible in large part by the amazing increase in storage and processing speed
that the computer revolution was creating. Developing-country analysts were
gaining from the same advances, though with some lag due to tighter resource
constraints. Furthermore, in addition to the computing and technical demands
that handling large data sets involved, developing country analysts often had
to deal with data accessibility difficulties. This meant inter alia having to
face skepticism and rent-seeking behavior from statistical agencies and inter-
national organization staff when requesting access to data that were supposed
in principle to be public. That problem had also become less severe by the end
of the 1990's, in part due to outside pressure. To process and analyze these
data then typically became the next barrier to break.
Third, much of distributive analysis was (and is still) handled as if it was not
subject to statistical uncertainty. Indeed, a considerable amount of energy and
resources seems to be wasted in discussions of poverty and inequality "results"
that cannot be trusted on formal statistical grounds. Even changes in poverty
headcounts of around 4% or 5% are often statistically insignificant within the
usual statistical precision criteria. Needless to say, the efforts deployed by
analysts and policy makers to account for variations of less than 1% or 2%
(as often occurs) in poverty rates are typically a pure loss of resources. This
unfortunate state of affairs needed to be remedied by a much greater use of
appropriate statistical techniques. Though conceptually relatively simple, the
use of these techniques nevertheless required reading through some technical
literature as well as writing tedious computer programs. DAD was in large part
written to help bypass these hurdles. Achieving this meant clearing the ground
of statistically insignificant results and leaving more time and resources for the
interpretation of those distributive findings that were statistically significant.
DAD was thus conceived to help policy analysts and researchers analyze
poverty and equity using disaggregated data. An overriding operational objec-
tive was to try to makeDAD's environment as accessible and as user friendly as
possible. Carl Fortin, our co-author, convincingly argued from the start that we
should program DAD in the Java programming language. An object-oriented
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language, Java created a new paradigm of platform independence: once writ-
ten, Java applications could run on any operating system as well as on the
internet. Conceived by Sun in 1995, Java could still be considered in 1998
to be an infant programming language. By now, however, it has become an
important pillar of the programming and internet industry. To make DAD com-
pletely free of charge, we also chose not to tie its use to statistical commercial
softwares such as Excel, SPSS, SAS or STATA. We therefore opted to design
DAD from scratch using some of Java's packages as building blocks.
To make DAD as user friendly as possible, we use pop-up application win-
dows and spreadsheets as the main working tools. This enables users to visu-
alize a lot of information at a glance, and to manage that information easily.
Most of the relevant variables and options needed for running applications can
be selected from single application windows. DAD's use of spreadsheets has
the advantage of displaying the entire data sets to be used. Small data sets can
easily be entered manually. Changes to cell values can be made directly on the
spreadsheet. The results of operations on data vectors can be checked easily.
DAD also allows loading two data bases simultaneously, and makes it possible
to display each of these two data bases alternatively on the spreadsheet. This
makes it easy to carry out applications with either one or two data bases. That
structure also enables DAD to account for whether the data bases are indepen-
dent when it comes to computing standard errors on distributive estimators that
use information from two samples.
14.2 Loading, editing and saving databases in DAD
DAD's databases are displayed on spreadsheets similar to those of SPSS,
STATA, or Microsoft's Excel — see Figure 14.1. Every line in a sheet repre-
sents one observation or one data "record". Typically, an observation consists
of one of the sampling or statistical units that were drawn into a survey. In dis-
tributive analyses, a sampling unit is often a household since it is households
that are typically the last sampled units in surveys. When observations repre-
sent households, there will thus be as many lines or observations in the data as
there are households drawn into the household survey. The statistical units (or
units of interest) are usually (for ethical reasons) the individuals. Even though
the sampling units originally drawn into the survey may have been the house-
holds, data sets are sometimes re-organized in such a way that each individual
in a household is assigned its own line of data. There will then be as many
observations in a data set as there are individuals found in the households.
A database used in DAD is then a matrix (a set of columns) whose length
is the number of observations discussed above and whose width is the number
of variables contained in the database. Each column displays the values of
a variable. A variable has as many values as there are observations in the
database. All columns inDAD are therefore of the same length. Variable values
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Figure 14.1: The spreadsheet for handling and visualizing data in DAD.
can have a "float" format — indicating, for example, the level of household
income — or an "integer" format — showing for instance the socio-economic
category to which a household belongs.
There are several options for entering data into DAD. The first one is to
create a new database in DAD and then enter the variable values manually.
This can be useful for exploratory or pedagogical purposes. Clearly, however,
this option is not convenient for entering large databases into DAD. A second
option for reading existing data bases into DAD is done by using well-known
copy/paste facilities. Before doing this, however, a new data base must be
created in DAD and then assigned a number of observations (or size) that cor-
responds to the length of the variables that will be copied/pasted.
The third possibility for entering data into DAD is typically more reliable
(and also faster) than the first two and involves two steps. The first step saves
the database in an ASCII (or a text) format. The way in which this is done
in practice depends on the software in which the data were previously han-
dled. DAD's Users Manual gives examples of such output procedures for
several common commercial softwares. One fast alternative to this is offered
by the use of STAT/TRANSFER (note however that this requires buying a li-
cense), which transforms databases rapidly from the most popular formats into
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an ASCII format. Once the database is in ASCII format, it can easily be im-
ported using DAD's Data Import Wizard. The wizard ensures inter alia that
the imported database does not contain missing or unreadable values. Once
the data are read in DAD, they can be submitted to a number of arithmetical
and logical operations, variable names can be added or changed, and new vari-
ables can be created. Databases can subsequently be saved in DAD's preferred
ASCII format (identified by the extension .daf).
As already mentioned, many of DAD's applications can use simultaneously
two databases. To use a second database, the user should first activate a second
file by clicking on the button File2, and then follow the same procedures as for
loading a first file.
14.3 Inputting the sampling design information
The process of generating random surveys usually displays four important
characteristics (this is discussed in more details in Chapter 16):
» the base of sampling units (the base from which sample observations are
drawn) is stratified;
• sampling is multi-staged, generating clusters of observations;
• observations come with sampling weights, also called inverse probability
weights;
• observations may have been drawn with or without replacement;
• observations often provide aggregate information on a number of units of
interest (such as the different individuals that live in a household).
Recent versions of DAD enable taking that structure into account for the es-
timation of the various distributive statistics as well as for the computation of
the sampling distributions of these statistics.
When a data file is first read or typed into DAD, the survey design assigned
to it by default is Simple Random Sampling. This supposes that the observa-
tions were independently selected from a large base of sampling units. This,
however, is rarely how surveys are designed and implemented. Once the data
are loaded, the exact sampling design structure can however be easily speci-
fied. This is done using the Set Sample Design dialogue box. Specifying the
sample design structure can involve letting DAD know about (up to) 5 vectors
(see Figure 14.2).
• STRATA: this specifies the name of the variable (in an integer format) that
contains the Stratum identifiers.
• PSU: this specifies the name of the variable (in an integer format) that
contains the identifiers for the Primary Sampling Units.
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Figure 14.2: The Set Sample Desian window in DAD.
• LSU: this specifics the name of the variable (in an integer format) that
contains the identifiers for the Last Sampling Units.
• SAMPLING WEIGHT: this specifies the name of the sampling weights vari-
able.
• CORRECTION FACTOR: this provides DAD with a Finite Population Cor-
rection variable.
14.4 Applications in DAD: basic procedures
Once data have been read into DAD and that the sampling design has been
specified, the field is wide open for the estimation of distributive statistics and
for performing statistical tests. For every application programmed in DAD,
there is a specific application window that facilitates the specification of vari-
ables, parameters and options to generate the desired distributive statistics. For
example, Figure 14.3 shows the specific application window for computing the
FGT poverty index with one distribution. There is a separate specific window
for the case of two distributions. The list of all applications available in DAD's
current version 4.4 appears in Tables 14.1 and 14.2.
Most application windows, including that of Figure 14.3, are divided into
three panels. The first panel is used to specify the relevant database variables
needed for the estimation. The second panel (generally at the bottom of the
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application window) specifies the parameter values and options to be used by
the estimator — examples include the level of inequality aversion, the value
of the poverty line, the percentile to be considered, as well as whether indices
should be normalized and whether statistical inference should be performed.
The third panel activates buttons to generate various types of results. Some
application windows can also generate popping-up dialogue boxes. One ex-
ample of this can be found when clicking on the Compute line button in the
Poverty| FGT application window. This serves to specify the manner in which
the poverty line should be (or was) estimated.
The following basic variables are typically required for carrying out DAD's
computations.
• VARIABLE OF INTEREST. This is the variable that usually captures living
standards. It can represent, for instance, per capital total household income,
expenditures per adult equivalent, calorie intake, height-for-age scores for
children, etc..
» SIZE VARIABLE. This refers to the "ethical" of physical size of the ob-
servation. For the computation of many distributive statistics, we will in-
deed wish to take into account how many relevant individuals (or statistical
units) are found in a given observation. We might, for instance, wish to
estimate inequality across individuals, the proportion of children who are
poor, or the concentration of pension benefits among pensioners. Individ-
uals, children and pensioners will then respectively be the statistical units
of interest. Households do differ, however, in their size or in the number
of children they contain. DAD takes this into account through the use of
the SIZE VARIABLE. When an observation represents a household, com-
puting inequality across individuals requires specifying household size as
the SIZE VARIABLE, whereas computing poverty among children requires
putting the number of children in the household as the SIZE VARIABLE. If
the statistics of interest were the proportion of households in poverty, then
no SIZE VARIABLE would be needed.
• GROUP VARIABLE. (This should be used in combination with GROUP
NUMBER.) It is often useful to limit some distributive analysis to some
population subgroups. We might for example wish to estimate poverty
within a country's rural area or within the group of public workers. One
way to do this is to set SIZE VARIABLE to zero for all of the observations
that fall outside these groups of interest. Another way is by defining a
GROUP VARIABLE whose values will allow DAD to identify which are the
observations of interest.
» GROUP NUMBER. GROUP NUMBER tells DAD on which value of the
GROUP VARIABLE to condition the computation of some distributive statis-
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tics. The value for GROUP NUMBER should be an integer. For example,
rural households might be assigned a value of 1 for some variable denoted
as region. Setting GROUP VARIABLE to region and GROUP NUMBER to
1 then makes DAD know that we wish the distributive statistics to be com-
puted only within the group the rural households.
• SAMPLING WEIGHTS. Sampling weights are the inverse of the sampling
rate. They are best specified once and for all using the Set Sample De-
sign window (as discussed above). Distributive statistics (but not necessar-
ily their sampling distribution and standard errors) will be left unchanged,
however, if no variable is given for Sampling Weight (in Set Sample De-
sign window) and if the product of the sampling weight and size variables
is subsequently specified as the SIZE VARIABLE in the relevant application
windows.
DAD's applications with two distributions can be launched after having
loaded two databases. Each time one launches an application that can sup-
port two distributions, the dialog box, shown in Figure 14.4, opens to allow
the user to specify the desired number of distributions to be used as well as
the name of the databases for these distributions. The application window for
two distributions is very similar to that for one. The main difference is the
addition of a second panel to specify the relevant variables to be used for the
second distribution. The application for two distributions generally serves to
compute distributive differences across the two distributions. For curve appli-
cations with two distributions, for instance, differences between the curves of
the two distributions can usually be drawn.
14.5 Curves
DAD has built-in tools that facilitate the use of curves to display distributive
information. Say, for instance, that we wish to graph a Lorenz curve. We can
compare it to the 45° line to observe by how much income shares differ from
population shares. This is done by following these steps:
From the main menu, select the submenu: Curve] Lorenz. Indicate that the
number of distributions equals one.
After choosing the application variables, click on the button Graph to draw
the first Lorenz curve.
If you would like to draw another Lorenz curve for another variable of
interest, return to the Lorenz application window, re-initialize the variable
of interest and click again on the button Graph.
a
Table 14.1: DAD's applications (version 4.4)
Main menu Applications
Inequality
Polarisation
Poverty
Dominance
Welfare
Atkinson Index
Gini / S-Gini Index
Atkinson-Gini Index
Entropy Index
Quantiles Ratio
Interquantile Ratio
Coefficient of Variation
Logarithmic Variance
Variance of Logarithms
Relative Mean Deviation
Conditional Mean Ratio
Share Ratio
Income-Component Proportional Growth
Wolfson Index
Duclos, Esteban and Ray Index
FGT Index
Bounded Income Index
Watts Index
S-Gini Index
CHU Index
Sen Index
Bidimensional FGT index
Impact of Price Change
Impact of Tax Reform
Lump-sum Targeting
Inequality-neutral Targeting
FGT Elasticity
Income-Component Proportional Growth
Impact of Demographic Change
Poverty Dominance
Inequality Dominance
Indirect Tax Dominance
Atkinson Index
S-GiniIndex
Atkinson-Gini Index
ATK:Impact of Price Change
ATK:Impact of Tax Reform
ATK:Impact of Income-component Growth
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Table 14.2: DAD's applications (version 4.4 — continued)
Main menu Applications
Decomposition FGT: Decomposition by groups
FGT: Decomposition for 2 groups
FGT: Decomposition by sources
FGT: Growth & Redistribution
FGT: Sectoral
FGT: Transient & Chronic
Transition Matrix
S-Gini: Decomposition by groups
S-Gini: Decomposition by sources
Squared CV: Decomposition by sources
Entropy: Decomposition by groups
Atkinson: Social Welfare
Redistribution
Curves
Distribution
Tax or Transfer
Tax/Transfer vs TaxAfransfer
Transfer vs Tax
Horizontal Inequity
Redistribution
Coefficient of Concentration
HI:Duclos & Lambert (1999)
HI:Duclos, Jalbert & Araar (2003)
Lorenz
Generalised Lorenz
Concentration
Generalised Concentration
Quantile
Normalised Quantile
Poverty Gap
CPG
C-Dominance
Relative deprivation
Bi-polarisation
Pro-poor
Density Function
Joint Density Function
Distribution Function
Joint Distribution Function
Plot Scatters XY
Non-Parametric Regression
Non-Parametric Derivative
Conditional Standard Deviation
Descriptive Statistics
Statistics
Confidence Interval
Group Information
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• When the graph window appears, click on the button Draw all to plot all
of the curves.
• If you wish to draw the 45° line, select (from the main menu of the graph
window) Tools | Properties, and activate the option DRAW THE 45° LINE.
Figure 14.5 shows an example of Lorenz curves drawn by DAD.
We can also compare two Lorenz curves to test for inequality dominance
of one distribution over the other. For this, we choose again the application
Curves] Lorenz, but this time with two distributions.
DAD can also usually draw curves that show how the levels of some dis-
tributive statistics vary with ethical parameters — such as inequality or poverty
aversion parameters. Take for instance the Atkinson index of inequality. It may
be informative to check how fast it varies as a function of e, its parameter of
inequality aversion. To do this, follow these steps:
• From the main menu, select the submenu: lnequality|Atkinson. Indicate
that the number of distribution equals one.
• After setting the application variables, click on the button Range and spec-
ify the desired range for the parameter e.
m Click on the button Graph to draw the curve that shows the Atkinson index
against the inequality aversion parameter e.
• When the graph window appears, click on the button Draw to plot the
curve.
14.6 Graphs
Recent versions of DAD are quite flexible in terms of editing, saving and
printing graphs. On most application windows, a button Graph is available
to draw graphs instantly. The type of graphs drawn depends on the applica-
tion and on the type of Graph buttons selected. There are for instance two
Graph buttons in the Poverty|FGT Index application window. Clicking on
the Graph button plots estimates of the FGT index for a range of alternative
poverty lines. Clicking on the Graph2 button draws instead estimates of the
equally-distributed poverty gap that is equivalent to the estimated FGT poverty
index, and this for a range of poverty aversion parameters a.
Most of the options for editing DAD's graphs can be accessed from the
Graph Properties dialogue box — see Figure 14.7. DAD's graphs can also
be saved in a variety of formats. Table 14.3 lists some of them.
Curves are useful tools to check various types of distributive dominance.
Table 14.4 sums up some of the links between some of the applications and
curves found in DAD and the tests for various orders of social welfare, poverty
and inequality dominance.
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Table 14.3: Available format to save DAD's graph.
Extension
*.pmb
*.png
*.pmb
*.tif
*.JPg
*.pdf
*.ps
Description
Bitmat Image file
Portable Network Graphic
Bitmat Image file
Tag Image File Format
JPEG File Interchange Format
Portable Document Format
Postscript
Table 14.4: Curves and stochastic dominance.
Order
1
2
s
1
2
/>
1
2
s
Primal approach
Social welfare
Distribution|Distribulion function
Dominance|Poverty Dominance s = 2
Dominance|Poverty Dominance
Poverty
DominancejPoverty Dominance s = 1
Dominance|Poverty Dominance s = 2
Dominance|Poverty Dominance
Inequality
Dominance|Inequality Dominance s — 1
Dominance|lnequality Dominance s — 2
Dominance | Inequality Dominance
Dual approach
Curves|Quantile
Curves|Generalized Lorenz
Curves [Poverty Gap
Curves|CPG
Curves|Normalized Quantile
Curves Lorenz
14.7 Statistical inference: sampling distributions,
confidence intervals and hypothesis testing
DAD facilitates statistical inference in a number of original ways:
• DAD readily provides asymptotic standard errors on a large number of es-
timators of distributive statistics, including estimators of inequality and so-
cial welfare indices, normalized /un-normalized poverty indices, poverty
indices with deterministic/estimated poverty lines, poverty indices with
absolute/relative poverty lines, equally-distributed-equivalent incomes and
poverty gaps, quantiles, density functions, non-parametric regressions,
points on a large number of curves, crossing points of curves, critical poverty
lines, differences in indices and curves, ratios of various statistics, various
income/price/population impacts and elasticities, distributive decomposi-
tions into demographic/factor components, progressivity, redistribution
and equity indices, dominance statistics, etc.. It can be (and has typically
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formally been) shown that all of these estimators are asymptotically nor-
mally distributed.
• DAD can calculate the sampling distribution of most of these estimators
taking into account the sometimes complex design of the surveys. This
is done as indicated in Section 14.3. Existing (commercial) softwares can
sometimes take this design into account, but only for a sample number of
relatively simple distributive statistics (such as simple sums and ratios).
• DAD can provide at the click of a button estimates of confidence intervals
as well as test statistics and p-values for various symmetric and asymmetric
hypothesis tests of interest.
« DAD can be used to simulate numerically the finite-sample sampling dis-
tribution of most of the above-mentioned estimators using bootstrap pro-
cedures. The bootstrap can be performed on the ordinary estimators or
on (asymptotically ) pivotal transforms of them. It is well known that
bootstrapping on pivotal statistics leads to faster rates of convergence to
the true sampling distribution than bootstrapping on untransformed non-
pivotal statistics. Pivotal bootstrapping is, however, usually more costly in
time and resources since it requires estimates of the asymptotic distribu-
tion of the estimators. This is not a problem for DAD, however, since the
(sometimes complex) asymptotic standard errors of these estimators are al-
ready programmed into it. Moreover, as mentioned above, the asymptotic
standard errors and the pivotal statistics derived from them can be sample-
design corrected, providing one more degree of superior accuracy for the
bootstrap procedures available in DAD.
The Standard deviation, confidence interval and hypothesis testing
dialogue box is the main tool for telling DAD what to do in terms of statistical
inference. This box is shown on Figure 14.8.
14.8 References
For further information on Java's development and structure, see (Deitel and
Deitel 2003)'s introductory book, or Chapter 1 of (Lewis and Loftus 2000).
DAD's official web page provides access to extensive information on the soft-
ware:
www.mimap.ecn.ulaval.ca.
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Figure 14.3: Application window for estimating the FGT poverty index —
one distribution.
t
Figure 14.4: Choosing between configurations of one or two distributions.
Figure 14.5: Lorenz curves for two distributions
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Figure 14.7: The dialogue box for graphical options
Figure 14.6: Differences in Lorenz curves drawn by DAD
Differencr the between the lorenz curve of gross income and its of net income
256
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Figure 14.8 The STD option
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Chapter 15
NON-PARAMETRIC ESTIMATION IN DAD
15.1 Density estimation
15.1.1 Univariate density estimation
It is often useful to visualize the shapes of income distributions. There are
essentially two main approaches to doing so, and a mixture of the two. The first
approach uses parametric models of income distributions. These models as-
sume that the income distribution follows a known particular functional form,
but with unknown parameters. Popular examples of such functional forms
include the log-normal, the Pareto, and variants of the beta or gamma distribu-
tions. The main statistical challenge is then to estimate the unknown parame-
ters of that functional form, and to test whether a given functional form appears
to estimate better the observed distribution of income than another functional
form.
The second approach does not posit a particular functional form and does
not require the estimation of functional parameters. Instead, it lets the data
entirely "speak for themselves". It is therefore said to be non-parametric.
The method is most easily understood by starting with a review of the density
estimation used by traditional histograms. Histograms provide an estimate
of the density of a variable y by counting how many observations fall into
"bins", and by dividing that number by the width of the bin times the number
of observations in the sample. To see this more clearly, denote the origin of
the bins by i/o and the bins of the histogram by [J/Q + m-h,yo + (m + l)h]
for positive or negative integers m. For instance, if we take m = 0, then the
bin is described by the interval ranging from the origin to the origin plus h.
Also, let {yi}f=1 be a sample of n observations of income j/j. The value of the
histogram over each of the bins is then defined by
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Such a histogram is shown on Figure 15.1 by the rectangles of varying heights
over identical widths, starting with origin J/Q- For bins defined by [yo+mh, yo+
(m + l)h], the bin width is indeed a constant set to h, but we can also allow
the widths to vary across the bins of the histogram. The choice of h controls
the amount of smoothing performed by the histogram. A small bin width will
h lead to significant fluctuations in the value of the histogram, and a very large
width will set the histogram to the constant h~l. Choosing an appropriate value
for such a smoothing parameter is in fact a pervasive preoccupation in non-
parametric estimation procedures, as we will discuss later. The choice of the
origin can also be important, especially when n is not very large. There can be,
however, little guidance on that latter choice, except perhaps when the nature
of the data suggest a natural value for yo- One way to avoid choosing such
a 2/0 is by constructing what will appear soon to be a "naive" kernel density
estimator, that is, one in which the point y in f(y) is always at the center of the
bin:
This naive estimator can also be obtained from the use of a weight function
w(u), defined as:
and by defining
(15.4)
This frees the density estimation from the choice of J/Q. This naive estimator
can also be improved statistically by choosing weighting functions that are
smoother than w(u) in 15.3. For this, we can think of replacing the weight
function w(u) by a general "kernel function" K(u), such that1
(15.5)
A smooth kernel estimate of the density function that generated the histogram
is shown on Figure 15.1.
'DAD: DistributionJDensity Function.
Figure 15.1: Histograms and density functions
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In general, we would wish J_^o K(u)du = 1, since we would then have
Jf^o f(y}dy = 1. For /(y) to qualify fully as a probability density function,
we would also require K(u) > 0 since we would then be guaranteed that
f(y) S 0, although there are sometimes reasons to allow for negativity of the
kernel function, h is usually referred to as the window width, the bandwidth
or the smoothing parameter of kernel estimation procedures. There are also
arguments to adjust the window width that applies to observation yt for the
number of observations that surround j/j, making h larger for areas where there
are fewer observations. This is done for instance by the nearest neighbor and
the adaptive kernel methods. As in the use of the naive density estimator, each
observation will provide a box or a "bump" to the density estimation of f ( y ) ,
and that bump will have a shape and a width determined by the shape of K(u)
and the size of h respectively2.
The definition of f(y) in (15.5) makes it inherit the continuity and differen-
tiability properties of K(u). It is often sound and convenient to choose a kernel
function that is symmetric around 0, with / K(u)du = 1, / uK(u)du = 0 and
/ v?K(u)du — cr'jf > 0. One such kernel function that has nice continuity and
differentiability properties is the Gaussian kernel, defined by
The "bumps" provided by the Gaussian kernel have the familiar bell shapes,
are smoothly differentiable up to any desired level, and are such that cr|- = 1.
15.1.2 Statistical properties of kernel density
estimation
The efficiency of non-parametric estimation procedures is usually measured
by the mean square error (MSB) that there is in estimating the function f(y)
at a point y. The MSB in estimating f(y) by f(y) is defined by
The most common way of defining a measure of global accuracy simply sums
the mean square error across values of y. This yields the mean integrated
square error (or MISE), a measure of the accuracy of estimating f(y) over the
whole range of y:
2DAD:Distribution|Density Function.
E:18.5.1
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The relative efficiency of a particular choice of a kernel function K(u) can
then be assessed relative to that choice of the kernel function which would
minimize the MISE. The Gaussian kernel function has very good efficiency
properties, although they are not quite as good as some other (less smooth)
kernel functions, such as the (efficiency-optimal) Epanechnikov, the biweight
or the triangular kernels, which are described and discussed for instance in
Silverman (1986) (see in particular Table 3.1).
15.1.3 Choosing a window width
Even, however, if we were to agree on a particular shape for an argument-
centered kernel function, there would still remain the question of which win-
dow width to choose. Again, conditional on the choice of a particular form for
K(u), we can choose the window width that minimizes the MISE. To see what
this implies, note first that we can decompose the MSB at y as a sum of the
square of the bias and of the variance that there is in estimating } ( y ) :
For symmetric kernel functions, the bias can be shown to be approximately
equal to
where, as before, f^(y) stands for the i -order derivative of f ( y ) . The vari-
ance equals
where CK = / K(ufdu. Substituting (15. 10) and (15.11)in (15.9) then gives:
Hence, considering (15.10), we find that the bias of /(y) will be low if the
kernel function has a low variance, since it is then the observations that are
"closer" to y that will count more, and since it is those observations that pro-
vide the least biased estimate of the density at y. But the bias also depends on
the curvature of f(y): in the absence of such a curvature, the density function
is linear and the bias provided by using observations on the left of y is just
(locally) outweighed by the bias provided by using observations on the right of
y. When f(2\y) = 0, therefore, there is asymptotically no bias in using kernel
density estimation.
Looking at (15.11), we find ceteris paribus that a flatter kernel (i.e., with
a lower CK) decreases the variance of /(y). A flatter kernel weights more
equally the observations found around y, and that reduces the variance of an
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estimator such as (15.5). We also obtain the familiar result that the variance of
the estimator decreases proportionately with the size of the sample.
An increase in h plays an offsetting role on the precision of f ( y ) , as is
shown by (15.12). When f^(y) / 0, a large h increases the bias by mak-
ing the estimators too smooth: too much use is made of those observations
that are not so close to y. Conversely, a large h reduces the variance of f ( y )
by making it less variable and less dependent on the particular value of those
observations that are very close to y. Hence, in choosing h in an attempt to
minimize MISE (/ j, a compromise needs to be struck between the competing
virtues of bias and variance reductions. The precise nature of this compromise
will depend on the shape of the kernel function as well as on the true pop-
ulation density function. For instance, if the Gaussian kernel is used and if
the true density function is normal with variance a2, then the choice of h that
minimizes the MISE is given by (see for instance Silverman 1986, p.45):
This value of h* is conditional on both K(u) and f ( y ) being normal density
functions. Silverman (1986) also argues for a more robust choice of h*, given
by
where A = min(standard deviation, interquartile range/1.34). This is because
(15.14)
( . . . ) will yield a mean integrated square error within 10% of the optimum for all the
t-distributions considered, for the log-normal with skewness up to about 1.8, and for the
normal mixture with separation up to 3 standard deviations. (...) For many purposes it
will certainly be an adequate choice of window width, and for others it will be a good
starting point for subsequent fine tuning. (Silverman 1986, p.48)
Further (asymptotic ) results show that, under some mild assumptions — in
particular, that the density function f ( y ) is continuous at y, and that h —> 0
and nh —» oo as n —> oo — the kernel estimator f ( y ) converges to f ( y ) as
n —> oo. When h is chosen optimally, it is of the order of n""1/5, and by
(15.12) the MISE is then of the order of n~OA. This is slightly lower than the
analogous usual rate of convergence of parametric estimators, which is n~°'5.
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15.1.4 Multivariate density estimation
Kernel estimation can also be used for multivariate density estimation. Let
u, y and yj be d-dimensional vectors. We can estimate a d-dimensional density
function as3:
where h is a window width common to all of the dimensions. The multivariate
Gaussian kernel is given by K(u) = (2-7r)~ ' exp (— 0.5uru). The issues
of kernel function and window width selections are similar to those discussed
above for univariate density estimation. The approximately optimal window
converges at the rate n"1/^"1"4), and the optimal window width for the Gaus-
sian kernel and a multivariate normal density /(y) with unit variance is given
15.1.5 Simulating from a density estimate
Simulations from an estimated density are sometimes needed to compute
estimates of functionals of the unknown true density function. This is the case,
for instance, for the estimation in DAD of indices of classical horizontal in-
equity. The estimation of such indices requires information on the net income
distribution of those who have the same gross incomes, and such information
cannot be gathered directly from sample observations of net and gross incomes
since very few (if any) exact equals can be observed in random samples of fi-
nite sizes. Another use of simulated distributions is for computing bootstrap
estimates of the sampling distribution of some estimators. The usual bootstrap
procedure proceeds by conducting successive random sampling (with replace-
ment) from the original sample {yjjjLj. This constrains the new samples to
contain only those observations yj that were contained in the original sample.
Those new samples could instead be generated from a non-parametric esti-
mate of the density of the original sample of incomes, which would yield a
bootstrap estimate that would be smoother and less dependent on the precise
values that the observations yj took in the original sample.
Consider first the case of generating J independent realizations, {yj }/=1 , in
a univariate case, and suppose that a non-negative kernel function K(u) with
window width h is used to estimate f ( y ) . Also assume that observation i has
sampling weight Wj, and suppose for simplicity that the initial observations
{yi}?=i were drawn independently from each other. The following simple
3DAD: DistributionjJoint Density Function.
algorithm is adapted slightly from Silverman (1986), p. 143. For j = 1, . . . ,J,
we then:
Step 1 Choose i with replacement from {fc}£=1 with probability
Step 2 Choose e randomly using the probability density function K;
Step 3 Set y] = yt + he.
Note that this algorithm does not even require computing directly /(y).
For the multivariate case, the above algorithm becomes just slightly more
complicated. For instance, for the estimation of classical HI at gross income
x, we need to generate a random sample of net incomes, {y|}^_i, that follows
the estimated kernel conditional density f ( y \ x ) . For this, we use the original
sample {xj, j/j, w^}f=l with sampling weights Wj. For j = 1, . . . , J, we then:
Step 1 Choose i with replacement from {k}%=1 with probability
Step 2 Choose s randomly using the probability density function K;
Step 3 Set yj = y; + he.
This gives a simulated sample of net incomes {j/?}^=1, conditional upon gross
income being exactly equal to x. A local index of classical HI at x can then
be computed using this simulated sample, and global indices of classical HI
can be estimated simply by repeating this procedure for each of the observed
values of gross incomes, {o;j}™=1.
Because they follow an estimated density function that is on average
smoother than the true one, the simulated samples generated by the above al-
gorithms will have a variance that is generally larger than both the variance
observed in the sample and the true population variance. Let for instance the
sample variance of the y$ be denoted as a^. In the univariate case, the variance
of the simulated y? will equal <5^ + h^a^. This can be a problem if, as is the
case for the measurement of indices of classical HI, the quantity of interest is
intimately linked to the dispersion of income. There may also be a wish to con-
strain the simulated samples of net incomes to have precisely the same sample
mean, fty, as the original sample. Constraining the simulated samples to have
the same mean and variance as the original sample can be done by translating
and re-scaling the simulated samples. This involves replacing Step 3 above by
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in the univariate case. For the bivariate case, we also use Step 3', but replace
fty by jB[y|a;] and ci^ by 6^ , , which can be respectively computed as:
(15.17)
Equation (15.16) is in fact an example of a kernel regression of y on x, a
procedure to which we now turn.
15.2 Non-parametric regressions
The estimation of an expected relationship between variables is the second
most important sphere of recent applications of kernel estimation techniques.
Non-parametric regressions offer several useful applications in distributive
analysis. An example of such an application is the estimation of the relation-
ship between expenditures and calorie intake. Regressing calorie intake non
parametrically on expenditure does not impose a fixed functional relationship
between those two variables along the entire range of calorie intake. On the
contrary, it allows a fair amount of flexibility by estimating the link between
the two variables through a local weighting procedure. The local weighting
procedure essentially considers the expenditures of those individuals with a
calorie intake in the "region" of the specified calorie intake. It weights those
values with weights that decrease rapidly with the distance from the calorie
intake. Hence, those with calorie intake far from the specified level will con-
tribute little to the estimation of the expenditure needed to attain that level.
The results using this method are thus less affected by the presence of "out-
liers" in the distribution of incomes, and less prone to biases stemming from
an incorrect specification of the link between spending and calorie intake.
Basically, then, one is interested in estimating the predicted response, m(x),
of a variable y at a given value of a (possibly multivariate) variable x, that is,
Alternatively, if the joint density f(x,y) exists and if f ( x ) > 0, m(x) can also
be defined as:
The difficulty in estimating the function m(x) is that we typically do not
observe in a sample a response of y at that particular value of x. Furthermore,
even if we do, there are rarely other observations with exactly the same value
of x that will allow us to compute reliably the expected response in which we
are interested.
Let then {xi, yi}f-i be a sample of n observed realizations jointly of a; and
y. The response information that is provided by the sample can be expressed
as:
To estimate m(x), kernel regression techniques use a local averaging proce-
dure that involves weights K(u) that are analogous to those used in Section
15.1 for density estimation. Recalling (15.5) and (15.19), this leads to the fol-
lowing Nadaraya-Watson non-parametric estimator of m(x)4:
To reduce the bias of using neighboring yj's, the kernel weights K (^-jp1) are
typically inversely proportional to the distance between x and xt. They also
depend on the window width h.
As in the case of the kernel density estimators, the kernel smoother m(x)
can be shown to be consistent under relatively weak conditions, including that
m(x) and f ( x ) are both continuous functions of x, and that h —> 0 and nh —>
oo as n —> oo (see for instance Hardle 1990, Proposition 3.1.1). Again, the
variance of m(x) alone does not fully capture the convergence of fn(x) to
m(x) since we must also take into account the bias of fh(x), which comes
from the smoothing of the j/$ in (15.21). Under suitable regularity conditions,
including that h ~ n~a2, the asymptotic distribution of the kernel estimator
(nh) ' (m(x) — m(x)) can be shown to be normal, with its center shifted by
its asymptotic bias — see Hardle (1990), Theorem 4.2.1, for a demonstration.
This asymptotic bias is a function of the form of the kernel K(u) and of the
derivatives of m(x) and f ( x ) . It is given by:
This asymptotic bias can be estimated consistently using estimates of m^2' (x),
m,(l\x), f^(x) and f ( x ) . Such an estimation, however, complicates signif-
icantly the computation of the sampling distribution of m(x), and it can be
4DAD: Distribution|Non-Paratnetric Regression.
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avoided if we can expect (or can make) the bias to be small compared to the
variance. This will be the case if m(x) is relatively constant, or if we make h
fall just a bit faster than its optimal speed of n~a2 — again, see the discussion
of this in Hardle (1990), pp.100-102.
The variance of (nh) ' (m(x) — m(x)) is given by:
The conditional variance cr2^ can be estimated consistently as in (15.17). In
the case of kernel density estimation, note again that the smoothing process
makes the rate of convergence of the kernel estimator m(x) to be n~OA instead
of the usual slightly faster parametric convergence rate of n~°'5.
15.3 References
This chapter draws significantly from Silverman (1986) and Hardle (1990),
to which readers are referred for more details and in-depth analysis.
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Chapter 16
ESTIMATION AND STATISTICAL INFERENCE
16.1 Sampling design
There exist in the population of interest a number of statistical units. For
simplicity, we can think of these units as households or individuals. From an
ethical perspective, it is usually preferable to consider individuals as statistical
units of interest since it is in the welfare of individuals that we are ultimately
interested, but for some purposes (such as the distribution of aggregate house-
hold wellbeing) households may also be appropriate statistical units.
These statistical units are those for which we would like to observe socio-
economic information such as their household composition, labor activity, in-
come or consumption. Since it is usually too costly to gather information on
all of the statistical units of a large population, one would typically be con-
strained to obtain information on only a sample of such units. Distributive
analysis is therefore usually done using survey data.
Since surveys are not censuses, we must take care to distinguish unobserved
"true" population values from observed sample values. Sample differences
across surveys are indeed due both to true population differences and to sam-
pling variability. Population values are generally not observed (otherwise, we
would not need surveys). Sample values as such are rarely of interest: they
would be of interest in themselves only if the statistical units that appeared
by chance in a sample were also precisely those which were of ethical inter-
est. This is not usually the case. Hence, sample values matter in as much as
they can help infer true population values. The statistical process by which
such inference is performed is called statistical inference. The sampling pro-
cess should thus ideally be such that it can be used to make some statistically-
sensible distributive analysis at the level of the population, and not solely for
the samples drawn.
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Sampling errors thus arise because distributive estimates are typically made
on the basis of only some of the statistical units of interest in a population. The
fact that we have no information on some of the population statistical units
makes us infer with sampling error the population value of the distributive in-
dicators in which we are interested. The error made when relying solely on the
information content of one sample depends on the statistical units present in
that sample. The drawing of other samples would generate different sampling
errors. Because samples are drawn randomly, the sampling errors that arise
from the use of these samples are also random.
Since the true population values are unknown, the sampling error associ-
ated with the use of a given sample is thus also unknown. Statistical theory
does, however, allow one to estimate the distribution of sampling errors from
which actual (but unobserved) sampling errors arise. This nevertheless re-
quires samples to be probabilistic, viz, that there be a known probability dis-
tribution associated to the distribution of statistical units in a sample. This
also strictly means that there is absence of unquantiflable and subjective crite-
ria in the choice of units. If this were not so, it would not be possible to assess
reliably the sampling distribution of the estimators.
To draw a sample, a sampling base is used. A sampling base is made
of all the sampling units (SU) from which a sample can be drawn. The base
of sampling units — e.g., the census of all households within in a country —
is usually different from the entire population of statistical units — e.g., the
population of individuals, say. There are several reasons for this, an important
one being that it is generally cost effective to seek information only within
a limited number of clusters of statistical units, grouped geographically or
socio-economically. This also facilitates the collection of cluster-level (e.g.,
village-level) information.
A process of simple random sampling draws sample observations randomly
and independently from a base of sampling units, each with an equal probabil-
ity of selection. Simple random sampling is rarely used in practice to generate
household surveys. Instead, a population of interest (a country, say) is of-
ten first divided into geographical or administrative zones and areas, called
strata. The first stage of random selection takes place from within a list of pri-
mary sampling units (denoted as PSU's) built for each stratum. Within each
stratum, a number of PSU's are then randomly selected. PSU's are often de-
partments, villages, etc.. This random selection of PSU's provides " clusters"
of information.
Since the cost of surveying all statistical units un each of these clusters
may be prohibitive, it may be necessary to proceed to further stages of random
selection within each selected PSU. For instance, within each department,
a number of villages may be randomly selected, and within every selected
village, a number of households may also be randomly selected. The final stage
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of random selection is done at the level of the last sampling units ( LSU's).
These LSU's are often households. Each selected LSU can then provide
information on all individuals found within that LSU. These individuals are
usually not selected — information on all of them appears in the sample. They
therefore do not represent LSU's in statistical terminology.
16.2 Sampling weights
Sampling weights (also called inverse probability, expansion or inflation
factors) are the inverse of the sampling probabilities, viz, of the probabilities
of a sampling unit appearing in the sample. These sampling weights are SU-
specific. The sum of these weights is an estimator of the size of the population
ofSU's.
Samples are sometimes "self-weighted". Each sampling unit then has the
same chance of being included in the survey. This arises, for instance, when the
number of clusters selected in each stratum is proportional to the size of each
stratum, when the clusters are randomly selected with probability proportional
to their size, and when an identical number of households (or LSU's) across
clusters is then selected with equal probability within each cluster.
It is, however, common for the inclusion probability to differ across house-
holds. One reason comes simply from the complexity of sample designs, which
makes differential sampling weights occur frequently. Another reason is that
the costs of surveying SU's vary, which makes it more cost effective to sur-
vey some households (e.g., urban ones) than others. Sampling precision can
also be enhanced with differential probabilities of household inclusion. The
idea here is to survey with greater probability those households who contribute
more to the phenomenon of interest. It leads to a sampling process usually
called sampling with "probability proportional to size".
Assume for instance that we are interested in estimating the value of a
distribution-sensitive poverty index. The most important contributors to that
index are obviously the poor households, and more precisely the poorest among
them. An a priori suspicion might be that such poorest households are propor-
tionately more likely to be found in some areas than in others. Making inclu-
sion probabilities larger for households in these more deprived areas will then
enhance the sampling precision of the estimator of the distribution-sensitive
poverty index since it will gather data that are more statistically informative.
A reverse sample-design argument would apply for a survey intended to es-
timate total income in a population. The most important contributors to total
income are the richest households, and it would thus be sensible to sample
them with a greater probability. Yet one more consequence of the princi-
ple of "probability proportional to size" is the desirability of sampling with
greater probability those households of larger sizes. Distributive analysis is
normally concerned with the distribution of individual well-being. Ceteris
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paribus, larger-size households contribute more information towards such as-
sessment, and should therefore be sampled with a greater probability (roughly
speaking, with a probability proportional to their size).
Omitting sampling weights in distributive analysis will systematically bias
both the estimators of the values of indices and points on curves as well as
the estimation of the sampling variance of these estimators1. Including such
weights will usually make the analysis free of asymptotic biases. To see this,
we follow Deaton (1998), p.45, and let Y be the population total of the z's,
with a population of size N. An estimator of that population total is then given
by
where <, is the number of times unit i appears in a random sample of size n and
where iuj is the sampling weight. Let TTJ be the probability that unit i is selected
each time an observation is drawn from the population. Households with a low
value of TT, will have a low probability of being selected in the survey, relative
to others with a higher TTJ. Then, E[tj] = mri = Wi~l is the expected number
of times unit i will appear in the sample, or, for large n, it is roughly speaking
the probability of being in the sample. Hence,
and Y is therefore an unbiased estimator of Y". An analogous argument applies
to show that N = ^f=1 Uwi is an unbiased estimator of population size N.
16.3 Stratification
The sampling base is usually stratified into a number of strata. The basic
advantage of stratification is to use prior information on the distribution of the
population, and to "partition" it in parts that are thought to differ significantly
from each other. Sampling then draws information systematically from each
of those parts of the population. With stratification, no part of the sampling
base therefore goes totally unrepresented in the final sample.
To be more specific, a variable of interest, such as household per capita in-
come, often tends to be less variable within some stratum than across an entire
population. This is because households within the same stratum typically share
to a greater extent than within the entire population some socio-economic char-
acteristics — such as geographical locations, climatic conditions, and demo-
'DAD:Poverty|FGT Index.
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graphic characteristics — that are determinants of the incomes of these house-
holds, stratification helps generate systematic sample information from a
diversity of "socio-economic areas".
Because information from a "broader" spectrum of the population leads on
average to more precise estimates, stratification generally decreases the sam-
pling variance of estimators. For instance, suppose at the extreme that house-
hold income is the same for all households in a given stratum, and this, for
each and every stratum. In this case, supposing also that the population size
of each stratum is known in advance, it would be sufficient to draw only one
household from each stratum to know exactly the distribution of income in the
population.
16.4 Multi-stage sampling
Multi-stage sampling implies that SU's end up in a sample only subse-
quently to a process of multi-stage selection. Groups (or " clusters") of SU's
are first randomly selected within a population (which may be stratified). This
is followed by further sampling within the selected groups, and followed by
yet another process of random selection within the subgroups just selected.
The first stage of random selection is done at the level of primary sampling
units ( PSU ). An important condition would seem to be that first-stage sam-
pling be random and with replacement for the selection of a PSU to be done
independently from that of another. There are many cases, however, in which
this condition is not met.
1 First-stage sampling is typically made without replacement.
This will not matter in practice for the estimation of the sampling variance
if there is multi-stage sampling, that is, if there is an additional stage of
sampling within each selected PSU. The intuitive reason is that selecting
a PSU only reveals random and incomplete information on the popula-
tion of statistical units within that PSU, since not all of these statistical
units appear in the sample when their PSU is selected. Selecting that
same PSU once more (in a process of first-stage sampling with replace-
ment) does therefore reveal additional information, information different
from that provided by the first-time selection of that PSU. This extra infor-
mation is roughly of equal value to that which would have been revealed
if a process of sampling without replacement had forced the selection of a
different PSU.
Hence, in the case of multi-stage sampling, first-stage sampling without
replacement does not extract significantly more information than first-stage
sampling with replacement. It does not therefore practically lead to less
variable estimators than a process of first-stage sampling with replacement.
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If, however, there is no further sampling after the initial selection of PSU's,
then a finite population correction (FPC) factor should be used in the com-
putation of the sampling variance. This would generate a better estimate of
the true sampling variance. If FPC factors are not used, then the sampling
variance of estimators will tend to be overestimated. This means that it will
be more difficult to establish statistically significant differences across dis-
tributive estimates, making the distributive analysis more conservative and
less informative than it could be.
2 Sampling is often systematic.
Systematic sampling can be done in various ways. For instance, a complete
list of N sampling units is gathered. Letting n be the number of sampling
units that are to be drawn, a "step" s is defined as s = N/n. A first sam-
pling unit is randomly chosen within the first s units of the sampling list.
Let the rank of that first unit be k 6 {1,2, • • • , s}. The n — 1 subsequent
units with ranks k + s, k + 2s, k + 3s,..., k + ns then complete the sample.
If the order in which the sampling units appear in the sampling list is ran-
dom, then such systematic sampling is equivalent to pure random sam-
pling. If, however, this is not the case, then the effect of such systematic
sampling on the sampling variance of the subsequent distributive estimators
depends on how the sampling units were ordered in the sampling list in the
first place.
(a) For instance, a "cyclical" ordering makes sampling units appear in cy-
cles. "Similar" sampling units then show up in the sampling list at
roughly fixed intervals. Suppose for illustrative purposes that the size
of these intervals is the same as s. Then, systematic sampling will lead
to a gathering of information on similar units (e.g., with similar in-
comes), thus reducing the statistical information that is extracted from
the sample. This will reduce the sampling precision of estimators, and
increase their sampling variance.
(b) A cyclical ordering of sampling units suggests that there is more
sampling-unit heterogeneity around a given sampling unit than across
the whole sampling base (since information around sampling units is
simply cyclically repeated across the sampling base). A more fre-
quent phenomenon arises when adjacent sampling units show less het-
erogeneity than that shown by the entire sampling base. A typical
occurrence of this is when sampling units are ordered geographically
in a sampling list. Households living close to each other appear close
to each other in the list. Villages far away from each other are also far
away in the sampling list. Since geographic proximity is often asso-
ciated with socio-economic resemblance, the farther from each other
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in the list are sampling units, the more likely will they also differ in
socio-economic characteristics.
Systematic sampling will then force units from across the entire sam-
pling list to appear in the sample. Representation from implicit strata
will thus be compelled into the sample. This will lead to a sampling
feature usually called implicit stratification. Pure random sampling
from the sampling list will not force such a systematic extraction of
information, and will therefore lead to more variable estimators.
By how far implicit stratification reduces sampling variability depends
on the degree of between-stratum heterogeneity which stratification al-
lows to extract, just as for explicit stratification. The larger the hetero-
geneity of units far from each other, the larger the fall in the sampling
variability induced by the systematic sampling's implicit stratification.
One way to account for and to detect the impact of implicit stratifica-
tion in the estimation of sampling variances is to group pairs of adjacent
sampling units into implicit strata. Assume again that n sampling units
are selected systematically from a sampling list. Then, create n/2 im-
plicit strata and compute sampling variances as if these were explicit
strata. If these pairs did not really constitute implicit strata (because,
say, the ordering in the sampling list had in fact been established ran-
domly), then this procedure will not affect much the resulting estimate
of the sampling variance. But if systematic sampling did lead to im-
plicit stratification, then the pairing of adjacent sampling units will
reduce the estimate of the sampling variance — since the variability
within each implicit stratum will be found to be systematically lower
than the variability across all selected sampling units.
Generally, variables of interest (such as incomes) vary less within a cluster
than between clusters. Hence, ceteris paribus, multi-stage selection reduces
the "diversity" of information generated compared to SRS and leads to a less
informative coverage of the population. The impact of clustering sample ob-
servations is therefore to tend to decrease the precision of estimators, and thus
to increase their sampling variance. Ceteris paribus, the lower the within-
cluster variability of a variable of interest, the smaller the gain of information
that there is in sampling further within the same clusters.
To see this, suppose the extreme case in which household income happens
to be the same for all households in a cluster, and this, for all clusters. In such
cases, it is clearly wasteful to adopt multi-stage sampling: it would be sufficient
to draw one household from each cluster in order to know the distribution of
income within that cluster. More information would be gained from sampling
from other clusters.
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16.5 Impact of sampling design on sampling
variability
There are two modelling approaches to thinking about how data were ini-
tially generated. The first one, which is also the more traditional in the sam-
pling design literature, is the finite population approach. The second approach
is the super-population one: the actual population is a sample drawn from
all possible populations, the infinite super-population. This second approach
sometimes presents analytical advantages, and it is therefore also regularly
used in econometrics.
To illustrate the impact of stratification and clustering on sampling vari-
ability, consider therefore the following "super-population model", based on
Deaton (1998), p.56. Then, the income XMJ of a household j from a cluster i
of a stratum h can be modelled as:
For simplicity, assume that the x^ij are drawn from the same number n of
clusters in each of the L strata, and that the same number of LSU (or "house-
holds") m is selected in each of the clusters. The indices hij then stand for:
• h = 1,,..,L: stratum h
• i = 1,..., n: cluster i (in stratum h)
• j = 1,..., TO: household j (in cluster i of stratum h).
For simplicity, also assume that a/, is distributed with mean 0 and variance &„,
that PM is distributed with mean 0 and variance cr|, and that e/,y is distributed
with mean 0 and variance a^. Assume moreover that these three random terms
are distributed independently from each other.
16.5.1 Stratification
Say that we wish to estimate mean income fj,. The estimator, ft, is given by
Estimation and statistical inference 279
be the estimator of the mean /j,^ of stratum h. Clearly, E[/i/j] = /j, + a^. and
E[fi\ = p, since by (16.4) and (16.5)
The sampling variability of fi is thus a simple average of the sampling variances
of the L strata's /(/,.
Stratification can in fact be thought of as an extreme case of clustering, with
the number of selected clusters corresponding to the number of population
clusters, and with sampling being done without replacement to ensure that
all population clusters will appear in the sample. Suppose instead that one
were to select L strata randomly and with replacement, to make it possible that
not all of the strata will be selected. This is in a sense what happens when
stratification is dropped and clustering is introduced. Using (16.4) and (16.5),
we then have that
where t/, is a random variable showing the number of times stratum h was
selected. Then, recalling that /K/, = fj, + ah and linearizing (16.9), we have
approximately that
since fJ,^h=i ^h = LH and E [fyj = 1. Assuming independence between ft^
and th and between the fih, we have that
Because of the independence of sampling across strata, we also have that
Since t^ follows a multinomial distribution, with var(tft) = (L — l)/L and
cav(th,ti) = —l/L, we find that
The first line of (16.17) follows by the definition of /%, and the second line
follows from (16.3) — note that ah is fixed for all of the Xhii in the same
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Hence, using (16.12) and (16.15), we obtain
The last term in (16.16) is the effect upon sampling variability of removing
stratification. The larger this term, the greater the fall in sampling variability
that originates from stratification.
16.5.2 Clustering
Let us now investigate the effect of clustering on the sampling variance,
that is, on var (fth)- We find:
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stratum h. The last line of (16.17) is obtained from the sampling independence
between fthi ar>d e^tj-
Hence, for a per-stratum given number of observations rnn, it is better to
have a large n to reduce sampling variability, namely, it is better to draw ob-
servations from a large number of clusters. The larger the cross-cluster vari-
ability cr|, the more important it is to have a large number of clusters in order
to keep var (/}/,) low. Ceteris paribus, for a given sample size and for a given
<jj| + <7£, the sampling variance of distributive estimators is smaller the smaller
the between-cluster heterogeneity, <r|, but the larger the within-cluster hetero-
geneity, of.
16.5.3 Finite population corrections
Sampling without replacement imposes that all of the selected sampling
units are different. It therefore extracts on average more information from the
sampling base than sampling with replacement, and ensures that the samples
drawn are on average closer to the population of sampling units. Sampling
without replacement therefore increases the precision of sample estimators. To
account for this increase in sampling precision, a FPC factor can be used, al-
though it complicates slightly the estimation of the variance of the relevant
estimators.
Assume simple random sampling of n sampling units from a population
of N sampling units. Thus, we have that Wj = N/n for all of the n sample
observations. To illustrate the derivation of an FPC factor in this simplified
case, we follow Cochrane (1977) and Deaton (1998), p.42-44. An estimator Y
of the population total Y of the x's is given by
where the random variable tj indicates whether — and how many times — the
population unit i was included in the sample. Taking the variance of (16.18),
we find:
Using (16.18) and (16.19), the distinction between simple random sampling
with and without replacement is analogous to the distinction between a bino-
mial and a multinomial distribution for the ij. With sampling without replace-
ment, the probability that any one population unit appears in the final sample
is equal to n/N, i.e., E[iJ = n/N. Since ij then takes either a 0 or a 1 value,
Substituting var(ij) and cov(ij, tj) into (16.19), and defining
we find
where 1 - / = (N - n)/N is an FPC factor.
Take now the case of simple random sampling with replacement. We can
then express ti for any given population unit i as a sum of n independent draws
tij, with j = 1 , . . . , n, each one ty indicating whether observation i was se-
lected in draw j. Thus:
Since for any draw j, E[ty] = I/A7', the expected value of ti is again n/N, but
ti may now take values greater than 1. The draws ty being independent, and
each draw having a binomial distribution with parameter l/N, we have that
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it thus follows a binomial distribution with parameter n/N. The variance of ij
is then given by E[t?] - (n/N)2 = n/JV - (n/N)2 = n/N (1 - n/N). Th
covariance cov(ij, tj) can be found by noting that E[t,t,-] = P(ij = tj = 1) =
n/N • (n - l)/(N - 1), and thus that
which is the variance of a multinomial distribution with parameters n and 1/N.
It can be checked that the covariance cov(ti,tj) is given by —n/N2. Substi-
tuting var(tj) and cov(tj, tj) into (16.19) again, we now find
This is larger than (16.22): the difference between the two results equals
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and depends on the magnitude of n relative to N. The larger the value of n
relative to N, the greater the sampling precision gains that there are in sampling
without replacement.
16.5.4 Weighting
We follow once more the approach of Cochrane (1977) and Deaton (1998),
pp.45-49. Suppose that we are again interested in estimating the variance of
the estimator Y of a total Y, but for simplicity assume that sampling is done
with replacement so that we can for now ignore FPC factors. Y is now defined
as:
Taking its variance, we find
ti follows once more a multinomial distribution, but now with var(ij) = n7Tj(l —
TTj) and cov(ij, tj) = —nwiTTj. Substituting this into (16.28), we find
To estimate (16.29), we can replace population values by sample values and
thus use the estimator
Denote as j/j = w,x,,i = 1,... ,n, the n sample values of WiXi, and let
y = n~l £"=i j/j. Then, (16.30) leads to
with the difference that a familiar n/(n — 1) small-sample correction factor has
been introduced in (16.31) to correct for the small-sample bias in estimating
the variance of the j/j. Incorporating weights in the estimation of sampling
variances is thus relatively straightforward.
284 POVERTY AND EQUITY
16.5.5 Summary
The above material calls to mind the importance for statistical offices of
making available sampling design information. This includes providing
• the sampling weights;
• stratum and PSU (cluster) identifying variables;
» information on the presence or not of systematic sampling (and thus of
implicit stratification), including the relationship between the numbering
of sampling units and the original ordering of these units in the sampling
base;
• the finite population correction factors, namely, the size of the sampling
base, when appropriate.
Equipped with this information, distributive analysts can provide reliable
estimates of the sampling precision of their estimators2.
16.6 Estimating a sampling distribution -with
complex sample designs
We provide in this section a detailed account of the computation of sampling
variances in DAD, taking full account of the sampling design. Let:
• h = 1, . . . , L: the list of the strata (e.g. the geographical regions);
• i = l , . . . , Nh'. the list of primary sampling units ( PSU; e.g., villages) in
stratum h;
• Nh- the population number of PSU in a stratum h;
• n^: the number of selected PSU in a stratum h;
• Mht'. the population number of last sampling units ( LSU) (e.g., house-
holds) in PSU/w;
• m/jji the number of selected LSU in the PSU hi (for instance, the number
of households from village hi that appear in the sample);
• qhij'. the number of observations in selected LSU hij (e.g., the number of
household members in a household hi j whose socio-economic information
is recorded in the survey, with each household member providing 1 line of
information in the data file);
2DAD: Edit|Set Sample Design.
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• Whij '• the sampling weight of LSU hij;
• M = J^h=i Ej^i MM: the population number of LSU (e.g., the number
of households in the population);
• rn = Eft=i ESi mhi'- the number of selected LSU (e.g., the number of
selected households that appear in the sample);
• X^ijk'- the value of the variable of interest (e.g., adult-equivalent income)
for statistical unit hij k in the population;
• Shijk'- the size of statistical unit hijk in the population (e.g., if the statistical
unit is a household, then Shijk mav be the number of persons in household
hijk, or alternatively the number of adult equivalents);
 the population total of inter-
est;
• Xhijk' the value of X (the variable of interest) that appears in the sample
for sample observation hijk;
» s^ijk'' the size of selected sample observation hijk;
 the estimated population
total of interest;
 the estimated population number of LSU;
the relevant sum in LSU /iij;
the relevant sum in PSU /ii;
 relevant mean in stratum h.
The sampling covariance of two totals, Y and Z (Z being defined similarly
to Y) is then estimated by
where
— note the similarity with (16.21) and (16.22) — and where //, is a function
of a user-specified FPC factor, fpch, for stratum /i, such that,
the
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• if a fpcfr is not specified by the user, then fh = Q;
Recall that setting fh^Qis useful only when the sampling design is of the
form either of simple random sampling or of stratified random sampling with
no subsequent sub-sampling within the PSU's selected. In both cases, sam-
pling must have been done without replacement.
The variance VgD of Y is obtained from (16.32) simply by replacing (z^i — ~Zh
ty(yhi-Vh)-
An often-used indicator of the impact of sampling design on sampling vari-
ability is called the design effect, deff. The design effect is the ratio of the
design-based estimator of the sampling variance (Vso) over the estimate of the
sampling variance assuming that we have obtained a simple random sample of
m LSU without replacement. Denote this latter estimate as VSRS- Then,
Some of the above variables often take familiar forms and names:
Xkijk can be thought of as an "individual-level" variable, such as height,
health status, schooling, or own consumption. This variable is called the
"variable of interest" in DAD. If x^ijk 's indeed individual-specific, then
For simple random sampling, we would have that
and, recalling (16.22), the sampling variance of Y would then equal
where var(y) is the variance of the population yhij, and where / = m/M if
an FPC factor is specified for the computation of VSD, and / = 0 otherwise.
VSRS can then be estimated as follows:
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shijk will not exceed 1 in most reasonable instances. Individual outcomes
are, however, not always observed. Even if they are, we may sometimes
believe that there is equal sharing in the household to which individuals
belong. In those cases, Xfajk will typically take the form of adult-equivalent
income or other household-specific measure of living standard.
• s^jk gives the "size" of the sample observation hijk. This size may be
purely demographic, such as the number of individuals in the unit whose
living standard is captured by Xhijk- It may also be 1 even if hijk represents
a household and if we are interested in a household count for distributive
analysis. But Shijk maY also be an ethical size, which depends on norma-
tive perceptions of how important the unit is in terms of some distributive
analysis. Examples of such sizes include the number of adult-equivalents in
the unit (if, say, we wish to assign individuals an ethical weight that is pro-
portional to their " needs"), the number of families, the number of adults,
the number of workers, the number of children, the number of citizens, the
number of voters, etc..
• qhij is the number of sample observations or statistical units provided by
the last sampling unit. This LSU may contain a grouping of households,
of villages, etc... More commonly for the empirical analysis of poverty and
equity, a LSU represents a household.
16.7 References
General references on estimation and inference taking into account survey
design include Asselin (1984) and Cochrane (1977). Applications to economic
analysis are discussed and presented in Deaton (1998), Howes and Lanjouw
(1998) (focussing on poverty analysis), and Zheng (2002) (with a specific focus
on Lorenz curves). Alternative approaches to taking into account survey de-
sign can be found inter alia in Cowell (1989) (modelling sampling weights as
jointly distributed with living standards), and in Biewen (2002b) and Schluter
and Trede (2002a) (for dependence across members of the same sampling unit
— households in their case). Kennickell and Woodburn (1999) illustrates the
impact of a consistent estimation of survey weights in the US surveys of Con-
sumer Finances for the analysis of the distribution of wealth.
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Chapter 17
STATISTICAL INFERENCE IN PRACTICE
Assessing statistically the extent of poverty and equity in a distribution, or
checking for distributive differences, usually involves three steps. First, one
formulates hypotheses of interest, such as that the poverty headcount is less
than 20%, or that tax equity has increased over time, or that inequality is greater
in one country than in another. Second, one computes distributive statistics,
weighting observations by their sampling weights and (when appropriate) by
a size variable. Third, one uses these statistics to test the hypotheses of in-
terest. This last step can involve testing the hypotheses directly, or building
confidence intervals of where we can confidently locate the true population
values of interest. This third step may allow for the effects of survey design
on the sampling distributions of distributive indices and test statistics, and may
also involve performing numerical simulations of such sampling distributions,
if the circumstances make it desirable to do so.
17.1 Asymptotic distributions
Under the null hypothesis that n = no, and under some generally mild reg-
ularity conditions, all of the estimators p, and associated test statistics consid-
ered in this book and programmed in DAD can be shown to be asymptotically
normally distributed with mean no and asymptotic sampling variance cr?. This
can be simply stated as:
The parameter <r| is unknown, but we can typically estimate it consistently by
<j? — this is indeed usually readily provided by DAD. Asymptotically, we can
then also write that:
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which also implies that
a statistics that does not depend on unknown (or "nuisance") parameters, and
that is therefore typically called "pivotal". Many of the results that follow rely
implicitly on this result.
In the simplest cases, the estimators of interest can be expressed as a straight-
forward sum of variable values across observations. Take for instance the case
of an estimator a\ estimated using a sample {yi,t}f-i of n observations of y\^\
This is of course just the sample mean of the j/j's. As is well known, the
asymptotic sampling distribution of di is given by
where a\ and a^ are respectively the population mean and the population vari-
ance of y. That variance can be estimated consistently by the sample variance
of the j/i/s.
Unfortunately, most of the distributive estimators do not take the simple
form of (17.4). Instead, they often take the following general form:
where
• dk is expressible as a sum of the n observations of j/jy: a^ = X^Li J"W>
• 9 can be expressed as a continuous function g of the a's;
• and ykti is usually some fc-speciflc transform of the income of observation
i.
The sampling distribution of 0 will depend on the function g and on the joint
sampling distribution of the estimators a*, k = 1,..., K. This joint sampling
distribution is usually easily estimated by considering the joint distribution of
the dk (recall (17.4)).
DAD then generally uses Rao (1973)'s linearization approach to derive the
standard error of indices such as 6. Define a = («i, 02 , . . . , OIK)' and let G
be the gradient of g with respect to the a's:
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A linearization of 9 then yields
The sampling variance of 9 can then be shown to be asymptotically equal to
where V is the asymptotic covariance matrix of the d/< and is given by
The gradient elements g^-.gj-, • • • i can be estimated consistently using the
estimates •£&- , •&- ,..., of the true derivatives. The elements of the co-asrd 'a^d ' '
variance matrix can also be estimated consistently using the sample data, re-
placing for instance var(a) by var(a). Note that it is at the level of the esti-
mation of these covariance elements that the full sampling design structure is
taken into account (see Section 16.6).
17.2 Hypothesis testing
The outcome of an hypothesis test is a statistical decision: the conclusion of
the test will either be to reject a null hypothesis, HQ, in favor of an alternative,
HI, or to fail to reject it. Most hypothesis tests involving an unknown true
population parameter /j, fall into three special cases:
The ultimate statistical decision may be correct or incorrect. Two types of error
can occur:
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1 The first one, a Type I error, occurs when we reject HQ when it is in fact
true;
2 The second one, a Type II error, occurs when we fail to reject HQ when HO
is in fact false.
The power of the test of an hypothesis Hg versus HI is the probability of
rejecting HQ in favor of HI when HI is true.
Let a be the level of statistical significance in which we are interested, a
is often referred to as the size of an hypothesis test. It is the probability of
making a Type I error, namely, the probability that we may wrongly reject
a null hypothesis. Typical values of a are 0.01, 0.025, 0.05 and 0.1. Let
z (p) be the p-quantile of the standardized normal distribution. That is, if F is a
standard normal distribution function, then F(z(p)) = p. Let/to be the sample
estimate of p,, that is, /}Q is the value of ft computed from the sample at hand,
and define ZQ as ZQ = (fio — W))/<J/i. The rules of rejection and non-rejection
of the usual types of hypothesis tests are then as follows1:
1 (Two-sided HI) Reject HQ : /j, = p,Q in favor of H\ : fj, ^ p,Q if and only if:
Note that (17.11) is equivalent to:
Note also that the size of such a test is a since, under the null hypothesis,
we have that
2 (Lower-bounded HI) Reject HQ : H < HQ in favor of HI : p > fj,o if and
only if:
Again, (17.14) is equivalent to
3 (Upper-bounded HI) Reject HQ : \i > JJLQ in favor of H\ : fj, < p,o if and
only if:
which is equivalent to
'DAD: DistributionjConfidence Interval.
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17.3 p-values and confidence intervals
Table 17.1 sums up the confidence intervals and p-values for each of the
three usual types of hypothesis tests considered above.
The p-value of an hypothesis test is the smallest significance level for which
HQ would be rejected in favor of some HI. Roughly speaking, a p-value thus
indicates the maximum probability that an error is made when one rejects a
null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis. It therefore gives us the
"risk" that there is of rejecting a null hypothesis. The larger the p-value, the
more imprudent it is to reject HQ in favor of HI.
A p-value is typically compared to some subjective error probability thresh-
olds such as 1%, 5% or 10%. If the p-value exceeds these thresholds, we do
not reject the null hypothesis; if the p-value lies beneath the threshold, we
reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis.
A confidence interval (or, more generally, a confidence set) 0(1 — a) is a
range of values that is constructed using the sample data and that has a spec-
ified probability (1 — a) of containing the true parameter of interest fj.. The
probability value 1 — a associated with a confidence interval is known as the
confidence level. More formally, let T be the "parameter space" of p,, that is,
the range of all of the possible values that /j. could possibly take. A confidence
interval 0(1 — a) is then an estimate of fj, in the sense that there should be a
high probability 1 — a that fj, is in that interval 0(1 — a).
More precisely, a confidence level (1 - a) is the probability that (i, is in
•0(1-a):
Typical confidence levels are 0.9,0.95 and 0.99. Note that 0 (1—a) is a random
variable since it depends on the particular sample drawn from the population.
Roughly speaking, a 1 — a confidence level is then the proportion of the times
that a confidence interval 0(1 — a) will include the unknown parameter when
independent samples are taken repeatedly from the same population, and that
a 1 — a confidence interval is calculated for each sample. As for hypothesis
tests, confidence intervals can be two sided, lower bounded or upper bounded.
The width of a confidence interval thus gives us some idea about how un-
certain we are about the true unknown parameter. In fact, building confidence
intervals provides more information than carrying out simple hypothesis tests
of the types described above. This is because confidence intervals provide a
range of plausible values for the unknown parameter. Looking at Table 17.1,
it can also be seen that there is a nice symmetry between the results of hy-
pothesis tests and the confidence intervals that correspond to those tests. In-
deed, the confidence intervals of Table 17.1 include all of the hypothesized HO
values that cannot be rejected in favor of the corresponding two-sided, lower-
bounded or upper-bounded HI hypotheses. Said differently, choosing any p®
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value inside of these confidence intervals will not lead to the rejection of HQ,
but choosing any value of /J.Q outside of these intervals will lead to the rejection
of HO in favor of Hi2.
Table 17.1: Confidence intervals and p values associated to the usual hypothe-
sis tests
Case Confidence interval p-value H\ is:
1 [Ao - <5>z(l - a/2), Ao - <5>z(a/2)] 2[1 - F(|zo|)) two-sided
2 [/io — #AZ(1 ~a)i+°°] 1 — f (20) lower-bounded
3 [—00, [to — dfiz(a)\ F(za) upper-bounded
17.4 Statistical inference using a non-pivotal
bootstrap
The technique of the bootstrap (BTS), inspired in large part by Efron (1979),
is being applied with increasing frequency in the applied economics litera-
ture. BTS is a method for estimating the sampling distribution of an estimator
which proceeds by re-sampling repetitively one's initial data. For each sim-
ulated sample, one recalculates the value of this estimator and then uses the
generated BTS distribution to carry out statistical inference. In finite sam-
ples, neither the asymptotic nor the BTS sampling distribution is necessarily
superior to the other. In infinite samples, they are usually equivalent. When
combined together, they usually outperform either approach used individually.
The following steps summarize a typical BTS procedure:
- Draw n observations with replacement from the initial sample by taking
into account the precise way in which the original sample was drawn (repli-
cating, for instance, as closely as possible the survey design);
- Repeat the previous step B — 1 independent times;
- Assess the sampling distribution of the estimator (for instance, its sampling
variance) using the distribution of B simulated values.
Let the vector V be made of B estimates of ft, each one computed from
one of B simulated (or bootstrap) samples. The vector V is the main tool for
capturing the sampling distribution of the estimator /}. Thus, we have:
2DAD: Distribution|Confidence Interval.
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where fa is the estimate of /} computed from the ith bootstrap sample. For
two-sided tests and confidence intervals with significance level a or confidence
level I — a, the number of simulations should be chosen so that a(B + l)/2 is
an integer (to facilitate the computation of critical test values). Let p,* (p) be the
p-quantile of the vector V: we then have thatp = B~l 5^i=i I (fa — A*(p))-
The rules of rejection and non-rejection are then:
1 Reject HQ : /j, = no in favor of HI : /j, / /^> if and only if:
2 Reject HQ : /i < p,Q in favor of H\ : // > no if and only if:
3 Reject Hg : p, > /J.Q in favor of ITi : ^ < /IQ if and only if:
Table 17.2 summarizes the confidence intervals and p-values for each of the
three usual types of hypothesis tests, using non-pivotal bootstrap statistics.
The interpretation and the use of these statistics are analogous to what we saw
in Section 17.3.
17.5 Hypothesis testing and confidence intervals
using pivotal bootstrap statistics
Let JZ and a^. be respectively the average of the fii in V and the estimate
of the asymptotic standard deviation of jj, computed from the ith bootstrap
sample. Let ti be the following asymptotically pivotal statistics:
ti is asymptotically pivotal since it follows asymptotically a standardized N(0, 1)
normal distribution which is free of nuisance parameters, i.e., parameters that
are unknown.
Let the vector V then be defined as:
and let t*(p) be the p-quantile of the vector V. The rules of rejection and
non-rejection of the usual null hypotheses are then as follows:
Table 17.2: Confidence intervals and p values for the usual hypothesis tests, using non-pivotal bootstrap statistics 
Case
1
2
3
Confidence interval p-value fl"i is:
 two-sided
lower-bounded
upper-bounded
Table 17.3: Confidence intervals and p values for the usual hypothesis tests, using pivotal bootstrap statistics
Case
1
2
3
Confidence interval p-va/«e ffiis:
 two-sided
lower-bounded
upper-bounded
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1 Reject HQ : p, = HQ in favor of Hi : jj, ^ p,Q if and only if3:
2 Reject HQ : p. < fj-o in favor of H i : /j, > HQ if and only if:
3 Reject HQ : p, > p,Q m favor of .Hi : yu < JJ.Q if and only if:
Table 17.3 summarizes the confidence intervals and p-values associated to
each of the three usual types of hypothesis tests, using pivotal bootstrap statis-
tics. Again, these statistics can be interpreted and used basically as above in
Section 17.3.
17.6 References
Much of the statistical inference literature for distributive analysis has fo-
cused on deriving the sampling distribution of inequality and poverty indices.
See Cowell (1999) and Davies, Green, and Paarsch (1998) for overall reviews,
as well as Aaberge (2001b) for cross-country evidence of the role of sampling
variability, Barrett and Pendakur (1995) for generalized Gini indices, Beach,
Chow, Formby, and Slotsve (1994) for decile means, Bishop, Chakraborti,
and Thistle (1990) for Sen's welfare index, Bishop, Chakraborti, and This-
tle (1991a) for Gini-based relative deprivation indices, Bishop, Chow, and
Zheng (1995b) for decomposable poverty indices, Bishop, Formby, and Zheng
(1997) for Sen's poverty index, Bishop, Formby, and Zheng (1998) for Gini-
based progressivity indices, Chotikapanich and Griffiths (2001) for approxi-
mating S-Gini indices using grouped data, Davidson and Duclos (2000) for var-
ious classes of poverty indices with deterministic and estimated poverty lines,
Duclos (1997a) for linear progressivity and vertical equity indices, Kakwani
(1993) for additive poverty indices, Ogwang (2000) for the Gini index, Pre
ston (1995) for poverty indices with estimated poverty lines, Rongve (1997)
for poverty indices with known poverty lines, Rongve and Beach (1997) for
the use of approximations to inequality indices, Thistle (1990) for two classes
of inequality indices, Van de gaer, Funnell, and McCarthy (1999) and Zheng
and Gushing (2001) for comparing inequality across statistically dependent in-
comes, Xu (1998) for the P(z; p = 2) poverty index, and Zheng (2001b) for
poverty indices with estimated poverty lines.
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The second major area of statistical inference research in distributive analy-
sis has dealt with the sampling distribution of tools for stochastic dominance.
This includes Anderson (1996) for integrals of distribution functions, Bahadur
(1966) for quantiles, Beach and Davidson (1983) for the Lorenz curve, Bishop,
Chakraborti, and Thistle (1989) for Generalized Lorenz curves, Bishop and
Formby (1999) for a review, Dardanoni and Forcina (1999) for different infer-
ence approaches to ordering Lorenz curves, Davidson and Duclos (1997) for
Lorenz and concentration curves, Davidson and Duclos (2000) for primal and
dual dominance curves, Klavus (2001) for an application to health care financ-
ing in Finland, Maasoumi and Heshmati (2000) for an application to Swedish
distributions, Xu (1997) for Generalized Lorenz curves, Xu and Osberg (1998)
for "deprivation curves", Zheng, Formby, Smith, and Chow (2000) for mean-
normalized dominance curves, and Bishop, Chow, and Formby (1994b) and
Zheng (1999b) for marginal dominance analysis using Lorenz and quantile
curves.
Issues, methods and applications dealing with the multiple hypothesis tests
associated to inferring stochastic dominance orderings can be found inter alia
in Barrett and Donald (2003) for simulations of the distribution of statistics
needed for complete sets of hypothesis tests, Beach and Richmond (1985) for
the joint sampling distribution of some of these statistics, Bishop, Formby, and
Thistle (1992) and Bishop, Chakraborti, and Thistle (1994a) for applications
of the union-intersection approach, Kaur, Prakasa Rao, and Singh (1994) for
testing second-order dominance, Kodde and Palm (1986) for Wald criteria for
the joint testing of equality and inequality hypotheses, and Wolak (1989) for
testing multivariate inequality constraints.
For general references to the bootstrap, see Efron and Tibshirani (1993)
and MacKinnon (2002). Specific applications of the bootstrap and other re-
sampling simulation methods to distributive analysis can be found inter alia in
Biewen (2000) (for inequality indices), Biewen (2002a) (for a demonstration
of the consistency of bootstrapping inequality, poverty and mobility indices),
Mills and Zandvakili (1997) (for inequality indices), Palmitesta, Provasi, and
Spera (2000) (for the Gini family of inequality indices), Xu (2000) (for iterated
bootstrapping of the S-Gini indices), and Karagiannis and Kovacevic' (2000)
and Yitzhaki (1991) for jackknife calculations of the variance of the Gini.
For the use of the "influence function" in protecting against the possible
presence of contaminated data, see Cowell and Victoria Feser (1996b) (for
inequality indices), Cowell and Victoria Feser (1996a) (for poverty indices),
and Cowell and Victoria Feser (2002) (for social welfare rankings).
Other statistically relevant works can be found (among others) in Elbers,
Lanjouw, and Lanjouw (2003) and Hentschel, Lanjouw, Lanjouw, and Pog-
giet (2000) for "poverty mapping" (the estimation of small-area statistics on
poverty and inequality using various data sources); Breunig (2001) for a bias
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correction to the estimation of the coefficient of variation; and Lerman and
Yitzhaki (1989) for the impact of using aggregated data in the estimation of
inequality indices and in making social welfare rankings.
To generate estimation and statistical inference results using DAD, the an-
alyst does not need to specify the functional forms of the distribution of the
population of interest. Said differently, to estimate, for instance, poverty and
equity indices, or to generate the standard errors of such indices, we do not
need to tell DAD that the incomes we are studying are distributed according
to a normal, a Pareto, or a beta distribution, for instance. In that sense, all of
DAD's results are "distribution free".
In some circumstances, it may however be useful to do distributive analysis
conditional on some distributional assumption. Examples of such analysis can
be found in Chotikapanich and Griffiths (2002) (estimation of Lorenz curves),
Cowell, Ferreira, and Litchfield (1998) (density estimation in Brazil), Cheong
(2002) (estimation of US Lorenz curves), Horrace, Schmidt, and Witte (1995)
(sampling variability of order statistics using parametric and non-parametric
approaches), Ogwang and Rao (2000) (parametric models of Lorenz curves),
Ryu and Slottje (1999) (parametric approximations of Lorenz curves), Sarabia,
Castillo, and Slottje (1999) and Sarabia, Castillo, and Slottje (2001) (general
methods for building parametric models of Lorenz curves), and Schluter and
Trede (2002b) (parametric estimation of tails of Lorenz curves).
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Chapter 18
EXERCISES
18.1 Household size and living standards
18.1.1
Using the file AGGR-7 [p.319], compute the poverty headcount by using the
variable EXPCAP and a poverty line of 373 FCFA.
18.1.2
Then, find the poverty line which you must use with the variable TTEXP to
obtain the same estimate of poverty as that obtained in question 18.1.1.
18.1.3
Using for the variable EXPCAP the poverty line used in question 18.1.1, and
for the variable TTEXP the poverty line found in question 18.1.2, decompose
poverty across household size GSIZE using EXPCAP and TTEXP. Discuss.
18.1.4
Using again the same file AGGR-7 [p.319], decompose poverty across the sex
of the household head SEX by using EXPCAP and TTEXP and their associated
poverty line used in questions 18.1.1 and 18.1.2. Discuss.
18.2 Aggregative weights and poverty analysis
18.2.1
Using the file AGGR-7 [p.319], compute total poverty in Cameroon without
using the SIZE variable and by using it. Discuss.
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18.2.2
Using the file AGGR-7 [p.319], decompose total poverty in Cameroon accord-
ing to the categories captured by GSIZE without using the SIZE variable and
by using it. Discuss.
18.2.3
Using the file DECB-8 [p.319], decompose total poverty in Cameroon accord-
ing to the categories captured REGION without using the SIZE variable and
by using it. Discuss.
18.3 Absolute and relative poverty
18.3.1
Using the file DECB-8 [p.319], compute the average ol'EXPEQ for the whole
of Cameroon and for each of the two regions of REGION.
18.3.2
Then, compute half of these averages for the whole of Cameroon and for each
of its two regions in REGION. (These statistics are subsequently used as rela-
tive poverty thresholds in 18.3.3.)
18.3.3
Finally, compute the poverty headcount for the whole of Cameroon and for
each of its two regions using as poverty lines:
a- a national absolute threshold of 373 FCFA;
b- the national relative threshold;
c- the relative thresholds for each of the two regions.
Check whether using an estimate of the national relative threshold (as opposed
to a known or deterministic national relative threshold) has an impact on the
standard error of the national headcount.
18.4 Estimating poverty lines
18.4.1
Computing a food poverty line with a "FEl-inspired" method. With LINE-6
[p.319], draw a non-parametric regression of FDEQ on CALEQ for an interval
of CALEQ of 0 to 4000 calories. Find the level of food expenditures that is
expected to yield an intake of 2400 calories per day.
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18.4.2
Computing a CBN poverty line. With LINE-6 [p.319], draw a non-parametric
regression of EXPEQ on FDEQ for an interval of FDEQ which includes the
food poverty line estimated in 18.4.1. Find the level of total expenditures ex-
pected at a level of food expenditures equal to the food poverty line estimated
in 18.4.1.
18.4.3
Using the results of 18.4.1 and 18.4.2, compute the share of food expenditures
in the total expenditures of those whose level of food expenditures equals the
food poverty line. By dividing the food poverty threshold by this share, esti-
mate a global poverty line.
18.4.4
A second method of estimation of the share of food expenditures in total expen-
ditures. With LINE-6, draw a non-parametric regression of FDEQ on EXPEQ
for an interval of EXPEQ of 0 to 500 FCFA. Find the level of food expendi-
tures expected at a level of total expenditures equal to the food poverty line
estimated in 18.4.1.
18.4.5
Using the results of 18.4.4, compute the share of food expenditures in the total
expenditures of those whose level of total expenditures equals the food poverty
line estimated in 18.4.1. By dividing the food poverty line by this share, esti-
mate a second global poverty line.
18.4.6
A third method for the estimation of the non-food poverty line. With LINE-
6, draw a non-parametric regression of EXPEQ on FDEQ for an interval of
FDEQ which includes the food poverty line estimated in 18.4.1. Find the level
of total expenditures expected at a level of food expenditures equal to the food
poverty line estimated in 18.4.1.
18.4.7
Using the results of 18.4.6, compute the expected non-food expenditures of
those whose level of total expenditures equals the food poverty line estimated
in 18.4.1. By adding these expected non-food expenditures to the food poverty
line, estimate a third global poverty line.
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18.4.8
Computation of a global poverty line according to the FBI method. With
LINE-6 [p.319], draw a non-parametric regression of EXPEQ on CALEQ for
an interval ranging from 0 to 4000 calories for CALEQ. Estimate the global
poverty line that corresponds to 2400 calories per day.
18.5 Descriptive data analysis
18.5.1
Density functions. With DECB-8 [p.319], estimate the density of LEXPEQ for
the whole country and for each region (by using REGION).
18.6 Decomposing poverty
18.6.1
With AGGR-7 [p.319], decompose poverty across SEX. Then check the cal-
culations of the absolute and relative decompositions provided by DAD by
separately calculating the poverty indices for each group in SEX. Reconstruct
manually the decomposition to verify that DAD gives the correct decomposi-
tion results.
18.6.2
Using DECA-7 [p.319], decompose total poverty according to the socio-economic
categories AGE and EDUC.
18.6.3
Using DECB-8 [p.319], decompose total poverty according to the socio-economic
categories SECT, TYPE and OCCUR
18.7 Poverty dominance
18.7.1
Using DECA-7 [p.319], plot the first-order dominance curves separately for
those who have a primary level and a superior level of education (see variable
EDUC) and for poverty lines varying between 0 and 1000 FCFA. What do
these curves show?
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18.7.2
Using DECA-7 [p.319], plot the first-order dominance curves separately for
the female-headed and for the male-headed households, for poverty lines vary-
ing between 0 and 300 FCFA. What do these curves indicate? Find the relevant
"critical thresholds" and comment.
18.7.3
Repeat 18.7.1 and 18.7.2 for second- and third-order dominance.
18.7.4
Compute the FGT poverty index for a = 0 and for poverty lines equal to 150,
250 and 300 FCFA, separately for the female- and male-headed households.
18.7.5
Repeat 18.7.4 for second- and third-order dominance.
18.7.6
Using DECB-8 [p.319], draw poverty gap curves separately for the two groups
identified by the variable REGION.
18.7.7
Using DECA-7 [p.319], draw poverty gap curves separately for the female-
headed and the male-headed households.
18.7.8
Using DECB-8 [p.319], draw CPG curves separately for the two groups iden-
tified by the variable REGION.
18.7.9
Using DECA-7 [p.319], draw CPG curves separately for the female-headed
and the male-headed households.
18.8 Fiscal incidence, growth, equity and poverty
18.8.1
Use the file "CAN4"[p.321] to predict the level of taxes paid and benefits
received by individuals at different gross incomes X. For this, use the window
"non-parametric regression ", and choose alternatively for the x axis the "level"
or the "percentile" of gross incomes. What do these regressions indicate?
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18.8.2
Use the file "CAN6"[p.321] to draw the Lorenz Curve for gross income (X)
and net income (N) in 1990 Canada.
a- What does the difference between the two Lorenz curves indicate?
b- Then, draw a concentration curve for each of the three transfers Bl, B2
et B3 and the tax T. What can you say about the TR- progressivity and the
"equity" of the distribution of the tax and benefits?
c- Would a proportional increase in the benefit B1 combined with a propor-
tional decrease in B3 of the same absolute magnitude be good for inequal-
ity, poverty and social welfare?
d- Would a proportional increase in the benefit B2 financed by a balanced-
budget proportional increase in the tax T be good for inequality, poverty
and social welfare?
18.8.3
Use the same file "CAN6"[p.321] to check the IR- progressivity of each of
the three benefits and the tax T. For this, you can draw concentration curves
for X combined separately with each of the three transfers B1, B2 and B3 and
the tax T. What can you say about the IR- progressivity and the "equity" of
the distribution of the tax and benefits? How does it compare with the TR-
progressivity results?
18.8.4
Using the file "CAN4"[p.321], compute the concentration indices of each of B
and T, and compare them to the Gini index of gross income X. Then, compute
an estimate of TR- progressivity of the tax and benefit system in Canada.
18.8.5
Compare the Lorenz curve for N with the concentration curve for N (using X
as the ranking variable). What does this tell you?
18.8.6
Express the total redistribution exerted by the Canadian tax and transfer sys-
tem as vertical equity minus horizontal inequity ( reranking), using Gini and
concentration indices.
18.8.7
Draw the conditional standard deviation of benefits B and taxes T at various
values of gross income X.
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18.8.8
Draw the conditional standard deviation of net income N at various values of
gross income X. What does this indicate?
18.8.9
Draw the share of total taxes T paid by those at different levels of gross income
X, and at different ranks of X. Compute this as the ratio of expected taxes over
mean gross income f i x - Do the same for total benefits B. Compare this to the
share of total gross income, computed as X over nx- What does this say?
18.8.10
Compute the average tax rate paid by individuals at different levels of gross
income X and at different ranks of X. Estimate this as the expected tax paid at
X over X. What does this say about tax progressivity in Canada?
Use the file PERHE-12 [p.322]for exercises 18,8.11 to 18.8,17.
18.8.11
Compare the Lorenz curve of per capita total expenditures (EXPCAP), using
SIZE, and of total expenditures (TTEXP). Which type of expenditures is more
equally distributed? Why?
a- To understand better why, add to the graph a concentration curve of to-
tal expenditures, using per capita expenditures as the ranking variable, and
WHHLD to count observations; this will indicate the concentration of total
expenditures among the poorest households, ranked by per capita expendi-
tures.
b- To complete your understanding, add a concentration curve for household
size, using WHHLD as the aggregating weight and EXPACP as the rank-
ing variable; this will indicate the concentration of individuals among the
poorest households, as ranked by EXPCAP. Does this help you understand
the difference between the above two Lorenz curves?
18.8.12
Predict the proportion of individuals who visited a public health center and
a public hospital in a given month. For this, use the variables CENTRO and
HOSPIT, who indicate the proportion of individuals in a household who visited
these institutions. Make this prediction at different percentiles of the distribu-
tion of per capita total expenditures.
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18.8.13
Graph again the concentration curve of total expenditures (TTEXP) using
WHHLD and EXPCAP to rank individuals. Compare it to the concentration
curve among households (thus use WHHLD) of their use of health centers and
public hospitals, which is given respectively by NCENTRO and NHOSPIT,
and use EXPCAP to rank households. What does this suggest?
18.8.14
Add to the previous graph the concentration curve of individuals in house-
holds. What does this information add to your equity judgement?
18.8.15
Draw on a new graph the concentration curve of total expenditures (TTEXP)
using WHHLD and EXPCAP to rank households. Compare this to the concen-
tration curves for access to piped water (PUBWAT) and to sewerage (PUB-
SEW), using WHHLD as the aggregating weight to draw the curves and EX-
PCAP as the ranking variable. That is, find out the concentration of access to
piped water and sewerage among various proportions of poorest households,
and compare that to their share in total expenditures. What do you find?
18.8.16
Add to your previous graph the concentration curves for the number of indi-
viduals who have piped water (NPUBWAT) and who have sewerage (NPUB-
SEW), using household weighting and EXPCAP as the ranking variable. How
do you interpret the differences you obtain with the results of question 18.8.15 ?
18.8.17
Redo the previous analysis of the incidence of access to piped water (PUB-
WAT) and to sewerage (PUB SEW), but this time use individual weighting
(which is usually considered to be the best descriptive choice from a normative
or ethical perspective). Thus, draw the Lorenz curve of per capita total ex-
penditures (EXPCAP) using individual weighting, WIND. Compare this to the
concentration among individuals of the access to piped water (PUBWAT) and
to sewerage (PUBSEW), using WIND as the aggregating weight to draw the
curves and EXPCAP as the ranking variable. That is, find out the concentration
of access to piped water and sewerage among various proportions of poorest
individuals, and compare that to their share of the population and of the total
expenditures.
Use the file PERED-16 [p.322] for exercises 18.8.18 to 18.8.22.
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18.8.18
Make a new graph again of the concentration curve of total expenditures
(TTEXP) using WHHLD and EXPCAP to rank households. Compare it to
the concentration curve of the number of children at various levels of public
education, NPUBPRIM, NPUBSEC and NPUBUNIV using the same aggre-
gating weights. Is education enrolment equitably distributed according to this?
What happens to our understanding of the "picture" if we add the concentration
curve for the number of children NCHILD?
18.8.19
Now add the Lorenz curve of per capita total expenditures EXPCAP using
NCHILD as the size variable. Compare it to the concentration curve of the
enrolment of children at various levels of public education, which is given by
PUBPRIM, PUBSEC and PUBUNIV, using NCHILD and EXPCAP as the
ranking variable. Has your equity judgement evolved?
18.8.20
Redraw the Lorenz curve of per capita total expenditures, now using WCH0612
as the aggregating weight, and compare it to the concentration curve of PUB-
PRIM using the same aggregating weight.
18.8.21
Redraw the Lorenz curve of per capita total expenditures now using WCH1318
as the aggregating weight, and compare it to the concentration curve of PUB-
PSEC using the same aggregating weight.
18.8.22
Test the hypothesis that a small increase in secondary school fees combined
with a decrease in primary school fees of the same total magnitude would not
change the distribution of well-being in Peru.
Use the file SENESAM [p.323] to do exercises 18.8.23 to 18.8.26.
18.8.23
Using EXPEQ as ranking variable, predict the proportion of children between
7 and 12 at different levels of living standards who attend primary school.
Compare these results to those you obtain when you separate children into
boys and girls.
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18.8.24
Draw the conditional standard deviation of primary school attendance sepa-
rately for boys and girls at various values of EXPEQ. What does this indicate?
18.8.25
Draw the conditional standard deviation of primary school attendance sepa-
rately for each of the three STRATA, and this, at various values of EXPEQ.
Explain what you find.
18.8.26
Compare the Lorenz curve for EXPEQ with the concentration curve for EX-
PEQ (using TTEXP as the ranking variable). What does this suggest?
Use the file ESPMEN [p.325] to do exercises 18.8.27 to 18.8.53. When needed,
use EXPEQ as the variable of interest, the headcount as the poverty index, and
a poverty line of 60000 FCFA per adult equivalent.
18.8.27
Draw the concentration curves of FDEQ, NFDEQ, HEALTHEQ and SCHEX-
PEQ for the population of individuals (i.e., setting the size variable to SIZE)
and using EXPEQ as the ranking variable. How do these curves compare to
the Lorenz curve for EXPEQ?
18.8.28
Compare the Lorenz curves of EXPEQ and INCOMEQ. What do you find?
How do you explain this?
18.8.29
Compare the Lorenz curves of EXPEQ for each of the 3 values of DEPT.
18.8.30
Draw the CD curve (normalized by the mean of the variables but not by the
poverty lines) of FDEQ and NFDEQ for different poverty lines and for c=l.
What does it tell you?
18.8.31
Compute the Gini inequality index for TTEXP, EXPEQ and INCOMEQ. Do
this for values of p equal to 1, 2 and 3. Then, draw these indices for each of
these variables on a graph for p ranging from 1 to 5.
Exercises 313
18.8.32
Decompose inequality in EXPEQ as a sum of inequality in each of its four
components, FDEQ, NFDEQ, HEALTHEQ and SCHEXPEQ.
18.8.33
Draw the share of total SCHEXPEQ of those at different levels of EXPEQ, and
at different ranks of EXPEQ. Compute this as the ratio of expected SCHEX-
PEQ conditional on some value of EXPEQ over that value of EXPEQ. over Do
the same for HEALTHEQ. What do you find?
18.8.34
What would the impact on poverty be if we were to transfer 1000 FCFA (per
adult equivalent) to each individual in the population?
18.8.35
Where, among the different DEPT, would the impact of group- targeting an
equal amount to all be the greatest for the same overall budget spent by the
government? Does this result depend on the choice of the poverty line?
18.8.36
Where, among the different REGION, would the impact of group- targeting
an equal amount to all be the greatest for the same overall budget spent by the
government?
18.8.37
Assume that some form of government targeting can raise everyone's EXPEQ
by the same proportion in a particular area. Per FCFA of overall per capita
increase in EXPEQ, for which targeted DEPT would aggregate poverty reduc-
tion be the largest? Check this for the headcount and for the average poverty
gap indices.
18.8.38
Assume that some form of government targeting can raise everyone's EXPEQ
by the same proportion in a particular area. Per FCFA of overall per capita
increase in EXPEQ, for which targeted ZONE would aggregate poverty reduc-
tion be the largest?
18.8.39
Say that food prices are about to increase by about 5%, due to the removal of
food subsidies. In which group within DEPT will poverty increase the most?
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18.8.40
Using CD curves, check whether the ZONE for which the impact of an increase
in food prices will be the largest depends on the choice of the poverty line and
on the choice of poverty index (focus on first-order poverty indices).
18.8.41
The government wishes to determine whether increasing the price of
HEALTHEQ, for the benefit of a fall in the price of SCHEXPEQ, would be
good for poverty.
a- Compare the distributive cost/benefit of changing the price of each of
HEALTHEQ and SCHEXPEQ.
b- Check whether the reform is good for poverty for ratios of MCPF ranging
from 0.5 to 2.0.
18.8.42
Find the impact on poverty of those within ZONE=1 of a predicted increase of
3% in expenditures EXPEQ.
18.8.43
Find the impact on national poverty of a predicted increase of 3% in the ex-
penditures EXPEQ of those within ZONE=1. Compare your results to those
obtained for ZONE=2. Do this for FGT indices with o=0, 1 and 2.
18.8.44
Find the impact on national poverty of a predicted increase of 3% in every-
one's expenditures FDEQ. Compare your results to those for a 3% increase in
everyone's NFDEQ. Do this for the FGT indices with a=0, 1 and 2.
18.8.45
Per FCFA of growth in overall per capita EXPEQ, in which of ZONE=1 or
ZONE=2 is growth in expenditures EXPEQ conducive to greater poverty re-
duction?
18.8.46
Per FCFA of growth in overall per capita EXPEQ, which of growth in FDEQ
or in NFDEQ leads to greater poverty reduction? Graph this for a range of
poverty lines and for all poverty indices of the second-order (a=l, or s=2).
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18.8.47
What is the elasticity of poverty with respect to EXPEQ? Compute this for the
different DEPT.
18.8.48
The government wishes to determine whether increasing the price of
HEALTHEQ by 5%, for the benefit of a revenue-neutral fall in the price of
SCHEXPEQ, would be good for inequality reduction. Assume a ratio of
MCPF=1. Find out the impact on the Lorenz curve and on the Gini coeffi-
cient.
18.8.49
Say that food prices are about to increase by about 10%, due to the removal
of food subsidies. What is the predicted impact on the Gini index and on
L(p = 0.5)?
18.8.50
Find the impact on the Gini index of inequality of a predicted increase of 3%
in the expenditures EXPEQ.
18.8.51
Find the impact on the Gini index and on L(p = 0.5) of a predicted increase
of 3% in everyone's expenditures FDEQ. Compare your results to those for a
similar 3% increase in NFDEQ.
18.8.52
The government wishes to determine whether increasing the price of NFDEQ,
for the benefit of a fall in the price of FDEQ, would be good for poverty.
i Assess this for a ratio of the MCPF of NFDEQ over that of FDEQ equal
to 1, for a range of poverty lines and for all distribution-sensitive poverty
indices (second-order, o=l or s=2).
ii Up to which ratio of MCPF can we go and still declare the reform to be
good for poverty?
iii Are these conclusions also valid for the goal of inequality reduction?
Use the file ESPSANT [p.326] to do exercises 18.8.53 to 18.8.54.. When
needed, use the headcount as a poverty index and set the poverty line to 60000
FCFA per adult equivalent.
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18.8.53
Using EXPEQ as the ranking variable, predict the proportion of individuals at
different levels of living standards whose households make use of public health
services. Do this separately for the different values of SEX.
18.8.54
Compute the proportion of EXPEQ that is spent on HEALTHEQ by individu-
als at different levels and ranks of EXPEQ. What does this suggest?
Use the file SCOL [p.326] to do exercises 18.8.55 to 18.8.57. When needed,
use the headcount as the poverty index and set the poverty line to 60000 FCFA
per adult equivalent.
18.8.55
Predict the proportion of children below 14 at different values of EXPEQ that
attend primary school. Compare the results you obtain across the different
values of ZONE. How do these results compare with those for attending sec-
ondary school?
18.8.56
Compare the concentration curve (among children below 14) of attendance
at primary school, secondary school, public primary school and public sec-
ondary school, using EXPEQ as the ranking variable. Draw this for various
proportions of the poorest children. Compare this concentration curve with
the Lorenz curve for EXPEQ. Discuss your results.
18.8.57
Draw the concentration curves of UNI and SUP. Compare this to the Lorenz
curve for EXPEQ for the same population.
18.9 Sampling designs and sampling distributions
18.9.1
Load the file Burkina_94 [p.327] and initialize its sampling design (SD). Do
this first only by specifying the variable WEIGHT as sampling weight.
a- Compute the mean of total expenditure per adult equivalent (EXEPQ) with
the size variable equal to SIZE. Why does STD1 differ from STD2? What
is a sufficient condition so that both standard deviations be equal?
b- Now use both variables WEIGHT and STRATA to reinitialize the SD of
this file. Compute, again, the mean of total expenditure per adult equivalent
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when the size variable is SIZE, and compare with the STD's of question a.
What can be said about the impact of stratification on STD1?
c- Now use variables WEIGHT, STRATA and PSU to reinitialize the SD of
this file. Compute, again, the mean of total expenditure per adult equivalent
when the size variable is SIZE, and compare with the STD's of questions a
and b. What can you say about the impact of PSU's on STD1?
d- By using the GSE variable to specify the socio-professional group, compute
the mean of total expenditure per adult equivalent when the size variable is
SIZE and for groups 1,2, and 6. How does the sampling variability differ
across these estimates?
18.10 Equivalence scales and statistical units
18.10.1
Load the file SenegaL95 [p.323] and compute the mean of total expenditure per
adult equivalent (EXEPQ) after initializing the sampling design with variables
STRATA, PSU and WEIGHT.
18.10.2
Well-being, in a household, can be represented alternatively by:
a- Total expenditure of household "EXP"
b- Total expenditure per capita "EXPCAP"
c- Total expenditure per adult equivalent "EXPEQ"
Using the variable SIZE to set the size variable, compute the headcount and
the average poverty gap indices when the poverty line equals 140000 FCFA
and when the variable of interest is alternatively EXPEQ, EXPCAP and EXP.
Explain why the results differ.
18.10.3
When sample observations represent households, three size variables are typi-
cally used in combination with the variable of interest EXPEQ:
a- 1 for all households
b- The number of persons in the household (SIZE)
c- The number of adult equivalents in the household (EQUI)
Compute the FGT index for a = 0,1 for every one of these three alternative
definitions of the size variable and explain the difference.
318 POVERTY AND EQUITY
18.10.4
Compute the Gini and Atkinson (with e = 0.5) indices of inequality for:
a- Total expenditure when the size variable equals 1 for all households.
b- Expenditure per capita when the size variable equals SIZE,
c- Expenditure per equivalent adult when the size variable equals SIZE,
d- Expenditure per equivalent adult when the size variable equals 1.
Comment on the differences between these results.
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18.11 Description of illustrative data sets
18.11.1 CAMEROON_96, LINE-6, AGGR-7,
DECA-7, and DECB-8
The files LINE-6, AGGR-7, DECA-7, and DECB-8 are made of a sub-sample
of 1000 observations drawn from a survey (the Enquete Camerounaise aupres
des menages or ECAM) on the expenditures and the incomes of households
in 1996 Cameroon. The file CAMEROON.96 is made of approximately 1700
households from the same survey. The ECAM is a nationally representative
survey, with sample selection using two-stage stratified random sampling. The
first stage consists in the selection of 150 PSUs ("tlot") within each of the six
strata, and the second stage consists in the selection of households within each
PSU.
Table 18.1: The distribution of households in ECAM (1996)
Households
PSU (tlot)
Yaounde
336
42
Douala
384
48
Cities0' Rural (3 strata)
360
30
630
30
Total
1710
ISO
"Cities <50000 inhabitants.
In Yaounde and Douala, PSU's are systematically selected with equal prob-
abilities. The number of PSU's drawn by stratum is proportional to the num-
ber of urban households found in 1987 in that stratum. In a second stage, 8
households are drawn in every PSU (with equal probabilities), using a list of
households established during an enumeration of that PSU.
For the other cities, at the first stage, one city is selected for every one of the
ten provinces. Enumeration zones are then drawn with probability proportional
to the number of households originally listed in 1987. Households are then
drawn as above.
In every one of the three rural strata, two PSU's were selected within the
semi-urban area and 8 in the rural area. PSU's were again drawn with prob-
ability proportional to the number of households enumerated in 1987. Within
each selected PSU, 21 households were systematically selected from a house-
hold list.
Variables for CAMEROON-96
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STRATA: Stratum of the household
1 Yaounde
2 Douala
3 Cities
4 Rural: Forest
5 Rural: Hauts-Plateaux
6 Rural: Savana
PSU: PSU of the household
WEIGHT: Sampling weight
SIZE: Household size
NADULT: Number of adults
NCHILD: Number of children
EXPEQ: Total expenditures per adult equivalent per day
F_EXP: Food expenditures per adult equivalent per day
NF_EXP: Non food expenditures per adult equivalent per day
INS_LEV: Education level of the head of the household
1 Primary
2 Professional Training
3 Secondary 1st cycle
4 Secondary 2nd cycle
5 Superior
6 Not responding
Variables for LINE-6, AGGR-7, DECA-7, and DECB-8
TTEXP: total expenditures of the household (all monetary data are in Francs CFA
per day)
EXPEQ: total expenditures of the household, per adult equivalent
EXPCAP: total expenditures of the household, per capita
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FDEQ: food expenditures of the household, per adult equivalent
NFDEQ: non- food expenditures of the household, per adult equivalent
WHHLD: sampling weight of the household
SIZE: household size
CALEQ: calories of household, per adult equivalent.
SEXE: sex of household head (man, woman, not reported)
REGION: region (urban, rural)
AGE: age of household head (less than 35 years; 35-50 years; more than 50 years)
EDUC: Education level of household head (primary; vocational training; secondary
first cycle; secondary second cycle; superior; other)
TYPE: household type (one adult; single parent; nuclear; wider nuclear household)
OCCUP: usual occupation of household head (independent with employees; inde-
pendent without employees; unqualified employee; manager or qualified
employee; traders; others)
SECT: sector of occupation (formal, informal, other)
GSIZE: indicator of household size (1 person; 2 persons; 3-4 persons; 5-7 persons;
8 or more)
18.11.2 CAN4 and CAN6
CAN4 and CAN6 contain illustrative data made of a small sub-sample of ob-
servations drawn from the Canadian surveys of Consumer Finance. They
contain the following variables:
Variables for CAN4 and CAN6
X: Yearly gross income per adult equivalent.
T: Income taxes per adult equivalent.
Bl: Transfer 1 per adult equivalent.
B2: Transfer 2 per adult equivalent.
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B3: Transfer 3 per adult equivalent.
B: Sum of transfers B1,B2 and B3
N: Yearly net income per adult equivalent (X minus T plus B)
18.11.3 PERHE-12 and PERED-16
PERHE-12 and PERED-16 contain an illustrative sample of some 3600 house-
hold observations drawn from the 1994 Peru LSMS survey.
Variables for PERHE-12
TTEXP: total expenditures of household (constant June 1994 soles per year).
EXPCAP: total expenditures, per capita (constant June 1994 soles per year).
WHHLD: household aggregation weight.
SIZE: household size.
CENTRO: proportion of individuals in the household who used a public health center
in last month.
HOSPIT: proportion of individuals in the household who used a public hospital in
last month
PUB WAT: household has piped water.
PUBSEW: household has sewerage
NCENTRO: number of individuals in the household who used a public health center in
last month
NHOSPIT: number of individuals in the household who used a public hospital in last
month
NPUBWAT: number of individuals in household who have access to piped water
NPUBSEW: number of individuals in household who have access to sewerage
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Variables for PERHE-16
EXPCAP: total expenditures, per capita (constant June 1994 soles per year).
WHHLD: household aggregation weight.
WIND: individual aggregation weight.
WCHILD: child aggregation weight.
WCH0612: aggregation weight for children between 6 and 12.
WCH1318: aggregation weight for children between 13 and 18.
NCHILD: number of children in household (18 and below)
NCHILD0612: number of children between 6 and 12.
NCHILD1318: number of children between 13 and 18.
NPUBPRIM: number of household members in public primary school
NPUBSEC: number of household members in public secondary school
NPUBUNIV: number of household members in public post-secondary school
PUBPRIM: number of household members in public primary school as a proportion of
NCHILD
PUBSEC: number of household members in public secondary school as a proportion
of NCHILD
SIZE: household size.
TTEXP: total expenditures of household (constant June 1994 soles per year).
18.11.4 SENEGAL_95 and SENESAM
SENEGAL.95 is drawn from a nationally representative survey carried out
in 1995 Senegal (the EnquSte stn6galaise aupres des manages), with sam-
ple selection using a multi-stage stratified random sampling procedure. The
country was first split in five strata. The first sampling stage consisted in the
selection of PSU's (enumeration areas, or Secteurs d'Enumeration (SE)) from
a 1990 "Master Sample" list with probability proportional to the number of
households in the PSU's. 396 SE were thus selected in the urban area and
204 in the rural area. Census districts were then selected within each SE. In a
final stage, 15 households were systematically selected within each of the ur-
ban census districts, and similarly 24 households were systematically selected
within each of the rural census districts.
Table 18.2: The distribution of households in ESAM (1995)
STRATA Households SE Census Districts # of households
in census in Master Sample
URBAN
+ DAKAR
Socio -economic level
- High
- Medium
-Low
+ Other urban areas
RURAL
333343
187799
69065
52768
59946
145544
450276
396
218
82
63
73
178
204
in ESAM
132
74
28
22
24
58
55
in ESAM
1980
1110
420
330
360
870
1320
STRATA: Stratum of the household
1 Dakar
(a) High socio-economic level
(b) Medium socioeconomic level
(c) Low socio-economic level.
2 Other cities
3 Rural area
PSU: PSU of the household
WEIGHT: Household sampling weight
SIZE: Household size
EQUI: Number of adult equivalents in the household
EXP: Total household expenditures
EXPEQ: Total expenditures per adult equivalent
EXPCAP: Total expenditures per capita
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Variables for SENEGAL.95
TOTAL 783319 600 187 3300
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INS_LEV: Education level of the head of the household
Variables for SENESAM
WEIGHT: aggregation weight.
STRATA: survey strata.
SIZE: household size.
WCH712: aggregation weight for children between 7 and 12.
WMCH712: aggregation weight for boys between 7 and 12.
WFCH712: aggregation weight for girls between 7 and 12.
TTEXP: total household expenditures
EQUI: number of adult equivalents in household
EXPEQ: total expenditures per adult equivalent
SCHEXP: household school expenditures
SCHEXPEQ: school expenditures per adult equivalent
PSCH712: proportion of children between 7 and 12 in school.
PMSCH712: proportion of boys between 7 and 12 in school.
PFSCH712: proportion of girls between 7 and 12 in school.
18.11.5 ESPMEN, ESPSANT and ESPSCOL
These files are drawn from illustrative subsamples of Senegal's ESP (Enquete
Senegalaise Prioritaire
Variables for ESPMEN
WEIGHT: aggregation weight.
STRATA: survey strata.
SIZE: household size.
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REGION: region.
DEPT: geographical department.
ZONE: geographical zone.
TTEXP: total household expenditures (include health and education)
EQUI: number of adult equivalents in household
EXPEQ: total expenditures per adult equivalent
FDEQ: food expenditures per adult equivalent
NFDEQQ: non-food expenditures per adult equivalent
INCOMEQ: income per adult equivalent
HEALTHEQ: health expenditures per adult equivalent.
SCHEXPEQ: education expenditures per adult equivalent.
AGE: age of household head
Variables for ESPSANT
WEIGHT: aggregation weight.
SIZE: household size.
DEPT: geographical department.
ZONE: geographical zone.
TTEXP: total household expenditures (include health and education)
EQUI: number of adult equivalents in household
EXPEQ: total expenditures per adult equivalent
HEALTHEQ: health expenditures per adult equivalent.
HEALTHUSE: household uses public health services.
SEX: sex of household head
Variables for ESPSCOL
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WEIGHT: aggregation weight.
SIZE: household size.
DEPT: geographical department.
ZONE: geographical zone.
EQUI: number of adult equivalents in household
EXPEQ: total expenditures per adult equivalent
NCHILD: number of children
PRIM: proportion of children below 14 going to primary school
SEC: proportion of children below 14 going to secondary school
UNI: proportion of household members attending university.
SUP: proportion of household members attending superior education.
SEX: sex of household head.
PUBPRIM: proportion of children below 14 going to public primary school
PUBSEC: proportion of children below 14 going to public secondary school
18.11.6 Burkina_94
Burkina_94 is drawn from a nationally representative survey (Enquete Pri-
oritaire) carried out in 1994 Burkina Faso with sample selection using two-
stage stratified random sampling. Seven strata were formed. Five of these
strata were rural and two were urban. Enumeration areas ( PSU's, or zones
de denombremeni) were sampled in a first stage from a list computed from
the 1985 census. This first-stage sampling within strata 7 (Ougadougou-Bobo-
Dioulasso) was made with equal probability and without replacement. First-
stage sampling within the other 6 strata was made with probability propor-
tional to the size (estimated from the 1985 census) of each PSU and without
replacement. 20 households were then systematically sampled within each of
the selected PSU's in a second stage.
Variables for BURKINA.94
WEIGHT: Sampling weight
328 POVERTY AND EQUITY
SIZE: Household size
STRATA: Stratum of the household
PSU: Enumeration area of the household
GSE: Social economic group of the household head
1 wage-earning (public sector)
2 wage-earning (private sector)
3 Artisan or trading
4 Others activities
5 Farmers (crop)
6 Farmers (food)
7 Inactive
SEXE: Sex of household head
1 Male
2 Female
EXP: Total household expenditures
EXPEQ: Total expenditures per adult equivalent
SMW: Size* Weight
MEAN_PSU: Mean expenditure (EXPEQ) in a PSU
MEAN_STR: Mean expenditure (EXPEQ) in a stratum
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1 - /: FPC factor, 282
A: hypothetical distribution, 52, 92,
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AD(z): absolute deprivation, 90
B: benefit, 136
B: hypothetical distribution, 52, 92,
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Bi\ level of gross benefit expended
on individual i, 226
B*: benefit offered to i, 226
C: number of goods, 209
C: number of income components,
97,212,218
CB (p) '• concentration curve of ben-
efit B at rank p, ordered in
terms of X, 189
Cp(e): cost of inequality subsequent
to a flat tax, 150
Cjv(e): cost of inequality in the dis-
tribution of net income, 150
CN(P)'- concentration curve for N at
rank p, ordered in terms of
X, 129
CN(P)'- concentration curve for N at
rank p, ordered in terms of
X), 187
CT(P)'- concentration curve for taxes
T at rankp, ordered in terms
of X, 128
Ci\ Shapley value of factor i, 71
C-jj: cost of inequality in the distri-
bution of locally p-expected
utilities of net incomes, 150
D"A(z): stochastic dominance curve
of order s at z and for distri-
bution A, 167, 176
E: equivalence scale, 31
E: household size, 31
F(y): distribution function, 52, 208
F(z): proportion of individuals un-
derneath the poverty line z,
39, 156, 167, 206
FN\X('): distribution function of N
conditional on X being equal
to x, 128
FX,N(-, •)'• joint distribution function
of gross and net incomes, 128
G(p): proportional change in the Gen-
eralized Lorenz curve, 193
G(p; z): Cumulative Poverty Gap, 89,
175, 192
GCXc(p)'' generalized concentration
curve for xc, 189,209
GL(p): Generalized Lorenz curve, 65,
183, 193
I: index of inequality corresponding
to the social welfare function
W, 61
1(2): standard Gini index, 55
I(p): S-Gini inequality index, 55-57,
131, 149
I ( p , e ) : Atkinson-Gini inequality in-
dex, 61
1(9): Generalized entropy inequality
index, 67
I(k\9): inequality within subgroup
k, 68
IGxi,,) (p) '• concentration index for X(c),
130, 220
IT(p): S-Gini indices of TR- pro-
gressivity, 144
IV(p): S-Gini indices of Ifi-progressivity
and vertical equity, 144
I[x]: indicator function, 226
I*(z; p.e): index of inequality in cen-
sored income, 89
/Ar(e): Atkinson inequality index for
TV, 64, 149
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SYMBOLS 377
J: number of taxes and benefits, 146
K: number of mutually exclusive pop-
ulation subgroups, 87
K(u): the multivariate Gaussian Ker-
nel, 265
LA(P}' Lorenz curve for A, 49, 50,
52, 129,131,187,219
M: permutation matrix, 160
M: the population number of last sam-
pling units (LSU), 285
MA' number of adults in household,
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Mhi' the population number of last
sampling units ( LSU), 284
N: net income, 127
N(p): p-quantile of net income, 148,
188
N(q\p): tj-quantile of conditional dis-
tribution of N, 128,147,148
Nh'. the population number of primary
sampling units ( PSU) in a
stratum h, 284
NJ\ observation j of N, 144
P(k; z; a): FGT poverty index of sub-
group k, 87, 200
P(z): poverty index, 165, 226
P(z; a): Foster-Greer-Thorbecke(FGT)
poverty index, 201
P(z;a = 1): average poverty gap,
169
P(z;e): Clark, Hemming and Ulph
poverty index, 82
P(z; p): S-Gini poverty index, 82
P(z\ p, e): Atkinson-Gini poverty in-
dex, 81
PC(z; e): Chakravarty poverty index,
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PW(z): Watts poverty index, 82
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Q(p): p-quantile, 40-42, 50, 52, 128,
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Q* (p; z): p-quantile censored at z, 42,
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QN(Q\P)'- <?-quantile function for net
incomes conditional on a p-
quantileof X, 128
R(q): per capita net commodity tax
revenues, 209
RD(z, p): relative deprivation in cen-
sored income, 90
5: set of players, 71
Shijk- me size of statistical unit hijk
in the population, 285
T: taxes net of transfers, 127
T(X): deterministic portion of tax T
at X, 127
Tyy. component j of total tax T, 146
U: utility function, 110
U(y; e): utility function of y with pa-
rameter e, 60, 61,63-65,148,
182
V(y,q,'&): indirect utility function,
23
V(y,q;'&): indirect utility function,
207
W: social welfare function, 60, 159,
182
W(e): Atkinson social welfare func-
tion, 63, 64, 149
W(p): S-Gini social welfare function,
65
W(p,e): Atkinson-Gini social wel-
fare function, 63
Wjj(e): Atkinson social welfare func-
tion with locally p-expected
net incomes, 148
Wjj(f): Atkinson social welfare func-
tion with locally p-expected
utilities of net incomes, 148
X: gross income, 127, 188, 212
X(p): p-quantile of gross income, 147,
188
Xj-. observation j o f X , 144
.X"(c): income component c of total in-
come X, 212, 218
X(c)'- type c of total expenditure X,
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Xhijk'- the value of the variable of in-
terest for statistical unit hijk,
285
Y: food budget, 109
Y: population total of the x's, 274
Y: the population total of interest, 285
AP(z): difference in poverty indices,
167
A/(j/): difference in the densities of
income, 167
r(z): average poverty gap, 173
fls: class ofs-order social welfare in-
dices, 182,211
IIs (z): class of s-order poverty in-
dices, 165, 191,211
0: set of possible taste parameters,
208
Ts(l): class of s-order inequality in-
dices, 184, 192
T: a parameter space, 293
S9(z): cost of inequality in poverty
gaps, 88
S3(z; a); cost of inequality in poverty
for FGT indices, 89
a: level of statistical significance, 292
a: parameter of inequality aversion
in measuring poverty, 88
a: vector of a/,, 290
a = s — 1: ethical parameter, 184
aiy-. population mean of y^, 290
®: subsets of a set S of players, 71
ris(z+): class of dual s-order poverty
indices, 174
e: parameter of relative inequality aver-
sion, 57
ij(k): equal amount to each member
of a group k, 200
rj: some positive value, 118,159,161,
162
7: efficiency cost of taxing j relative
to that of taxing I, 209
M: estimator of the population num-
ber of LSU, 285
N: estimator of population size N,
274
Y: estimator of Y, 274
Y: estimator of the population total
of interest, 285
a\: generic estimator, 290
ft: estimator of /i, 278
fto: sample estimate of ft, 292
9: generic estimator, 290
v(l — a): confidence interval, 293
VSRS- estimator of the sampling vari-
ance under simple random sam-
pling, 286
K(P): weight used in linear indices,
53
K(P; p): weight used in S-Gini indices,
53,56
\(k): proportional factor for group k,
203
A: Lagrange multiplier, 227
A: proportional factor, 56, 59, 62, 96,
217
A*: social opportunity cost of spend-
ing public funds, 227
Ac: proportional factor for component
c, 212, 218
y(fc): vector of incomes in group k,
70
CDc(z;a): consumption dominance
curve of a component c, 208
IC(p): S-Gini indices of concentra-
tion, 130
IR(p): S-Gini indices of redistribu-
tion, 144
LP(X): Liability Progression at X,
133
MV: marginal value of a player i to
a coalition ®, 71
NBi\ net benefit of state support i,
226
RP(X): Residual Progression at X,
133
RR(p): S-Gini indices of reranking,
144
SYMBOLS 379
TR: tax or transfer, 187
deff: design effect, 286
xO : reference level, 29
E[ti\: the expected number of times
unit i will appear in the sam-
ple, 274
/j-(k): mean income in group k, 204
n(k}\ mean income in subgroup fc, 68
/i*(z): mean of censored quantiles,
42
HP(z): average income of the poor,
216
fj,g(z): average poverty gap, 83, 156
Hf: average income under a welfare-
neutral flat tax, 150
f^T- mean tax, 188
Hx '• mean of variable X, 41, 49, 97,
132,188,192,213,220,278
v. stochastic tax determinant, 128
ut(p): weight on income used in lin-
ear indices, 60, 174,182
(jj(p\ p): weight on income used in S-
Gini indices, 55, 56
B: government support per capitabud-
_ get, 226
B(p): expected benefit at rank p, 189
D (Ifi): normalized stochastic domi-
nance curve, 186
N(p): expected net income of those
at rank p in the distribution
of gross incomes, 144
~P(z;a): normalizedFGT indices, 186,
_ 208
Q(p): income shares or normalized
quantiles, 192
Q(p) = Q(p)/lJ'' income shares or
normalized quantiles, 184
T(X)/X: expected net tax of those
with income X in the dis-
tribution of gross incomes,
_ 188
T(p}\ expected net tax rate of those
with X ( p ) in terms of gross
incomes, 134
U(p): expected utility at rankp, 148
X(c)(p)
: expected value of income
component c at rank p in the
distribution of total income
X, 97, 132, 212
0(fc): average population shares, 96
g(p; z): normalized poverty gap, 186
yh\ mean in stratum h, 285
S(p): expected relative deprivation at
rank p, 59
1(6): contribution of between subgroup
inequality to total inequality,
69
CDc(z\a): normalized CD curves,
210
<p(k): share of the population found
in subgroup k, 68, 87, 96
?r: poverty function, 226
7r(Q(p);z): contribution of Q(p) to
poverty index, 165
n(y; z): poverty function, 227
Tr^(Q(p); z): ith order derivative of
7r(Q(p); z) with respect to Q(p),
165
TTJ: probability that unit i is selected,
274
p: ethical parameter, 53, 56
p(p): consumption ratio x% (p) jx\ (p),
107
CT: number of players in coalition ®,
71
ffj,(p): conditional variance of T at
gross income X(p), 147
ay', population variance of y^, 290
crj : variance of y conditional on some
value x, 269
var(/i): variance of fi, 279
var(?/): variance of the population y^j,
286
e: random term, 266
ea(z; a): Gini elasticity of FGT poverty
indices, 217
sy(k; z; a): elasticity of total poverty
with respect to total income
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with growth from compo-
nent A:, 213
sy(z; a): elasticity of total poverty with
respect to total income, 214
?: some positive value, 118
ti: taste parameters, 23, 207
f ( y ) : estimator of f ( y ) , 264
VSD' the design-based estimator of
the sampling variance, 286
f (p, e): equally distributed equivalent
EDE) income, 61
£*(z; p, e): equally distributed equiv-
alent (EDE) income of cen-
sored income, 81
£3 (z): equally distributed (EDE) poverty
gap, 88
f f l ' (z; a): equally distributed equiva-
lent ( EDE) poverty gap for
the un-normalized FGT in-
dices, 86, 88
£j\r(e): equally distributed equivalent
( EDE) incomes for Wjv(e),
149
f]v(e): equally distributed equivalent
( EDE) incomes for Wjj(e),
149
£;j(e): equally distributed equivalent
(EDE) incomes for Wjj(e),
149
C+(s): upper bound of range of poverty
lines over which dominance
holds at order s, 176
c: child parameter in equivalence scale,
32
c: equivalence scale parameter, 169
c: good, 207, 208
c; redistributive costs, 233
q: cost to i of accepting B*, 226
e: expenditure function, 23
e: net income for optimal recipients
of state support, 231
f ( Q ( p ) ) : density of income atp-quantile,
52
f ( k ; z ) : density of income at z for
group k, 201
f(y): density function, 39, 206, 260,
262-264
/ W (y); i-order derivative of function
/, 263
/ft: function of a user-specified FPC
factor, 285
g(p): income growth curve atp, 191,
192
g(p; z): poverty gap at percentile p,
42, 86, 173
ft: bandwidth, 259, 260
ft*: optimal bandwidth, 264
I: proportion of mean as relative poverty
line, 186
Ifj,: proportion of mean as relative poverty
line, 186
l+: upper bound of range of propor-
tions over dominance must
be checked, 184, 188
l+: upper bound of range of propor-
tions over dominance must
be checked, 185
m: the number of LSU, 285
m/jj:the number of selected LSU in
the PSU hi, 284
n(k}\ number of individuals in group
fc,70
n/ji the number of selected PSU in a
stratum h, 284
p: percentile, 49, 50, 52
pt = i/n: percentile corresponding
to ordered observation i, 50
q: percentile, 52
q: price vector, 23, 207
qR: reference prices, 23, 207
qc: price of good c, 207
qhtj'. the number of observations in
selected LSU hij, 284
r: number of randomly selected in-
dividuals from a population,
56
r: percentile, 52
SYMBOLS 381
s: class of indices, 158
s: number of players in set S, 71
s: order of stochastic dominance, 276
s: order of stochastic dominance, 158,
169
s: size parameter in equivalence scale,
31
t: average tax as a proportion of aver-
age gross income, 129
t: population subgroup, 96
t: vector of tax rates, 209
t ( X ) : expected tax at X as a propor-
tion of X, 133
th: random variable, 279, 280
ti\ number of times unit i appears in
a random sample of size n,
274
ti\ tax on/, 211
t;: tax rate on good I, 209-211
t(j): average tax TQ-J over average gross
income X, 146
w(u): weight function, 260
Wi\ the sampling weight of observa-
tion i, 265
WMJ: the sampling weight of LSU hij,
285
xc: consumption of commodity c, 109,
209
xc(q)'. consumption of commodity c
with prices q, 208
xc(y,q}'- expected consumption of
good c at income y when fac-
ing prices q, 208
xc(y,q',$)'- consumption of good c
at income y and preferences
$, when facing prices q, 207
Xhijk- the value of X that appears
in the sample for sample ob-
servation hijk, 285
y: income, 207
y: total nominal expenditure, 23
yR: Equivalent consumption expen-
diture, 23
yR: real income, 207
yi\ income of individual i, 41, 50,
161, 226
yhijk' sum of y in LSU hij, 285
yhi: relevant of y in PSU hi, 285
z: poverty line, 165, 167, 206
z(p): p-quantile of the standardized
normal distribution, 292
z*: poverty line, 119
z&: minimum calorie intake recom-
mended for a healthy life, 114
ZF'. minimal food expenditure neces-
sary for living in good health,
106
ZT\ total poverty line, 106
ZNF'- required non-food expenditures,
106
y: vector of n income levels, 159,
162
y: vector of n income levels, 159,
162
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